



Our ref: CORP F2022/000321
Receipt No: 16490304

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01 November 2022

The Hon Nicola Centofanti MLC
Member of the Legislative Council
Parliament House
ADELAIDE SA 5000

Dear Ms Centofanti

Determination under the *Freedom of Information Act 1991*

I refer to your application made under the *Freedom of Information Act 1991* which was received by the Department of Primary Industries and Regions (PIRSA) on 1 September 2022, seeking access to the following:

"A copy of all documents (including but not limited to hard copy or electronic briefings, minutes, reports, emails, letters, meeting agendas, diary entries, placemats, event attendance records and any other correspondence) between Department of Primary Industries and Regions South Australia and the Minister for Primary Industries and Regional Development (including directly with staff within the office of the Minister for Primary Industries), regarding biosecurity measures in response to the threat of foot and mouth disease."

Timeframe: 21/03/2022 to 31/08/2022

To include "all documents" would potentially reveal a large volume of documents and result in a substantial and unreasonable diversion of agency resources, pursuant to Section 18 of the Freedom of Information Act. Accordingly, on 12 September 2022, PIRSA's Senior Freedom of Information Advisor contacted your office seeking to refine the scope of your application.

Following negotiations with your office, on 19 September 2022, it was confirmed that your application is refined to "briefings, letters and emails" and the timeframe was revised to: 1/06/2022 to 31/08/2022.

Your application was placed on hold for a period of seven days while negotiations on revising the scope were being undertaken. Accordingly, the determination due date was extended to 11 October 2022.

On 4 October 2022, further clarification was sought from your office with respect to whether attachments to emails consisting of Commonwealth Government communications were included in scope. On 6 October 2022, it was confirmed that such documents are included. Accordingly, the determination due date was further extended to 13 October 2022.

To allow time for consultation to be undertaken pursuant to Section 25 of the Freedom of Information Act given an extension under Section 14A was no longer an option, an email was forwarded to your office on 7 October 2022 asking if you would accept an extended due date of 3 November 2022.

The following determination has been finalised.

I have located thirty-eight documents that are captured within the scope of your request.

Determination 1

I have determined that access to the following documents is **granted in full**:

Doc No.	Description of document	No. of Pages
1	Minute from Chief Executive, PIRSA to Minister for Primary Industries and Regional Development dated 4/8/2022 re Foot and Mouth Disease public concerns	3
2	Email from N Rhodes (PIRSA) to L Jones (Office of the Minister for Primary Industries and Regional Development) dated 7/7/2022 re Briefing request concerning Foot and Mouth Disease	1
3	Email from M Doroudi (PIRSA) to Minister for Primary Industries and Regional Development and staff dated 28/7/2022 re FMD virus	1
3a	Attachment to Document 3 – Disinfectants appropriate for inactivation of FMD virus on footwear	1
5	Minute from Chief Executive, PIRSA to Minister for Primary Industries and Regional Development dated 3/8/2022 re support for community-led Foot and Mouth Disease forums	4
6	Email from N Rhodes (PIRSA) to L Jones (Office of the Minister for Primary Industries and Regional Development) dated 25/7/2022 re FMD Countries	1
6a	Attachment to Document 6 – FMD-Free Country List	1
10a	Attachment to Document 10 – Agriculture Senior Officials' Committee Out-of-Session Agenda Paper re National Biosecurity Strategy	3
10b	Attachment to Document 10 – Draft National Biosecurity Strategy	21
10c	Attachment to Document 10 – National Biosecurity Strategy Reference Group	1
10d	Attachment to Document 10 – National Biosecurity Strategy consultation draft – Consultation Summary dated May 2022	13
10e	Attachment to Document 10 - Agriculture Senior Officials' Committee Response to Out-of-Session Agenda Paper re National Biosecurity Strategy	1
12a	Attachment to Document 12 – Presentation titled "Australia's biosecurity threats" dated 20/7/2022	16

13a	Attachment to Document 13 – National Talking Points - Foot-and-mouth disease in Indonesia dated 21/7/2022	8
15	Email from L Jones (Office of the Minister for Primary Industries and Regional Development) to N Rhodes (PIRSA) dated 15/6/2022 re Hansard - FMD	1
15a	Attachment to Document 15 – Hansard proof – Legislative Council dated 14/6/2022 (Cover page and page numbers 464 and 465 re Foot and Mouth Disease)	3
16	Email from N Rhodes (PIRSA) to L Jones (Office of the Minister for Primary Industries and Regional Development) dated 2/8/2022 re Minister's speaking points – LSA webinar	1
16a	Attachment to Document 16 – Livestock SA Emergency Management Animal Disease Industry Forum – Speaking Points	2
17	Email from N Rhodes (PIRSA) to M Spencer (Office of the Minister for Primary Industries and Regional Development) dated 27/7/2022 re National Biosecurity Strategy	1
17a	Attachment to Document 17 – Draft National Biosecurity Strategy 2022-2032	21
18	Email thread between L Jones (Office of the Minister for Primary Industries and Regional Development) and N Rhodes (PIRSA) dated 4/8/2022 re FMD standard response	2
21	Email from M Doroudi (PIRSA) to Minister for Primary Industries and Regional Development dated 15/8/2022 forwarding email from Department of Home Affairs re Southern Australia Exotic Animal Disease Scenario	1
21b	Attachment to Document 21 – Southern Australia Exotic Animal Disease Participant Guide	5
22	Email from L Jones (Office of the Minister for Primary Industries and Regional Development) to N Rhodes (PIRSA) dated 26/7/2022 re FMD interview	1
23	Email from A Barclay (PIRSA) to M Spencer, L Jones (Office of the Minister for Primary Industries and Regional Development) dated 26/8/2022 re FMD weekly update	1

With regard to Document 15a, only page numbers 464 and 465 (and the cover page) are in scope of your application. The remaining forty-seven pages are out of scope and are not attached.

The information removed from Documents 22 and 23 is outside of the scope of your request.

Determination 2

I have determined that access to the following documents is **granted in part**:

Doc No.	Description of document	No. of Pages
11	Email from M Doroudi (PIRSA) to Minister for Primary Industries and Regional Development dated 19/7/2022 forwarding email sent to the Department of the Premier and Cabinet re FMD preparedness activities	4
19	Emails between L Jones (Office of the Minister for Primary Industries and Regional Development) and N Rhodes (PIRSA) dated 11/7/2022 re FMD treatment at Adelaide Airport	2
20	Email thread between M Spencer, L Jones (Office of the Minister for Primary Industries and Regional Development), N Rhodes (PIRSA) dated 4/8/2022 and 5/8/2022 re FMD notes	3

The information removed from the above documents is pursuant to Clause 5(1)(a)(i) of Schedule 1 of the Freedom of Information Act which states:

“5 - Documents affecting inter-governmental or local government relations

(1) A document is an exempt document if it contains matter -

(a) the disclosure of which -

(i) could reasonably be expected to cause damage to intergovernmental relations; and

(b) the disclosure of which would, on balance, be contrary to the public interest.”

In addressing the public interest test requirement for the Clause 5 exemption, I have balanced the following factors:

In favour of the public interest:

- Meeting the objects of the Act favouring access to documents.
- Ensuring optimal use of public resources.
- High level of interest in the accountability of public office holders.
- The importance of transparency and openness and the interest that the public has in the decision-making processes of Government.
- High level of community and media interest in biosecurity risks to Australia.

Contrary to the public interest:

- The recent age of the information and the ongoing relevance of the matters was considered.
- Protecting the interests of the livestock industry, animal health and the community in keeping Australia FMD-free.
- The release of this information would undermine the government's efforts in addressing the biosecurity risk.

- Disclosure of this information would reveal the Commonwealth Government's procedures in dealing with airport arrivals. Knowledge of these details would prejudice the screening and detection measures in place, compromising Australia's response to the biosecurity threat.
- It is expected that disclosure would harm inter-governmental relationships with the Commonwealth Government resulting in agencies reconsidering their position regarding their future interactions with the South Australian Government.

Having considered the various factors weighing for and against disclosure, I have determined that disclosure of this information would, on balance, be contrary to the public interest.

Determination 3

I have determined that access to the following documents is **granted in part**:

Doc No.	Description of document	No. of Pages
7	Email from M Doroudi (PIRSA) to Minister for Primary Industries and Regional Development dated 4/8/2022 forwarding email from Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry re announcement of DAFF/EMA Joint Exotic Animal Disease Preparedness Taskforce	2
7a	Attachment to Document 7 – Media Release from Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry titled "New Taskforce to enhance Australia's Biosecurity Preparedness"	2
8	Email from L Jones (Office of the Minister for Primary Industries and Regional Development) to N Rhodes (PIRSA) dated 9/8/2022 forwarding media release from Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry titled "Inaugural National Biosecurity Strategy released"	3
9	Email from L Jones (Office of the Minister for Primary Industries and Regional Development) to N Rhodes (PIRSA) dated 25/8/2022 forwarding media release titled "Xtra strong biosecurity defences at Adelaide airport"	6
10	Email from M Doroudi (PIRSA) to Minister for Primary Industries and Regional Development dated 13/7/2022 forwarding email from Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry re National Biosecurity Strategy	3
12	Email from N Rhodes (PIRSA) to L Jones (Office of the Minister for Primary Industries and Regional Development) dated 24/7/2022 forwarding email from Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry re AGMIN presentation	3
13	Email from M Doroudi (PIRSA) to M Spencer (Office of the Minister for Primary Industries and Regional Development) and Minister Scriven dated 22/7/2022 forwarding email from Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry re FMD	2

14	Email from N Rhodes (PIRSA) to M Spencer (Office of the Minister for Primary Industries and Regional Development) dated 24/8/2022 forwarding email from Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry re Detector Dogs at Adelaide International	2
21a	Attachment to Document 21 – Southern Australia Exotic Animal Disease: Scenario based discussion - Agenda	3

The information removed from the above documents is pursuant to Clause 6(1) of Schedule 1 of the Freedom of Information Act which states:

“6 - Documents affecting personal affairs

(1) A document is an exempt document if it contains matter the disclosure of which would involve the unreasonable disclosure of information concerning the personal affairs of any person (living or dead).”

The information removed consists of the names of some staff and their contact details of agencies of the Government of the Commonwealth. The password code has been removed from Document 21a.

Pursuant to Section 25 of the Freedom of Information Act, consultation was undertaken with the Australian Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry and consent was not provided to release the information removed as the staff members concerned would not have an expectation that their personal information would be released in this way.

Email addresses of staff from other Australian jurisdictions have also been removed from Documents 7, 10 and 13 given the same expectation.

Accordingly, it is considered that disclosure of this information would be an unreasonable intrusion into the privacy rights of the individuals concerned.

The remaining information removed from Document 10 is outside of the scope of your application.

Determination 4

I have determined that access to the following document is **refused**:

Doc No.	Description of document	No. of Pages
4	Minute from Chief Executive, PIRSA to Minister for Primary Industries and Regional Development dated 12/7/2022	5

Access to the above document is refused pursuant to Clause 7(1)(c) of Schedule 1 of the Freedom of Information Act which states:

“7 – Documents affecting business affairs

*(1) A document is an exempt document –
(c) if it contains matter –*

- (i) *consisting of information (other than trade secrets or information referred to in paragraph (b)) concerning the business, professional, commercial or financial affairs of any agency or any other person; and*
- (ii) *the disclosure of which –*
 - (A) *could reasonably be expected to have an adverse effect on those affairs or to prejudice the future supply of such information to the Government or to an agency; and*
 - (B) *would, on balance, be contrary to the public interest”*

The document consists of a briefing minute to the Minister for Primary Industries and Regional Development containing the business affairs of a third party in relation to a biosecurity proposal.

In addressing the public interest test requirement for the Clause 7(1)(c) exemption, I have balanced the following factors:

In favour of the public interest:

- Meeting the objects of the Act favouring access to documents.
- Ensuring optimal use of public resources.
- High level of interest in the accountability of public office holders.
- The importance of transparency and openness and the interest that the public has in the decision-making processes of Government.
- High level of community and media interest in biosecurity risks to Australia.

Contrary to the public interest:

- Protecting the commercial and business interests of third parties.
- The need to protect the disclosure of proposals submitted to the State Government prior to full consideration.
- The recent age of the document and the ongoing relevance of the matter was considered.
- The release of this information would discourage the organisation concerned and other third parties from engaging with PIRSA to the detriment of the betterment of South Australia.
- Disclosure of this information would be expected to prejudice the future supply of information to Government, as the level of trust in handling such information would be substantially diminished.

Having considered the various factors weighing for and against disclosure, I have determined that disclosure of this document would, on balance, be contrary to the public interest.

If you are dissatisfied with this determination, you are entitled to exercise your right of review and appeal as outlined in the attached documentation <https://archives.sa.gov.au/finding-information/information-held-sa-government/making-freedom-information-application#Review>, by completing the "FOI Application Form for Internal Review of a Determination" and returning the completed form to:

Freedom of Information Principal Officer
Department of Primary Industries and Regions
GPO Box 1671
ADELAIDE SA 5001

or via email PIRSA.FOI@sa.gov.au

In accordance with the requirements of Premier and Cabinet Circular PC045, details of your application, and the documents to which you are given access, will be published in PIRSA's disclosure log. A copy of PC045 can be found at http://dpc.sa.gov.au/data/assets/pdf_file/0019/20818/PC045-Disclosure-Log-Policy.pdf

If you disagree with publication, please advise the undersigned in writing within fourteen calendar days from the date of this determination.

Should you require further information or clarification with respect to this matter, please contact Ms Lisa Farley, Senior Freedom of Information Advisor on 8429 0422 or email PIRSA.FOI@sa.gov.au.

Yours sincerely



Michelle Griffiths
Accredited Freedom of Information Officer
DEPARTMENT OF PRIMARY INDUSTRIES AND REGIONS



Minute to
Minister for Primary Industries and Regional Development
Minister for Forest Industries

Ref: A5549026

For	Signature
Critical Date	Nil
Subject	Foot and Mouth Disease public concerns

Synopsis

Due to the high level of enquiries and the need to direct resourcing towards preparedness activities your agreement is sought to the use of standard replies for enquiries relating to Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD), without the need for a briefing unless a new topic or concern was to arise. Generic standard responses have been drafted for consideration and will be managed by the Minister of Primary Industries and Regional Development's office.

Two draft generic letters have been drafted for consideration:

1. Generic Letters for Airport and Border Restrictions
2. Generic letter regarding SA preparedness advice

Recommendations

That you:

1. Endore the attached generic letters

ENDORSED / NOT ENDORSED

for
CHIEF EXECUTIVE
Department of Primary Industries and Regions

4/8/2022

.....
Hon Clare Scriven MLC
**Minister for Primary Industries
and Regional Development**
Minister for Forest Industries

/ / 2022

Ministerial Comments -

Document ID (9pt font):



Government
of South Australia

The Hon Clare Scriven MLC

Mr/ Mrs First name Surname
Position Title
Company
Address
SUBURB STATE POSTCODE

Email: xxxxxxxxx@xx.xxx.xx (remove hyperlink)

Dear

Thank you for your letter (or email) of (xx March 2022) regarding Foot and Mouth Disease in Indonesia.

The South Australian Government is taking the threat of FMD very seriously. We have a range of measures in place and the Department of Primary Industries and Regions SA (PIRSA) is working closely with Commonwealth and interstate agencies and national and state industry bodies to minimise the risk of incursion.

Staff resources are prioritising preparedness activities and increasing surveillance to ensure an early detection, should an incursion occur. Early detection and rapid response will reduce the spread and minimise the impacts to our rural communities.

I note your concerns regarding the international border and airport arrivals. The Australian Government has strengthened measures and implemented new measures to protect Australia. As border biosecurity activities are the responsibility of the Australian Government you may wish to raise your concerns directly with them if you have not already. For further information on national measures please visit:
<https://www.agriculture.gov.au/biosecurity-trade/pests-diseases-weeds/animal/fmd>

Once again, thank you for writing to me on this very important matter.

Yours sincerely

Hon Clare Scriven MLC
MINISTER FOR PRIMARY INDUSTRIES AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT
MINISTER FOR FOREST INDUSTRIES

/ / 2022

Minister for Primary Industries and Regional Development
Minister for Forest Industries

GPO Box 1671 Adelaide SA 5001
Telephone 08 8226 2931 | Email minister.scriven@sa.gov.au



Document ID (9pt font):



Government
of South Australia

The Hon Clare Scriven MLC

Mr/ Mrs First name Surname
Position Title
Company
Address
SUBURB STATE POSTCODE

Email: xxxxxxxxx@xx.xxx.xx (remove hyperlink)

Dear

Thank you for your letter (or email) of (xx March 2022) regarding your concern about Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD).

The South Australian Government is taking the threat of FMD very seriously. We have a range of measures in place and the Department of Primary Industries and Regions SA (PIRSA) is working closely with national organisations, interstate counterparts and national and state industry to minimise the risk of an incursion.

Staff resources are prioritising preparedness activities and increasing surveillance to ensure an early detection, should an incursion occur. An early detection and rapid response will reduce the spread and minimise the impacts to our rural communities.

Further information regarding FMD can be found on the PIRSA website:
https://www.pir.sa.gov.au/biosecurity/animal_health/cattle/foot_and_mouth_disease

Once again, thank you for taking the time to contact my office on this important issue.

Yours sincerely

Hon Clare Scriven MLC
MINISTER FOR PRIMARY INDUSTRIES AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT
MINISTER FOR FOREST INDUSTRIES

/ / 2022

Minister for Primary Industries and Regional Development
Minister for Forest Industries

GPO Box 1671 Adelaide SA 5001
Telephone 08 8226 2931 | Email minister.scriven@sa.gov.au



Farley, Lisa (PIRSA)

From: Jones, Lucas (PIRSA)
Sent: Thursday, 7 July 2022 12:19 PM
To: Rhodes, Nathan (PIRSA)
Cc: Spencer, Meagan (PIRSA)
Subject: Briefing request.

OFFICIAL

Hi Nathan,

When you are back on board at work, would you be able to organise a briefing on Foot and Mouth disease and Varroa Mite for One Nation Legislative Councillor Sarah Game on the week beginning 25 July?

Regards

Lucas

Lucas Jones | Senior Ministerial Advisor
Office of the Minister for Primary Industries and Regional Development
Office of the Minister for Forest Industries

Level 10, 1 King William Street, Adelaide | GPO Box 1671 Adelaide SA 5001
P: +61 8 8226 2931 | **M:** 0418 927 490 **E:** lucas.jones@sa.gov.au



**Government of
South Australia**

Farley, Lisa (PIRSA)

From: Doroudi, Mehdi (PIRSA)
Sent: Thursday, 28 July 2022 2:57 PM
To: Spencer, Meagan (PIRSA); Jones, Lucas (PIRSA); Scriven, Clare (PIRSA)
Subject: Disinfectants appropriate for inactivation of FMD virus on footwear
Attachments: Attachment A footbaths brief.docx

OFFICIAL

Hi Minister,

Just to correct or clarify what I said yesterday in relation to the use of chemicals in the footbath. PIRSA recommendation is Virkon or citric acid rather than chlorine (as it is too strong to be used for footbath).

Chlorine (bleach) can still be used on an infected premise for FMD to be disinfected.

Sorry for any confusion.

Regards

Mehdi

Attachment A: Disinfectants appropriate for inactivation of FMD virus on footwear

DISINFECTANT	Usual form supplied	Recommended working strength (usual dilution)	Recommended working strength final concentration	Contact time for inactivation	Applications	Other	Health aspects
Virkon	powder	20g/L	2% (w/v)	10 minutes	Excellent disinfectant active against all viruses and bacteria	Expensive for large decontamination exercises, mildly corrosive for many metals	Reasonable care necessary, not approved for use on skin.
Citric Acid	powder	30g/L	3%	15 minutes for non-porous surfaces	Especially useful for FMDV contamination.		Safe for clothes and body decontamination.
Citric Acid	powder	30g/L	3%	30 minutes for porous surfaces		Used extensively during Victorian AI outbreak with no issues	Avoid contact with eyes and skin, wear protective eyewear while preparing the solution
Sodium carbonate-washing soda (Na ₂ CO ₃ ·10H ₂ O)	crystals	100g/L	10% (w/v)	20 minutes	Efficacy is enhanced by addition of detergent. Useful against FMDV contamination	Better disinfectants are usually available for both viruses and bacteria. Avoid use with aluminium and like alloys.	Mildly caustic for eyes and skin. Not recommended
Sodium carbonate anhydrous (Na ₂ CO ₃)	powder	40g/L	4% (w/v)	20 minutes	Recommended for use in presence of high concentrations of organic matter.	Avoid use on aluminium and similar alloys	Caustic for eyes and skin, wear protective eyewear

Additional notes:

- Virkon is a modern disinfectant with outstanding virucidal and antibacterial properties. It is reported to have low toxicity and to be effective against all viruses tested (including members of all known viral families affecting animals), but it has not been approved for use on skin. It is relatively safe to use and comes in a powdered form ideal for dilution at the site of use. It is already available for use in airports.
- The advice in this table about concentrations and times is conservative and is intended to cover as many different emergency situations as possible. Temperature, the presence of organic materials, the nature of surfaces and other factors affect decontamination rates.
- Products effective for decontamination of viruses on the hands and the skin are limited. Virkon is reported to have low toxicity and to be effective against members of all virus families affecting animals, but it has not been approved for use on skin. Alternatively, citric acid or sodium carbonate may be added to washing water to induce antiviral conditions by lowering or raising the pH as appropriate for the agent to be inactivated.
- After adequate cleaning of the contaminated surface, the most critical factor is the time the disinfectant is in contact with the surface. For most applications, disinfectant must flood the surface and keep it thoroughly wet for at **least 10 minutes**.
- Foot baths are generally designed for enclosed footwear (boots, gumboots etc), so need options for travellers wearing open shoes (thongs, sandals)- mats may not be sufficient for this task as the preference would be to avoid skin contact.



Minute to
Minister for Primary Industries and Regional Development
Minister for Forest Industries

Ref: eA197755



For	Noting and Signature
Critical Date	Nil
Subject	The Hon. Nicola Centofanti is seeking support for community-led Foot and Mouth Disease forums

Synopsis

The Hon Nicola Centofanti MLC wrote to you on 29 July 2022 on behalf of Mr Steve Carn, seeking support from the Department of Primary Industries and Regions SA (PIRSA) for several community led forums on Foot and Mouth Disease. Officers from PIRSA have been in contact with Mr Carn and will be attending all planned forums.

Recommendations

That you:

1. Sign the attached letter to Hon Nicola Centofanti MLC

SIGNED / NOT SIGNED

Hon Clare Scriven MLC
**Minister for Primary Industries
and Regional Development**
Minister for Forest Industries

30/8/2022

Ministerial Comments -

Background

- Mr Steve Carn, a proactive producer from Parilla in the South Australian Mallee is assisting Platinum Ag to organise a number of murraylands Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) forums. He spoke with the Hon. Nicola Centofanti to seek support from PIRSA.
- PIRSA officers have been in contact with Platinum Ag and Mr Steve Carn to assist in presenting at their FMD forums.

Discussion

- A number of FMD forums have been arranged by Platinum Ag in the Murraylands.
- PIRSA will have a District Veterinarian and a local Animal Health Adviser in attendance at each forum to provide up to date information in regards to FMD, as well as general biosecurity measures producers should be thinking about.
- PIRSA supports this proactive initiative and will support any community group who invites PIRSA to present on this topic. PIRSA staff are also proactively planning to roll-out further workshops across all regions in South Australia. Presentations will focus on encouraging improved farm biosecurity practices and being alert for disease incursions while ensuring our producers are up-to-date with the perceived risks.

Stakeholder / regional impacts, consultation and engagement

- PIRSA officers have been in contact with the forum organisers and will be presenting at their forums
- Engagement with rural communities is critical to ensure they are aware of the current situation and the part everyone can play in reducing the risks.
- Further engagement in other regions is also being arranged.

Management of key risks

- Nil

Legislative and/or financial implications

- None

Attachments

A. Letter to Hon. Nicola Centofanti MLC



for

CHIEF EXECUTIVE

Department of Primary Industries and Regions

3/8/2022

CONTACT	Nathan Rohdes
POSITION	Executive Director
DIVISION	Biosecurity SA
MOBILE and LANDLINE	0412 376 450
Cleared by	Mary Carr



Government
of South Australia

The Hon Clare Scriven MLC

Hon Nicola Centofanti MLC
Leader of the Opposition in the Legislative Council
Parliament House
North Terrace
ADELAIDE SA 5000

Email: nicola.centofanti@parliament.sa.gov.au

Nicola,
Dear Ms Centofanti

Thank you for your letter of 29 July 2022 regarding the request for support from the Department of Primary Industries and Regions SA (PIRSA) for Mr Steve Carn's community-led forums on Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD).

Officers from PIRSA have been in contact with Mr Carn and will be speaking at the planned forums in the Murraylands. I am encouraged by the proactive approach to raise awareness and educate fellow producers to minimise the risk of an emergency animal disease outbreak.

PIRSA in conjunction with Livestock SA will be providing support to the livestock industry in South Australia regarding FMD preparedness through a range of forums including webinars and producer groups meetings. Presentations will focus on encouraging improved farm biosecurity practices and being alert for disease incursions while ensuring our livestock producers are up to date with the current perceived risks.

Once again, thank you for writing to me on this important issue.

Yours sincerely

A handwritten signature in blue ink that reads "Clare Scriven".

Hon Clare Scriven MLC
MINISTER FOR PRIMARY INDUSTRIES AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT
MINISTER FOR FOREST INDUSTRIES

30/ 8 / 2022

Minister for Primary Industries and Regional Development
Minister for Forest Industries

GPO Box 1671 Adelaide SA 5001
Telephone 08 8226 2931 | Email minister.scriven@sa.gov.au



Farley, Lisa (PIRSA)

From: Rhodes, Nathan (PIRSA)
Sent: Monday, 25 July 2022 8:16 AM
To: Jones, Lucas (PIRSA)
Cc: Doroudi, Mehdi (PIRSA)
Subject: FMD Countries
Attachments: fmd-free-country-list.pdf

OFFICIAL

Hi Lucas

Further to our discussion last night, attached is a list of countries that the Australian Government accepts to be free of Foot and Mouth Disease. By extension, all other countries are not recognised as free of FMD.

There are a whole host of countries that are typical Australian holiday destinations that have FMD, and those travellers routinely fly into various Australian airports. However, in those countries FMD is considered to be under control (albeit still present) whereas Indonesia does not have the disease under any sort of control and therefore the risk is heightened. It is prohibited to bring meat and animal products from all FMD countries into Australia, and the Commonwealth screens passengers for those items at all international airports.

I'll see you for our catch up at 11 – do you want to meet at 1KW or PH?

Regards, Nathan

Nathan Rhodes | Executive Director

Biosecurity | **Department of Primary Industries and Regions**

Government of South Australia | 33 Flemington Street, GLENSIDE SA 5065

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P: +61 8 429 3135 | **M:** +61 412 376 450 | **E:** nathan.rhodes@sa.gov.au

pir.sa.gov.au



Government of South Australia

Department of Primary Industries
and Regions

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Disclaimer: The information in this e-mail may be confidential and/or legally privileged. Use or disclosure of the information by anyone other than the intended recipient is prohibited and may be unlawful.



FMD-Free Country List

This list is referenced in section 6 of the *Biosecurity (Conditionally Non-prohibited Goods) Determination 2021*.

<u>Country</u>	<u>Country</u>	<u>Country</u>
Austria	Australia	Belgium
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Canada	Chile
Croatia	Cyprus	Czechia (Czech Republic)
Denmark	Estonia	Finland
Republic of North Macedonia	France	Germany
Greece	Hungary	Iceland
Ireland	Italy	Japan
Latvia	Lithuania	Luxembourg
Malta	Mexico	Montenegro
Netherlands	New Caledonia	New Zealand
Norway	Poland	Portugal
Romania	Serbia	Singapore
Slovakia	Slovenia	Spain
Sweden	Switzerland	United Kingdom
United States of America	Vanuatu	

OFFICIAL

AGRICULTURE SENIOR OFFICIALS' COMMITTEE**OUT-OF-SESSION AGENDA PAPER—AGSOC OOS 07/2022****DUE BY MIDDAY FRIDAY, 15 JULY 2022****NATIONAL BIOSECURITY STRATEGY****RECOMMENDATIONS**

That senior officials:

1. **ENDORSE** the draft national biosecurity strategy at Attachment A, noting that the existing avian influenza case study is being replaced with a foot and mouth disease case study that will be circulated as soon as possible.
2. **NOTE**, if the strategy is endorsed, proposed next steps for implementation.
3. **ENDORSE** the proposed arrangements for the strategy launch and broader stakeholder endorsement.
4. **AGREE** to a paper progressing to ministers with the same recommendations and content for endorsement at the Agriculture Ministers' Meeting on 20 July 2022.

KEY ISSUES

1. The final draft of the national biosecurity strategy (Attachment A) is ready for endorsement, following agreement to the draft by the National Biosecurity Committee (NBC). Following your endorsement, this version with necessary adjustments to case studies to ensure currency will be provided to agriculture ministers for their consideration.
2. Agriculture ministers agreed to progress a national biosecurity strategy in June 2021. The strategy has been developed by the NBC, with the assistance of PricewaterhouseCoopers and input from a stakeholder reference group (membership at Attachment B).
3. Australia's first national biosecurity strategy sets out priorities and actions to drive coordinated reform and investment, to ensure our biosecurity system is well-positioned to meet growing risks and challenges.
 - a. It goes beyond specific jurisdictional or sectoral interests - and will not replace or supplant existing strategies, but rather build on and complement work already underway, and guide future related strategies.
4. The draft strategy outlines a vision, purpose and six priority areas to build a stronger, more connected and resilient national biosecurity system into the future. It also includes initial actions to deliver on these priority areas, which will be further developed and added to in the foreshadowed implementation planning stage.
5. This draft reflects feedback and input from the stakeholder reference group and two phases of public consultation. An initial consultation phase was undertaken in October-November 2021 to inform the direction of the overall strategy, including its priority

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areas and possible inclusions. The outcomes of this phase were used to develop a consultation draft, which was released in February 2022 for public comment.

- a. Reaction to the consultation draft was largely positive, with stakeholders welcoming a national strategy and the opportunity to help shape the final version. The strategic direction, purpose and priority areas were generally well supported. Stakeholders indicated the actions should be more specific and emphasised the importance of a robust implementation approach with associated funding.
- b. A summary of feedback and list of submissions (136 submissions were received in total) can be found at Attachment C.

Implementation planning

6. The proposed implementation approach outlined in the final draft strategy includes a steering committee (consisting of government and non-government stakeholders) operating with NBC oversight, working groups for each priority area to contribute to action planning, and a strategy implementation team to provide ongoing project management support. An implementation plan and national action plan will be developed over a 6 to 12 month planning stage.
 - a. This approach provides for a clear and active role for non-government stakeholders (reflecting stakeholder feedback), with the NBC retaining overall oversight and decision-making authority given potential funding and regulatory implications.
7. There is an expectation from stakeholders that once the strategy is endorsed by ministers, implementation planning will start immediately and will not be a prolonged process – with stakeholders keen to see early outcomes and tangible results from this work.
 - a. Serious biosecurity threats such as foot-and-mouth disease and lumpy skin disease will enhance this expectation – and inform prioritisation of our early efforts.
 - b. A focus will be on those initial actions that align with our more immediate biosecurity priorities – as well as those we see as providing quick wins. However, this will not overshadow the more systemic nature of this agenda.
8. Implementation will require a commitment from all governments. The proposed implementation governance approach will require dedicated and ongoing resourcing from jurisdictions to deliver a realistic plan. This is separate to seeking to agree and fund specific reforms.
 - a. The previous Australian Government Minister for Agriculture wrote to state and territory agriculture ministers in early April seeking their views on implementation matters, including governance options and shared funding arrangements. No responses were received.
9. Implementation resourcing and funding will be a key issue for the credibility and value of the strategy. Further, not all activities can or should involve government efforts only. The priority area of sustainable investment included in the strategy is also, in part, a key enabler of other priority areas.

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10. NBC is considering implementation planning and accountability, in anticipation of an endorsed strategy. Further details will be provided once the strategy is endorsed in-principle. This will include detail on quick wins and those priority actions we aim to progress in the first instance.

Stakeholder endorsement and public launch

11. It is proposed a ministerial foreword and signature page – involving all ministers - will be included in the strategy. This will be developed in consultation with ministers' offices once the strategy has been agreed.
12. The strategy, once agreed by ministers, will be shared with key stakeholders ahead of a formal launch to garner their support and public endorsement on release.
 - a. An opportunity exists for expressions of stakeholder support to be formally captured in the strategy through inclusion of an endorsement page – further emphasising that the strategy is to guide and invigorate the efforts of all system participants, not just governments.
 - b. If ministers are agreeable to this, NBC will gauge the interest of key stakeholders, including reference group members, ahead of finalising the document for release and publication.
 - c. Consideration could also be given to extending this offer to ministers with responsibility for environmental matters, to underscore that biosecurity has broader implications than just agriculture and trade.
13. Jurisdictions, coordinated through NBC, will work with their ministers to confirm preferences and arrangements for the launch of the strategy.
14. A national communication and engagement strategy will also be prepared to support these activities, and a dedicated webpage created (potentially on the reinvigorated biosecurity.gov.au website) to host the final strategy and related information on planning, implementation and engagement.

Financial Implications

15. Dedicated and ongoing resourcing (staff and monetary) will be required to implement the strategy.

FOR DECISION

Attachment A: National biosecurity strategy – final draft

Attachment B: National Biosecurity Strategy Reference Group

Attachment C: Summary of consultation draft feedback

National Biosecurity Committee

July 2022

DRAFT

Doc 10b

NATIONAL BIOSECURITY STRATEGY


Connected

Resilient

Shared



20XX-20XX



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Acknowledgement of Country
We acknowledge the Traditional Custodians of Australia and their continuing connection to land and sea, waters, environment and community. We pay our respects to the Traditional Custodians of the lands we live and work on, their culture, and their Elders past and present.

Ministerial foreword

Drafting note: Ministerial foreword / statement from relevant ministers to be inserted following approval of final strategy

Opportunity for foreword to also highlight current threats - such as FMD and LSD - and how the strategy will contribute to addressing these. Foreword will also need to acknowledge the Reference Group

NATIONAL BIOSECURITY STRATEGY REFERENCE GROUP

Australian Banana Growers' Council	National Farmers' Federation
CSIRO	Seafood Industry Australia
Freight and Trade Alliance	Torres Strait Regional Authority
Invasive Species Council	Rural Research and Development Corporations representative – Australian Pork Limited

Purpose of the National Biosecurity Strategy

WHAT IS THE NATIONAL BIOSECURITY STRATEGY?

The biosecurity risks facing us are becoming increasingly complex and harder to manage. In this challenging and changing environment, we need to continually evolve our system to ensure our biosecurity remains strong.

The National Biosecurity Strategy guides this evolution.

Our national system is greater than the sum of its parts. It's a multilayered network of people, critical infrastructure and technology, partnerships, processes and regulatory activities that function cohesively overseas, at our border and within Australia to protect our national interests.

Our strategy builds from this solid foundation, uniting us behind a collective vision and purpose to enhance the significant capability already within our biosecurity system.

As we all share the benefits of our biosecurity system, we all have a valuable role to play in supporting it. This strategy is designed to help us to work more effectively together, driving improved collaboration, innovation, awareness and behavioural changes at local, regional, national and international levels.

This strategy outlines the current and future biosecurity environment and includes priority areas with initial actions for implementation. Importantly, it also sets the approach for us to work together to develop additional actions, drive its implementation and monitor our progress.

This strategy's scope covers exotic and established pests, weeds and diseases, including zoonotic diseases, but does not extend to human biosecurity.

It is informed by, and builds on, existing strategies and plans and the considerable efforts already being undertaken by the Australian, state and territory governments, industry, Indigenous Australians, landowners and managers, environmental groups and the community. The strategy was developed in consultation with these stakeholders, overseen by the National Biosecurity Committee (NBC).

Our 10-year strategy is a living document that will be reviewed every 5 years or sooner if there is a significant change to the risks, challenges or opportunities facing us.



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

EVOLVING AUSTRALIA'S BIOSECURITY SYSTEM

Our land, air, seas and waterways are deeply interwoven with our way of life – our people, environment and economy – which is why our biosecurity system is so valuable.

It's what protects us and the communities we live in from the harmful impacts of exotic and established pests, weeds and diseases. Even a single outbreak can have potentially devastating, costly and far-reaching impacts for Australia.

While our biosecurity system has served us well, biosecurity risks are growing and increasing in complexity, driven by factors such as climate change, unpredictable trade and travel patterns and changes in land use.

More than ever before – as highlighted by the presence of both foot-and-mouth disease and lumpy skin disease on our doorstep – we are dealing with multiple risks, on multiple fronts, at the same time.

To ensure we continue to meet the challenges of today and tomorrow, we must act now and evolve how we work together.

OUR VISION

FOR AUSTRALIA'S FUTURE BIOSECURITY SYSTEM

A biosecurity system that protects Australia and our way of life –

Connected

Resilient

Shared

SHARED PURPOSE BRINGING US TOGETHER

A risk-based system underpinned by science that protects Australia's people, our environment, economy and lifestyle from the biosecurity threats of today and tomorrow.

6 PRIORITY AREAS TO EVOLVE OUR SYSTEM

To achieve our vision and purpose, we will act in 6 priority areas. Our 6 priority areas have guided the development of initial actions and will help us to focus our efforts in the areas with the biggest impact.



Shared biosecurity culture

We will enhance our **culture of biosecurity action** so that everyone understands its importance and plays their part.



Stronger partnerships

We will strengthen and expand **partnerships and networks** between all stakeholders at local, regional, national and international levels.



Highly skilled workforce

We will develop and sustain a **highly skilled workforce** to ensure we have the right capability and capacity, in the right place, at the right time.



Coordinated preparedness and response

We will boost our system's **adaptability and its capacity** to prevent, detect, manage, respond to and recover from outbreaks.



Sustainable investment

We will ensure **funding and investment** is sufficient, co-funded, transparent, targeted to our priorities and sustainable for the long term.



Integration supported by technology, research and data

We will create a more **connected, efficient and science-based** system to facilitate more timely, informed and risk-based decisions.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

WE WILL TAKE ACTION IN OUR 6 PRIORITY AREAS



Shared biosecurity culture

Build on and develop national awareness and education programs

Drive positive biosecurity behaviours and incentivise compliance

Revitalise national communication, engagement and reporting mechanisms

Determine opportunities to embed biosecurity as a consideration into broader decision-making, risk and business planning



Stronger partnerships

Enhance partnerships and engagement with Indigenous Australians

Collaboratively review and refine roles and responsibilities

Review governance arrangements to ensure they include relevant stakeholders

Strengthen the involvement of environmental agencies and environmental and community groups

Identify and implement opportunities for greater industry and community involvement in decision-making bodies

Deepen international partnerships and capacity building

Strengthen understanding of antimicrobial and pesticide resistance and zoonotic pathways

Coordinate our international advocacy efforts to help shape global standards, rules and conditions



Highly skilled workforce

Identify current and future skills needs in key areas

Develop a national workforce strategy to build, retain and deploy capability

Build upon and expand existing cooperative and partnership arrangements

Strengthen professional development programs



Sustainable investment

Work together to identify funding needs and determine priorities

Strengthen frameworks to agree and deliver priority investments

Advance co-funding and investment strategies with stakeholders

Increase the transparency of biosecurity funding

Complete the development of a system performance and evaluation framework



Coordinated preparedness and response

Undertake and promote regular national preparedness exercises

Advance regionally based planning activities

Continually review and update risk information to inform priorities

Actively embed continuous learning

Strengthen traceability arrangements

Enhance our national surveillance and early detection arrangements

Evolve our national information management frameworks



Integration supported by technology, research and data

Continue to invest in and roll out transformative technologies to digitise and automate processes

Increase stakeholder coordination to prioritise, drive and deliver national research outcomes

Actively share data and research widely

Enhance the accessibility and use of surveillance and interception data

Further support innovations to build science and research capacity

Encourage the uptake of existing and emerging technologies, systems and processes

Increase the use of citizen science, Indigenous knowledge and on the ground insights

Encourage greater private sector investment in the development and delivery of biosecurity innovations

OUR WAY FORWARD DRIVING COLLABORATIVE ACTION

More than 30 initial actions across our 6 priority areas have been developed in collaboration with stakeholders.

Our next steps will be to:

- identify those initial actions that can be implemented immediately
- design a national implementation plan that sets out governance arrangements and guides future planning
- develop a national action plan that builds upon our initial actions and establishes a framework for monitoring and evaluation to keep us accountable.

As we all share in the success of our biosecurity system, a diverse range of stakeholders will be involved in developing, delivering and reviewing progress against the national action plan.

The plan will also be complemented by sector based, regional or other action plans developed by stakeholders.

The NBC will ultimately oversee the strategy's implementation, working with a National Biosecurity Strategy Implementation Committee comprised of biosecurity stakeholders.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

WHAT IS BIOSECURITY?

Australia is free from many harmful pests, weeds and diseases found elsewhere in the world. Our animal, plant, human and environmental health outcomes rely on strong biosecurity – that is, the controls and measures to manage the risk of these pests, weeds and diseases entering, emerging, establishing or spreading within Australia.

KEY BIOSECURITY TERMS

EXOTIC

A pest, weed or disease that is not currently known to be present in Australia, or, if present, is subject to a nationally agreed eradication program.


ESTABLISHED

A self-sustaining pest, weed or disease that occurs in Australia and is not regarded as eradicable. An established pest, weed or disease may be widely distributed across Australia or regionally distributed. A regionally distributed established pest, weed or disease may be the subject of management measures to mitigate further spread.

THE REACH AND IMPACT OF OUR BIOSECURITY SYSTEM

SCALE OF BIOSECURITY ACTIVITY ACROSS AUSTRALIA

 **115m**
mail items received on average each year over five years (2016-17 to 2020-21)

 **2.6m**
shipping containers arrived in Australia (2020-21)


 **OVER 15,100**
inspections were conducted on international vessels (2020-21)

 **OVER 2,600**
detections made post-biosecurity control (2020-21)

SAFEGUARDING AUSTRALIA'S INDUSTRIES, ENVIRONMENT, LIVELIHOODS AND WAY OF LIFE

 **1.6m**
jobs across the agricultural supply chain


 **\$251.5b**
total flow of benefits per year arising from assets vulnerable to biosecurity hazards, including infrastructure, agriculture, forestry and seafood industries and companion animals (2021 estimate)

 **\$73.5b**
in gross value of agricultural, forestry and seafood production (2020-21 estimate)


 **\$52.3b**
in agricultural, forestry and seafood exports (2020-21 estimate)


 **\$50.4b**
direct tourism contribution to Australia's GDP (2019-20 estimate)


ACTUAL AND POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF OUTBREAKS AND INCURSIONS

 **\$80b**
direct economic impact to Australia over 10 years in present value terms in the event of a large multi-state foot-and-mouth disease outbreak (2020-21 estimate)

 **\$5b**
annual cost to Australia for weed control measures and lost production (2018 estimate)

 **\$1.3b**
potential cost to our producers and consumers of pollination-dependent crops over 30 years in the event of a varroa mite incursion (2012 estimate)

 **\$390b**
cost of damages due to invasive species over the past 6 decades (2021 estimate)

 **MORE THAN 380 NATIVE SPECIES**
of plants have proved capable of being infected by myrtle rust, with this number likely to grow (2020 estimate)

 **\$7.8-11.1b**
potential cost to Australian horticultural industries over 50 years in present value terms if a worst-case *Xylella fastidiosa* incursion occurred (2021 estimate)

Why Australia needs biosecurity

We all enjoy the benefits of biosecurity. It's what protects our plants, animals and ecosystems, enables us to generate high-quality primary produce, provides access to export markets and supports our trusted international reputation with trading partners.

Strong biosecurity also supports other strategic priorities for Australia, from bioterrorism and national security, through to pandemic management and global food security.

As the risk landscape rapidly changes, our natural and productive ecosystems are becoming increasingly vulnerable to biosecurity risks. These risks can devastate native wildlife, impact our agricultural, seafood and forestry industries and compromise our clean air, water and land.

Even though our biosecurity system has served us well, we face the challenge of managing a range of growing and changing threats. We can't reduce our biosecurity risk to zero and even a single outbreak has the potential to affect our prosperity, environment, national security, ability to trade and way of life.

Pest, weed and disease outbreaks can potentially lead to:

- devastating impacts to agricultural and horticultural industries and their supply chains through lower yields or damage to crops, produce, livestock or fisheries, as well as increased costs for protection, response or ongoing management activities. These costs are often passed onto customers.
- damage to our unique natural environment and ecosystems, plants and animals.
- an inability for Australian primary producers to access export markets, as well as possible reputational damage to our premium, high-quality produce.
- detrimental impacts to land and sea Country of value to Indigenous Australians and the wider community.
- delays in access to essential produce due to supply chain disruptions and the impact of biosecurity response activities on stock levels or distribution channels.
- negative impacts on our amenity, cultural heritage, way of life and human health. COVID-19, for example, demonstrated the significant impact zoonoses can have on our health, economy and day-to-day lives.

A strong, resilient and adaptable biosecurity system is critical to ensure we manage these increasingly complex risks.



HIGHLY PATHOGENIC AVIAN INFLUENZA

Highly pathogenic avian influenza (AI), also known as bird flu, is a highly contagious viral infection of birds that can cause severe symptoms and sudden death in poultry. It is generally introduced by infected migratory birds and can be particularly disruptive to chicken, duck, emu and turkey farms, requiring the culling of infected flocks.

A single outbreak of AI could have significant economic impacts and restrict market access for Australian poultry products. Some forms of AI can also have human health impacts, causing influenza in exposed humans.

The Australian, state and territory governments, together with the egg and poultry meat industries, have rapid and effective emergency response plans in place to manage potential outbreaks.

These arrangements were tested in 2020 during the height of Victoria's COVID-19 related lockdowns when an outbreak of AI occurred on six farms. It triggered one of Australia's largest biosecurity emergency responses and demonstrated the critical importance of our people, technology and preparedness arrangements.

The eradication work ran for 9 months with over 340 people involved and included almost 1,400 surveillance visits, as well as significant diagnostic and laboratory testing, at an estimated total cost of \$22 million. This cost was a fraction of the potential losses facing industry if the outbreak had spread further.

Highly pathogenic AI was successfully eradicated from all affected farms in February 2021 and Australia formally regained its AI (notifiable) free status.

KEY – IMPACTS

- Amenity
- Economy
- Environment

KEY – PRIORITIES

- Shared biosecurity culture
- Highly skilled workforce
- Sustainable investment
- Stronger partnerships
- Coordinated preparedness and response
- Integration supported by technology, research and data

How our biosecurity system works

Australia's biosecurity system is multilayered with prevention, management and response activities undertaken overseas, at and within our borders, including our external territories. Our system relies heavily on the support of all stakeholders, such as governments, industry, research organisations, agricultural and environmental groups, Indigenous communities and individuals.

Without strong partnerships at all levels, we can't have a strong biosecurity system.

OVERSEAS

The Australian Government and importers work with overseas counterparts to identify and mitigate biosecurity risks before they reach our border, while also undertaking capacity building activities, including in the Indo-Pacific region, to further our biosecurity, trade, security and national interests. Officials facilitate trade in line with our international obligations, apply import conditions and controls, and engage in risk and intelligence gathering, analysis and horizon scanning. Our overseas partners and industry provide vital intelligence on risks and traceability of products to support this work.


AT OUR BORDER

Robust regulatory, surveillance and quarantine arrangements are in place to prevent, detect and intercept risks at our national border before they can do us harm. The Australian Government operates border controls, including screening, assessment, inspections and quarantine processes, to support this effort. Travellers have a role to play through their awareness of the importance of biosecurity and declaring goods if required. Industry also helps to protect us by having systems in place to proactively manage risks, applying treatments where needed and participating in surveillance activities.


WITHIN AUSTRALIA

Industry, governments, Natural Resource Management (NRM) organisations, environmental groups, landowners and managers and the wider community work at regional and local levels to prevent, plan for, detect and respond to outbreaks. The Australian, state and territory governments lead regulatory activities. Industry and governments coordinate and fund management and response activities under a range of deeds and agreements and all system participants work together on the ground to reduce the possibility and impact of further spread within and across borders. The general public plays a critical role in surveillance and the reporting of pest, weed and disease outbreaks. Research organisations work to enhance our understanding of biosecurity risks and examine new approaches to improve our system in areas like diagnostics, containment and treatments.

Our biosecurity system includes a wide range of stakeholders, from Traditional Owners, veterinarians, park rangers, landowners, farmers, entomologists and many more. The [National Biosecurity Statement](#) (2018) provided an overview of stakeholder roles and the national strategy builds from this strong foundation. One of our initial actions will see us work together to ensure everyone's roles are clear and reflect the future needs of our system.



OUR BIOSECURITY SYSTEM IN ACTION



RESPONSIBILITIES

- Australian Government
- State, territory and local governments
- ▲ Industry
- ◆ Research organisations
- ◆ Representative bodies (e.g. peak bodies, NRM organisations, environmental and community groups etc.)
- ◆ Individuals and communities

Biosecurity activity categories sourced from Centre of Excellence for Biosecurity Risk Analysis (CEBRA), Year 1 Report: Valuing Australia's Biosecurity System, Project 1607A – Milestone 6, 28 November 2017, University of Melbourne.

KHAPRA BEETLE

PEST, WEED AND DISEASE
OUTBREAKS CAN HAVE
FAR-REACHING IMPACTS

KHAPRA BEETLE COULD COST
AUSTRALIA
\$15.5B OVER 20 YEARS
IF IT BECAME ESTABLISHED
(2014 ESTIMATE)

**In 2020-21, responses to 20 interceptions
of the khapra beetle (*Trogoderma granarium*)
were managed across Australia.**

Changes in global trade patterns, such as increased volumes of goods, container movements and declining container hygiene are some of the drivers of recent increases in khapra beetle interceptions.

KHAPRA BEETLE

Smaller than a grain of rice, khapra beetle is a serious pest that can contaminate stored grains, rice, oilseeds and dried foodstuffs. It is not established in Australia. Khapra beetle can cause losses of up to 75% from direct feeding. Infested produce also becomes contaminated with beetles, cast skins and hairs from larvae, which can pose a health risk and are difficult to remove from storage structures and transport vessels.

If it were to establish here, many of our trading partners would refuse to buy our stored produce, particularly grains. Given Australia exports 65 to 75% of the grain we grow to more than 50 countries, this could cause significant economic losses.

Responding to a khapra beetle (or another exotic pest, weed or disease) outbreak can have wide ranging impacts across the supply chain.

AUSTRALIA
EXPORTS
65-75%
OF THE GRAIN
WE GROW

EXPORTING
TO MORE THAN
50
COUNTRIES

THE KHAPRA BEETLE IS SMALLER
THAN A GRAIN OF RICE

Image: *Khapra beetle adult and
larva on grains of rice*



**AFFECTED CUSTOMERS
HAD THEIR PURCHASES
REPLACED AND THE GOODS
WERE FUMIGATED**

The incident affected around 300 retail customers across Australia who had their homes and cars inspected and treated with insecticides, with some of their food and pet food collected for destruction. This response prevented the pest from establishing in Australia which could have been severely damaging to our domestic grain producers.



**IMMEDIATE ACTION WAS
TAKEN ACROSS OUR
BIOSECURITY SYSTEM**

The retailer worked closely with the Australian Government to remove the goods that were in this consignment from sale across Australia. It secured those goods that had made their way through the supply chain – from the port to the warehouse, to the distributor, to retailers and to customers' homes.



**OCTOBER 2020
A DETECTION IN
IMPORTED GOODS**

The Australian, state and territory governments began investigating and managing a detection of khapra beetle in a container of goods imported by a large retailer. This detection was initially reported by a member of the public who found khapra beetle in packaging material and notified biosecurity officials.

**FURTHER BIOSECURITY
MEASURES WERE
IMPLEMENTED**

Additional urgent measures were developed by the Australian Government in consultation with industry to better safeguard our agricultural sector and economy. This included stricter import conditions for high-risk goods and changes to container management. State and territory governments continue to undertake further monitoring and surveillance activities.

We are facing a changing biosecurity environment

Managing biosecurity risks is becoming more complicated as we face a range of compounding challenges on multiple fronts.

CHANGING OR INCREASING BIOSECURITY RISKS



> CLIMATE CHANGE

is impacting the global environment, causing changes in weather patterns and more extreme weather events. It is altering the habitat, range and distribution of many pests, weeds and diseases, as well as increasing their ability to spread and establish in new areas.

For example, the buffalo fly, a harmful parasite that can irritate beef cattle, interrupt feeding and cause sores, is already present in Australia's north and has been moving further south as the climate changes. It is predicted that it will establish itself in South Australia and Western Australia by 2030.

Established pests, weeds and diseases reduce the ability of our natural ecosystems, plants and animals to cope with changing climatic conditions. As climate change increasingly affects global plant and animal habitats, it will have flow-on impacts for biosecurity risks associated with changes in trade and travel patterns and the effectiveness of our existing control measures.



> SHIFTING TRADE AND TRAVEL PATTERNS

have seen Australia's supply chains, trading partners and demand for goods continuously evolve and increase in complexity. This is changing the biosecurity risks reaching our international and domestic borders, while impacting how we work with trading partners and each other.

The increased movement of people, equipment and goods increases biosecurity risks, by providing more opportunities for pests, weeds and diseases to spread. Within Australia, interstate road freight is predicted to increase by 1.7% every year until 2030. Additionally, predicted increases in trade and vessel movements will result in a greater likelihood of the introduction of marine pests like Asian green mussel (*Perna viridis*), which poses a serious threat to our aquaculture, native species and ability to export seafood.



> DECREASING BIODIVERSITY

driven by invasive species, climate change and changing land uses weakens the resilience of our ecosystems to future outbreaks. It is estimated that 8 out of 10 land-based threatened species are at risk due to invasive species. This is a growing problem in Australia, and for our external territories, which have unique and fragile ecosystems.

Around 20 new weed species are unintentionally introduced or become unmanaged populations each year, displacing native plant life and changing entire ecosystems, while creating fuel for bushfires and choking our waterways.

Additionally, the loss of genetic diversity in certain crops such as bananas, which are 95% Cavendish variety in Australia, exposes us to higher levels of risk in the event of a pest, weed or disease outbreak.



> CHANGING LAND USES

are altering the interface between urban and non-urban areas and the environment. As our population grows and spreads, it brings people closer to wildlife, natural habitats and agricultural areas, potentially increasing biosecurity risks. COVID-19 restrictions have accelerated this change in some areas, acting as a driver for Australians to relocate from our cities to regional centres in search of a different lifestyle.

As cities grow and peri-urban environments change, the risk of the introduction and spread of pests, weeds and diseases may increase through land development, habitat loss and the movement of people and goods into new areas. These changes to our urban and natural environment will also expose new people to biosecurity who may have limited awareness of its importance.



> INCREASING BIOSECURITY RISKS OVERSEAS

including in the Indo-Pacific, make us more susceptible to pests, weeds and diseases entering Australia. We have so far kept out many high-risk animal diseases such as rabies, foot-and-mouth disease, lumpy skin disease and African swine fever. These diseases have the potential to spread rapidly and will have devastating impacts if they were to enter Australia due to the movement and location of livestock and the presence of pest animals, like feral pigs. Geographically some of these diseases are only 5 km from Australian shores, with the movement of people, goods and marine infrastructure creating additional risk.

Climate change is altering the movement patterns of some species and increasing arrival risks through natural pathways like wind and tide. Pests such as fall armyworm, citrus canker, fruit flies and rust species can be wind borne, making them harder to track and limiting prevention and risk management options.

Australia's vast northern coastline is the frontline for many of these risks, with modern biosecurity infrastructure, trained people and strong surveillance activities critical to protecting our nation.



> ILLEGAL ACTIVITY

has increased in recent years, leading to a higher risk of biosecurity threats. The growth and increasing complexity of trade and online shopping – exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic – has inadvertently opened new pathways for illegal plants and animals to reach Australia, impacting biosecurity risks. The increasingly lucrative illegal trade in plants and animals was valued at US\$7-23 billion per year globally in 2016.

Additionally, increasing illegal fishing practices heighten the risk of exotic marine animals invading Australian waters, with poorly maintained vessels often harbouring marine pests on their infrastructure above and below the waterline.



> MAJOR GLOBAL DISRUPTIONS

such as the COVID-19 pandemic, can shock supply chains and impact the movement of goods and people. While these changes are often temporary, they can act as a catalyst for permanent changes in behaviour and supply chain pathways. For example, retailers may seek to change or diversify suppliers to improve supply chain reliability and manage business continuity risks. Other global events, such as war and natural disasters, can also impact trade and pathways, increasing or changing the biosecurity risks that can reach our border. System resilience, adaptability and responsiveness are critical to maintaining strong biosecurity in the face of an uncertain and changing environment.



Image: Alex Wild

ELECTRIC ANTS

Electric ants (*Wasmannia auropunctata*) are one of the world's most invasive pests. Native to Central and South America, they can damage our environment, agricultural crops and impact our ability to use domestic gardens and pools, public parks and other community amenities.

Electric ants have a painful sting and can even blind pets and other animals. Their presence can cause the decline of native insects and small animals, with dense infestations having the potential to reduce overall biodiversity. Electric ants damage plants and destroy electrical equipment and farm machinery. They collect honeydew from sap sucking insects, such as aphids, which can impact agricultural crops. Electric ants tend to nest under leaf debris and stones, in or under potted plants or rotten limbs, or in trees, but they can also nest in houses, infest beds, furniture and food.

The National Electric Ant Eradication Program is currently working to eradicate the ants from Queensland. The program uses a variety of baits and surveillance methods to detect the ants, such as traps, lures, odour detection dogs and community surveillance. Community engagement is an important part of the program as ants are mostly spread through human-assisted means, like the movement of pot plants, garden furniture, produce, equipment and machinery or the dumping of garden waste. The program works closely with industry and community partners to increase awareness and prevent further spread.

KEY – IMPACTS



KEY – PRIORITIES



LUMPY SKIN DISEASE

Lumpy skin disease (LSD) is a highly infectious disease of cattle and water buffalo. It can cause painful skin lesions on infected animals, with animal health, welfare and production impacts. The disease is spread primarily by biting insects like flies, mosquitos and ticks – and can also be spread by contaminated equipment.

LSD is not currently present in Australia. However, it poses a serious and increasing threat given its rapid spread throughout Asia and its ability to be transmitted by wind borne insects. If LSD reaches our shores it will significantly impact domestic and international trade and cause severe economic losses for our cattle and water buffalo industries. If wild buffalo populations and cattle in northern Australia's extensive rangelands were exposed to LSD, reservoirs of the virus could establish, making eradication extremely difficult.

Biosecurity stakeholders are working closely together to prepare for an outbreak of LSD. Efforts are being focused in northern Australia, and include enhanced



surveillance activities, dedicated public awareness campaigns, training of producers and Indigenous and park rangers, additional animal inspections, partnering with Indigenous landowners and more.

The Australian Government is also supporting our near neighbours in their ongoing efforts to prevent and control the spread of LSD within the region.

CHARRU MUSSEL

The charru mussel (*Mytella strigata*) is an exotic marine pest not present in Australia that is spread through international shipping and threatens Australia's unique marine ecosystems and economy. The mussel forms dense clusters that outcompete native marine species, impact aquaculture production, damage infrastructure and foul vessels.

Native to the waters of South and Central America, the charru mussel has spread rapidly through North America and Asia. Like many marine pests, charru mussels can hitch a ride on boats and ships, either as biofouling or as larvae in a ship's ballast water. Charru mussels have been detected on vessels heading to Australia but have been successfully eradicated.

A combination of national regulations and surveillance activities are used to keep this pest out of Australian waters. As a further line of defence to prevent the



introduction of this and other marine pests, surveillance programs are also run by Australian, state and territory governments around the country.

Innovative tools like underwater drones and analysis of environmental DNA are used to support these activities. National education and engagement activities are employed to engage communities and users of Australia's vast coastline and marine environments in biosecurity.

VARROA MITE

Internal and external mites of bees, including varroa mite (*Varroa destructor* and *Varroa jacobsoni*) are National Priority Plant Pests. Varroa mite, particularly *Varroa destructor*, weakens and eventually kills European honeybees (*Apis mellifera*). An outbreak could have significant repercussions for our economy, potentially costing producers and consumers of pollination-dependent crops – like almonds and pears – \$1.3 billion over 30 years (2012 estimate).

Australia is currently the only inhabited continent to successfully prevent the pest from establishing itself. While varroa mites have been detected on recently arrived bee swarms several times at ports across Australia, such as at the Port of Townsville (2016, 2019, 2020 – *Varroa jacobsoni*) and the Port of Melbourne (2018 – *Varroa destructor*), each time the swarms and the mites have been successfully eradicated or destroyed upon entry. This success is down to our strong partnerships, robust surveillance methods and coordinated preparedness activities across the system.

The National Varroa Mite Eradication Program was established in 2016 after varroa mite (*Varroa jacobsoni*)



Image: *Varroa destructor*

was detected in Townsville. The program is co-funded by industry, including the Australian Honey Bee Industry Council, state and territory governments and the Australian Government under national response arrangements. It funds important surveillance activities like GPS tracking, community awareness campaigns and extensive inspections of bees and their colonies, including the examination by entomologists of around 880,000 honeybee wings in 2019-20 alone. *Varroa jacobsoni* was declared eradicated in 2021 following the success of the program.

Across Australia, the close collaboration between governments, industry and the community has allowed for the rapid and transparent sharing of resources and information to effectively prepare for and eradicate the pest.

PANAMA TR4

Panama disease tropical race 4 (TR4) is a National Priority Plant Pest that affects bananas and is present in parts of Australia. The pest blocks the tissues that carry water and nutrients in banana plants, eventually killing them. Without management, it could devastate Australia's banana industry. Panama TR4 can live in soil for decades without a host and is spread easily in contaminated soil, plant material and water. There is currently no cure for the disease and our only defence is to implement effective separation and decontamination processes. The success of these prevention and management measures relies on strong partnerships and awareness of system stakeholders, as well as sustainable funding to support ongoing activities.

The Panama TR4 Program is a joint initiative between the Queensland Government and the Australian Banana Growers' Council (ABGC) to control and contain the disease. Since the region's first detection in 2015, the program has focused on early detection through surveillance on commercial banana farms in



Image: T. Pattison, DAF


Far North Queensland and compliance activities on known infested properties. The program also seeks to generate community support for efforts to protect against the disease through communications and engagement activities.

With the ABGC co-funding the Panama TR4 Program since 2019, a management board of equal government and industry representation has been established to govern and deliver the program's strategic direction until mid-2023. Beyond July 2023, industry will lead disease management. Continued success will require us to harness the potential of our shared biosecurity culture, supported by broad community engagement and awareness activities.

KEY – IMPACTS



KEY – PRIORITIES



Our opportunities for meaningful change

To meet the biosecurity risks of today and arm ourselves for the new and increasing risks coming our way, we must continue to evolve our system. This requires us to go beyond scaling our current efforts to enhance how we work together and leverage opportunities for improvement.

Engaging everyone in the biosecurity system is a fundamental opportunity to create a stronger system that is action oriented and raises awareness of risks, shared benefits and outcomes. This will rely on fostering a greater understanding and valuing of biosecurity, as well as behavioural change across the entire system to enhance prevention, preparedness, surveillance and reporting activities. The National Biosecurity Statement, developed in 2018, provides a solid starting point for the sharing of ownership across the biosecurity system.

Engaging at a grassroots level by promoting on-farm and on-land biosecurity, utilising citizen science and working more closely with Indigenous Australians, provides an opportunity to improve our system. Additionally, enhancing our engagement with international organisations and trading partners on biosecurity can help us to mitigate risks before they reach our shores. We have a significant opportunity to build upon and complement previous and existing activities (such as the Decade of Biosecurity) to connect, motivate, and empower a broader range of stakeholders, including the community.

Opportunities exist in the north to support and enhance existing biosecurity efforts. The north of Australia, home to some of our key primary production and tourism growth areas, faces a high risk of threats entering via natural pathways. The Northern Australia Biosecurity Strategy provides a platform for us to focus our efforts on high priority activities. These activities include expanding our Indigenous Ranger programs and capability, increasing surveillance and diagnostic capacity and capabilities, addressing regional skills needs in key areas and improving data collection.

A more flexible, improved risk-based regulatory system is needed to drive more efficient and harmonised processes using targeted and adaptable regulatory frameworks that provide benefits to all stakeholders. We have significant opportunities to facilitate coordinated data sharing and operationalise innovations in technology to support faster, risk-based decision-making and traceability. Co-regulation with industry can also provide material benefits to all stakeholders in managing risk and streamlining processes when they are carefully designed and supported by harmonised compliance frameworks.

Enhancing environmental biosecurity efforts will help us to conserve, restore and care for our land, sea and aquatic ecosystems, protect native plants and animals and support our biodiversity. We have the opportunity to improve outcomes through targeted awareness and engagement with environmental groups and the wider community, better coordinated research activities and enhanced risk analysis and biosecurity management for pests, weeds and diseases that impact our environment.

Funding and investment is currently sourced from all levels of government, industry and the community through a variety of models, reducing the transparency of system-wide investment. Funding has been under recent strain due to the evolving risk environment and growing demand for resourcing. We have the opportunity to work together across government, industry and the community to assess and reset our funding and investment frameworks to ensure they are fit for purpose, targeted to our priorities, sustainable in the longer term and that all biosecurity participants contribute equitably. Increased funding and investment transparency will help to keep us accountable for achieving our priorities.

Closer collaboration at regional and local levels through on the ground coordination and locally driven solutions could support better biosecurity outcomes. In addition to the potential to improve collaboration amongst the state and territory governments and with the Australian Government, opportunities exist for diverse stakeholder groups to work more closely together at regional and local levels. This includes industry, NRM organisations, landowners and managers, local governments, farmers and Traditional Owners. This collaboration will help to implement biosecurity priorities matched to regional needs, support prevention and preparedness activities, collect data and measure results consistently, coordinate mutually beneficial activities and maintain open and continuous communication.

Additional skills and infrastructure are required to support a more responsive biosecurity system as the skills of our people and the infrastructure that supports them are the foundation of our system. We have a skilled workforce with deep and diverse technical expertise, but there are capacity constraints and recruitment and retention challenges, particularly in a range of specialist capabilities and in regional areas across Australia.

Our laboratories, research facilities, national collections and quarantine centres are critical biosecurity assets for our nation. We need to continue to modernise national infrastructure to support emerging technologies and achieve a more adaptive system. We will only realise the benefits of new approaches and innovative technologies, like High-Throughput Sequencing and environmental DNA, if we have the skilled people and the supporting infrastructure necessary to operationalise them. We have an enormous opportunity to plan for the skills and critical infrastructure needed going forward and to create an environment where innovation and new and more efficient ways of working are actively encouraged.

Understanding the changing risk environment and enhancing the way we share threat information is critical to maintaining a strong system. Biosecurity risks are constantly evolving and as threats change, our risk profile and the way we need to work together changes. For example, climate risks will be important to consider to improve our decision-making and mitigate risk. Improved outcomes can also be achieved by continuing to leverage the One Health approach, recognising that the health of our people, animals and shared environment are interconnected. This is particularly important for antimicrobial resistance and zoonotic pathways. The early 2022 outbreak of the viral zoonotic disease Japanese encephalitis clearly demonstrates the importance of using a One Health approach to addressing risks.

We have the opportunity to better share risk information and threat assessments with a wider range of biosecurity stakeholders to improve our understanding of the changing environment and support investment, preparedness activities and research prioritisation.

It's time to evolve how we work together

The only way we can build an even stronger biosecurity system is to evolve how we work together.

Australia's biosecurity is underpinned by the 2019 Intergovernmental Agreement on Biosecurity, which provides a strong foundation to focus our collective efforts and supports wide-ranging partnerships.

However, as the challenges facing us continue to build, we need a renewed focus on enhancing our national biosecurity capacity and capability and fostering an action-focused and inclusive culture.

WHERE WE'RE GOING


In the future, we will more efficiently and effectively manage biosecurity risks.

Key to our success will be the adaptability and sustainability of our prevention, preparedness, surveillance, response, management and recovery systems, combined with a collaborative culture that encourages action and embeds continuous learning.

Everyone will know why biosecurity is important, care about it, understand their role and how they should play their part to ensure that our biosecurity remains strong.

HOW WE'LL GET THERE

We will work together to act in 6 priority areas. These priorities will guide our efforts so that we have the biggest impact and remain on track as we move into implementation planning.



VISION

A biosecurity system that protects Australia and our way of life –

Connected Resilient Shared

SHARED PURPOSE

A risk-based system underpinned by science that protects Australia's people, our environment, economy and lifestyle from the biosecurity threats of today and tomorrow.

PRIORITIES AND ACTIONS TO REALISE OUR VISION

Enhancing our capability and embedding advancements in technology and research are key enablers of our strategy. However, improving our system will also rely heavily on strengthening our biosecurity culture – the way we think, behave and work together – to promote awareness, drive coordinated action and complement efforts already underway, such as the Decade of Biosecurity.

Initial actions in our 6 priority areas have been collaboratively developed to support our vision and purpose and will be further built upon as part of implementation planning. Our next steps will be to identify initial actions for immediate implementation and to work together to develop a national implementation plan and national action plan that will drive the delivery of our priorities.

WE WILL TAKE ACTION IN 6 PRIORITY AREAS:



Shared biosecurity culture

We will ensure all Australians understand what biosecurity is and are empowered to act to support our system. We will create a culture of action in which we all care about, contribute to and are responsible for, our biosecurity. We all enjoy the benefits that effective biosecurity brings, just as we all share the consequences of our system’s failures.

Initial actions:

- Build on and develop national awareness and education programs – including introducing biosecurity into curricula – to deepen understanding of, and commitment to, Australia’s biosecurity and encourage community and industry stewardship in the system.
- Progress innovative approaches to drive positive biosecurity behaviours and incentivise compliance, including through social and behavioural research, leveraging community and other networks and exploring new channels of engagement, such as with culturally and linguistically diverse communities.
- Revitalise and continue to collaborate through national communication, engagement and reporting mechanisms, as well as relevant fora and symposia, to encourage greater knowledge sharing, build trust and increase transparency.
- Determine opportunities to embed biosecurity as a consideration into all levels of government, community, industry and other stakeholders’ broader decision-making, risk and business continuity planning.



Stronger partnerships

We will strengthen and expand partnerships with all stakeholders at local, regional, national and international levels to leverage our different expertise, resources and knowledge for greater impact and to support better biosecurity outcomes. Underpinning these partnerships will be mutual trust, formal recognition, transparency and a clear understanding of the importance of everyone’s role.

Initial actions:

- Enhance partnerships and engagement with Indigenous Australians to ensure Indigenous interests are incorporated and participation is enabled in the design and delivery of biosecurity outcomes and initiatives.
- Collaborate with a diverse range of biosecurity stakeholders to review and refine roles and responsibilities, providing flexibility to adapt as the system evolves.
- Review governance arrangements to ensure that they include relevant stakeholders in the design, development and implementation of national policies, programs and regulatory arrangements.
- Strengthen the involvement of environmental agencies and environmental and community groups to enhance biosecurity outcomes.
- Identify and implement opportunities for greater industry and community involvement in decision-making bodies.
- Deepen international partnerships and capacity building, including in the Indo-Pacific, to increase engagement, harmonisation, skills exchanges and information sharing on national priority pests, weeds and diseases.
- Work together to strengthen the understanding of antimicrobial and pesticide resistance, and zoonotic pathways - including surveillance and monitoring.
- Coordinate our international advocacy efforts to help shape global biosecurity standards, rules and conditions to support strong biosecurity in Australia.



Highly skilled workforce

We will develop and sustain the pipeline of biosecurity skills needed for the future, within government, industry and the community. We will ensure our people can be deployed when and where they are needed, and that they have the right skills by providing targeted capability and capacity building, education and training.

Initial actions:

- | | | |
|--|--|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Investigate national skills to identify current and future needs in key areas, such as science, data, new technologies and regulatory capabilities, considering the findings of existing industry and government workforce strategies. Develop a national biosecurity workforce strategy to build, develop, retain and deploy | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> capability across the system, including surge support for responses, taking into account regional needs across Australia. Build upon and expand existing cooperative and partnership arrangements to leverage the expertise and capability of biosecurity stakeholders to support system needs where there are mutual benefits. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Strengthen professional development programs and exchanges between biosecurity stakeholders to facilitate knowledge and information sharing, improve skills and support workforce retention. |
|--|--|--|



Coordinated preparedness and response

We will enhance our preparedness and response capability through improved coordination, regional planning, increased collaboration and faster information and data sharing to support our system's resilience and adaptability.

Initial actions:

- | | | |
|--|--|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Undertake and promote regular national preparedness exercises with biosecurity stakeholders to test and improve our collective readiness and increase public awareness of significant biosecurity threats. Advance regionally based planning activities to better align effort, integrate biosecurity practices and facilitate greater education and awareness opportunities. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Continually review and update risk information, including through regular strategic threat assessments, to inform priorities and share this with stakeholders. Actively embed continuous learning supported by enhanced post-incident reviews and evaluation practices to ensure lessons are captured and incorporated. Strengthen traceability arrangements to support improved biosecurity outcomes. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Enhance our national surveillance and early detection arrangements to ensure they are robust given the changing threat environment, drawing on the expertise and capabilities of biosecurity stakeholders. Evolve our national information management frameworks to ensure they are fit for purpose, interoperable and promote seamless information exchange. |
|--|--|--|



Sustainable investment

We will develop long-term sustainable biosecurity funding and investment approaches, including new funding streams and models, that recognise the value of government, industry and the community investing in biosecurity to support the system's growing needs and priorities. We will ensure these approaches are efficient, equitable, adaptable, transparent and are responsive to the changing risk environment.

Initial actions:

- | | | |
|---|---|---|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Work together to identify funding needs and determine priorities, including for critical assets, infrastructure and research. Strengthen frameworks to agree and deliver priority investments having regard to the level of risk and benefits from activities and to | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> increase efficiency by reducing duplicative investments and processes. Advance co-funding and investment strategies with stakeholders, including models that consider key risk creators and system beneficiaries in an equitable manner. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Increase the transparency of biosecurity funding to support improved accountability. Complete the development and implementation of a system performance and evaluation framework to inform future investment decisions. |
|---|---|---|



Integration supported by technology, research and data

We will create a more connected and efficient system in which we better leverage existing and new technology, research and data to facilitate more timely, informed and risk-based decisions. We will continue to deliver our biosecurity research priorities, informed by national biosecurity research, development and extension (RD&E) strategies. We will develop, share and embed new technologies in areas such as traceability, surveillance, screening, data analytics, treatments and diagnostics.

Initial actions:

- | | | |
|--|--|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Continue to invest in and roll out transformative technologies to digitise and automate processes, and support rapid and accurate detection, identification, traceability and response. Increase coordination and engagement with biosecurity stakeholders, including research and development bodies, to prioritise, drive and deliver national research outcomes. Actively share data and research to streamline research efforts and facilitate | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> the adoption of outcomes, ensuring that they are accessible, interoperable and reusable where practical. Enhance the accessibility and use of surveillance and interception data to support effective and seamless decision-making by all stakeholders. Further support innovations to build science and research capacity in areas such as pathway risk assessments, species identification and treatments. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Encourage the uptake of existing and emerging technologies, systems and processes across the biosecurity system. Increase the use of citizen science, Indigenous knowledge and on the ground insights as valued sources of expertise, data and information. Encourage greater private sector investment in the development and delivery of innovations that provide for better biosecurity outcomes. |
|--|--|--|

Our way forward: Driving collaborative action

The strategy sets our future vision and priorities and outlines more than 30 initial actions for implementation. Realising our vision will only be possible through our collective efforts, as biosecurity affects all of us.

Our next steps will be to:

- identify those initial actions that can be implemented immediately
- design a national implementation plan that sets out governance arrangements and guides future planning
- develop a national action plan that builds upon our initial actions and establishes a framework for monitoring and evaluation to keep us accountable.

To support the achievement of the strategy's vision and priorities and to help drive coordinated and collaborative activity across Australia, a diverse range of stakeholders will be involved in implementation, underpinned by an inclusive governance approach.

A National Biosecurity Strategy Implementation Committee (NIC) will be established, consisting of biosecurity stakeholders, including representatives from plant and animal industries, freight and logistics, aquatic industries, environmental groups, research organisations and Indigenous stakeholders. The NIC will work together with the NBC to develop, oversee, implement, monitor and review the national implementation plan and the national action plan.

They will initially be supported by expert stakeholder working groups for each priority area, who will further build upon and refine the initial actions in this strategy for inclusion in the national action plan.

A COLLABORATIVE APPROACH WILL DRIVE IMPLEMENTATION TO ACHIEVE OUR VISION AND PURPOSE



NATIONAL BIOSECURITY STRATEGY



NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION PLAN



ANNUAL REPORT ON PROGRESS



NATIONAL ACTION PLAN



**OTHER ACTION PLANS
(E.G. SECTOR, REGIONAL ETC.)**



IMPLEMENTATION PRINCIPLES

We will work together to develop and implement actions in our priority areas to strengthen our system.

To be successful, implementation will:

- be an **inclusive process** that includes collaboration with a broad range of stakeholders to develop, implement and monitor action plans
- provide a **range of different opportunities and avenues** for stakeholders to contribute and provide input
- **align with and complement** other relevant strategic agendas and activities where possible, to avoid duplication and siloing of effort
- have clear governance arrangements that embed opportunities for **greater stakeholder involvement in decision-making**, supporting our priority to enhance our shared biosecurity culture

- include mechanisms to ensure we are all **accountable** for implementation and that we **transparently** monitor and evaluate our progress
- focus on tangible actions in each of our priorities to deliver a **more resilient system** that can adapt to changes in our risk environment and is responsive to emerging opportunities and challenges.

COORDINATED IMPLEMENTATION


Implementing the strategy will be underpinned by a national implementation plan and national action plan, complemented by other local, regional or sector-based action plans.

To kick-start the strategy’s implementation, we will identify those initial actions that can be implemented immediately and commence their delivery as soon as possible.

To guide our longer-term efforts, a **national implementation plan** will be developed during a 6 to 12 month planning stage. This will outline the governance structure and framework for implementation over the next 10 years.

The implementation plan will support a **national action plan**, which will also be developed during the planning stage. The plan will build upon the initial actions in this strategy and detail the efforts needed to deliver our vision and priorities, ensuring they are specific, measurable, achievable, realistic and timely. It will include a monitoring and evaluation framework to provide transparency on who is responsible for specific activities and to support ongoing monitoring and reviews.

The national action plan will be complemented by sector based, regional or other action plans developed by stakeholders.



Engaging with our stakeholders – implementation will be informed by ongoing broader consultation, such as surveys, meetings, workshops and other fora, to ensure it is a collaborative and inclusive process.

Monitoring our progress:

- Progress against the national action plan will be monitored regularly to keep us on track and ensure that we adapt where needed, remaining focused on the continual improvement of our system.
- An annual report will be developed to provide an update on the strategy’s implementation, emerging issues and stakeholder priorities.
- A formal review of the strategy will be undertaken after 5 years, or sooner if there is significant change to the risks, challenges or opportunities facing us.

OVERVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS



Appendix

OUR BIOSECURITY SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE

Our system is supported by a mature and dynamic architecture of agreements, arrangements, deeds and statements between governments, plant and animal industries, environmental groups and research organisations. This is complemented by reviews undertaken by the Inspector-General of Biosecurity, CSIRO and other stakeholders.

Australia is also a signatory to a range of international biosecurity, trade, health and environmental agreements, including measures outlined by the World Trade Organization, International Plant Protection Convention, World Organisation for Animal Health and the World Health Organization.

The Intergovernmental Agreement on Biosecurity (IGAB) sets out commitments for governments, outlines agreed national goals and objectives and clarifies roles and responsibilities.

The IGAB also establishes the NBC. The NBC provides advice to the Agriculture Senior Officials Committee (AGSOC) on national biosecurity issues, and progresses the implementation of the IGAB. AGSOC reports to ministers responsible for primary industries.

The NBC is responsible for managing a national, strategic approach to biosecurity risks that could impact agricultural production, the environment, community wellbeing and urban amenity.

The NBC is supported by several sectoral committees – the Animal Health Committee, Environment and Invasives Committee, Marine Pest Sectoral Committee and Plant Health Committee – and the National Biosecurity Communication and Engagement Network, as well as ongoing expert groups and short-term, task-specific groups.

Formal emergency preparedness and response agreements establish arrangements for responding to exotic pests, weeds and diseases that are detected within Australia and have the potential to impact animal, plant or human health, or the environment. These agreements are the:

- Emergency Animal Disease Response Agreement (EADRA)
- Emergency Plant Pest Response Deed (EPPRD)
- National Environmental Biosecurity Response Agreement (NEBRA).

These arrangements are formal agreements between governments and (where relevant) industry signatories, and as appropriate, Animal Health Australia (AHA) and Plant Health Australia (PHA).

The arrangements cover the management and funding of responses to pest, weed and disease outbreaks, or where a pest, weed or disease primarily impacts the environment and/or social amenity (where the response is for the public good).

AHA and PHA are the custodians of the EADRA and EPPRD respectively and are national coordinators of key government-industry biosecurity partnerships in the areas of animal and plant health, producing and inputting into strategies and plans to guide these efforts. AHA and PHA, as well as other peak bodies such as Wildlife Health Australia (WHA), facilitate a national approach to enhancing Australia's animal and plant biosecurity systems, through awareness, preparedness and emergency response management.

The National Biosecurity Statement was finalised in 2018 and outlines national biosecurity goals, roles and responsibilities and principles for managing biosecurity risk. The strategy builds from this strong foundation.

Government strategies

The Australian, state and territory, and local governments have published a range of strategies, roadmaps and reviews that outline the goals, objectives, priorities and frameworks for the biosecurity system within their jurisdiction.

Peak research organisations and environmental biosecurity stakeholder publications

Research organisations and environmental groups are instrumental in the protection and continual enhancement of our biosecurity system. This includes organisations such as the CSIRO, Rural Research and Development Corporations and tertiary institutions. Research organisations develop strategies, research and position papers, and actions that explore and inform initiatives and outline innovative approaches in science, research and collaboration.

Environmental groups, such as regional NRM organisations, play a critical role in environmental biosecurity, regional planning, natural resource management and policy advocacy. A diverse range of Indigenous stakeholders, including Indigenous organisations and land-holding and native title bodies, are involved in biosecurity-related land and water management including surveillance activities. Surveillance activities are also enhanced by on-farm biosecurity and citizen science initiatives which support education, collaboration and capacity building.

Industry strategies and position papers

Industry peak bodies who understand and acknowledge the shared benefits of a strong and resilient biosecurity system are consistent advocates for its improvement. Importantly, they publish, in consultation with their members, an array of ambitious and considered strategies and position papers that seek to make a case for reform, action and investment.

System stakeholders work together on a range of holistic plans and strategies, such as PlantPlan 2021 and Animalplan 2022 to 2027. Animalplan was recently developed through collaboration between relevant animal health stakeholders from government, industry, research and other sectors as Australia's first national action plan to strengthen our animal health system, including our preparedness and ability to respond to emergency animal diseases such as foot-and-mouth disease.



DRAFT

Attachment B

National Biosecurity Strategy Reference Group

- Australian Banana Growers' Council
- CSIRO
- Freight and Trade Alliance
- Invasive Species Council
- National Farmers' Federation
- Rural Research and Development Corporation representative – Australian Pork Limited
- Seafood Industry Australia
- Torres Strait Regional Authority



NATIONAL BIOSECURITY STRATEGY



National biosecurity strategy consultation draft **Consultation summary**

May 2022

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Introduction

In 2021 agriculture ministers agreed to develop a national biosecurity strategy, to join up our collective ambition and efforts to strengthen our biosecurity system, ensuring it is able to meet the challenges of tomorrow. The National Biosecurity Committee is leading development of the strategy with guidance from a stakeholder reference group.

An initial consultation process was undertaken in late 2021 to inform the direction of the overall strategy, including its priority areas. The outcomes were used to develop a [consultation draft](#) (the draft) which was released on 21 February 2022 for public comment.

This report summarises the outcomes from the consultation process conducted in February - March 2022 on the draft.

Consultation format

As part of the development of the national biosecurity strategy, a consultation draft was released in February 2022. To accompany the draft, a public survey was released on the Department of Agriculture, Water and the Environment's Have Your Say platform. Submissions or comments on the draft were also invited via email to the National Biosecurity Strategy Project Team.

The consultation draft outlined a vision and purpose for Australia's biosecurity system, priority areas and initial strategic actions. The draft included specific consultation questions (Appendix A) to prompt stakeholder reflection and input, and to inform next steps – though stakeholders were encouraged to comment on all aspects of the draft. These consultation questions were used as the basis for the Have Your Say survey.

The purpose of the consultation was to receive stakeholder feedback on the proposed vision and purpose for Australia's national biosecurity system, priority areas and proposed actions, as well as to seek stakeholder views on implementation approaches. The feedback received is currently being used to shape and inform the final national biosecurity strategy.

The consultation period ran from Monday 21 February to Friday 18 March. A number of extensions were granted to 25 March. Each government jurisdiction was responsible for promoting the consultation process and engaging with their stakeholders as required.

This was the second phase of consultation for the national biosecurity strategy. An initial consultation process was held in late 2021 – involving a Have Your Say survey, workshops, meetings and engagement through existing stakeholder mechanisms.



Key observations


During the consultation period a total of 136 submissions were received (Appendix B). These consisted of:

- 83 Have Your Say survey responses
- 41 submission responses
- 11 emailed comments
- 1 submission collected via meeting (in lieu of a written submission).

Note: for the purposes of this report, a survey response, emailed comments or a submission document is considered a submission.

The majority of the submissions were received from national peak bodies operating in the agriculture sector.





Key observations from this consultation:

- Stakeholders were generally supportive of the draft overall, including its proposed strategic direction, vision and purpose and the priority areas.
- Priority areas that received the most attention through feedback were shared biosecurity culture, highly skilled workforce, sustainable investment and integration supported by technology, research and data.
- Stakeholders felt the actions needed to be more specific and measurable.
- Stakeholders wanted more detail on the implementation approach, including requesting a governance approach that includes non-government stakeholders, as well as further content on how progress against the strategy will be monitored and evaluated.
- Prevention needed greater emphasis – with the strategy thought to place too heavy a focus on preparedness and response.
- The scope of the strategy needed to be broader to encompass those established pests managed within the national biosecurity system.
- Indigenous Australians should be recognised as playing a greater role in the national biosecurity system, as landowners and managers and cultural custodians.
- Greater focus was needed on environmental biosecurity as a key opportunity for biosecurity over the next decade.
- Key topics such as zoonoses and One Health should be referenced.

Feedback themes

General comments

Overall, stakeholders reacted positively to the consultation draft, considering it well thought through, clear, easy to read and comprehensive. Stakeholders noted it appeared to be a pragmatic document, providing a solid foundation to drive national change to the biosecurity system.

However, other stakeholders felt it wasn't transformative, strategic or bold enough to achieve the change needed, and that it was too high level and lacked depth and detail on what change would be achieved as a result of implementing the strategy.

Stakeholders noted that a key aspect will be the need to work together, and that to successfully implement the strategy will require significant collaboration and commitment.

Vision and purpose

The majority of stakeholders agreed with the vision and purpose and felt they accurately reflected the intent of the strategy. Stakeholders mentioned the vision and purpose reflected the attributes of the Australia biosecurity system needed to meet future challenges and opportunities, and that this aligns with reports and reviews of the system. Stakeholders particularly liked the shared element of the vision. However, there were suggestions to strengthen these aspects of the draft. Stakeholders suggested the vision and purpose could be more ambitious and better articulate the significant change the strategy is hoping to achieve for the biosecurity system. Stakeholders are also particularly keen to see the action that comes out of the vision and purpose and the strategy overall.

Stakeholders found the term 'way of life' in the draft vision confusing and broad, and it was interpreted quite differently by the different sectors. Stakeholders liked the intent of the phrase and what it was trying to achieve and suggested a number of possible alternatives.

Priority areas and actions

The priority areas and actions were seen as a good starting point and were generally well supported. Most criticisms related to the lack of specificity of the actions – including detail on how they will be prioritised, monitored and evaluated. Stakeholders noted actions should ideally be SMART – specific, measurable, achievable, realistic and timely and progress publicly reported.

Many stakeholders provided detailed feedback on specific issues and areas that have been captured to inform next steps, including implementation and action planning.

Shared biosecurity culture

Stakeholders suggested shared biosecurity culture needed to be extended to also include the concept of shared responsibility. There was hope expressed by stakeholders that the strategy will provide the platform for greater public engagement and commitment to biosecurity, especially with those groups or individuals who do not currently engage with the topic of biosecurity. Stakeholders saw the importance of clearly articulating system participants' roles and responsibilities to assist people to understand their obligations and how they fit within the system.

Stakeholders suggested to really achieve the intent of this priority, a large national communication campaign is required, to increase awareness and educate Australians on biosecurity. Stakeholders also suggested creating education programs (including school programs and short courses) to educate children and the general public. This was seen as important in ensuring everyone has a better understanding of the risks and how they can contribute. Several submissions suggested a greater investment in and application of

behavioural science and social research to understand behaviours, drive positive behavioural change and improve compliance and engagement.

Some stakeholders suggested this priority area should be considered and actioned first as part of strategy implementation, as delivering outcomes for biosecurity more broadly is reliant on all stakeholders engaging and working together.

Stronger partnerships

Stakeholders were keen to see genuine and mutually beneficial partnerships develop between all sectors involved in the biosecurity system and to work together on common priorities to deliver tangible results. Stakeholders would also like to see more opportunities for them to be included in governance arrangements for the national biosecurity system, and specifically for the delivery of the strategy.

It was noted that environmental and Indigenous stakeholders play a key role in biosecurity and their contributions could be better emphasised throughout the document. Stakeholders also noted the importance of working with stakeholders in the broader strategic environment in which biosecurity operates, for example the One Health approach which brings together relevant sectors to provide benefits to human health in the areas of antimicrobial resistance, zoonoses and pandemic research.

Stakeholders suggested the Decade of Biosecurity initiative – which is being led by the Biosecurity Collective – should be included in the strategy as an initial action.

Highly skilled workforce

Many stakeholders raised the challenge of skill shortages in their sectors. Stakeholders noted they are having trouble attracting and retaining talent in fields such as entomology and plant pathology. Stakeholders would like to see the biosecurity workforce upskilled and grow in size across all sectors and stakeholder groups. Stakeholders specifically mentioned they would like to see more ‘frontline’ biosecurity officers who conduct inspections to assist with faster processing times, including by removing government staffing caps for biosecurity services. Some stakeholders mentioned they would like to be upskilled and accredited to take on low risk biosecurity activities which are currently delivered by government biosecurity officers. This would then enable government to focus on high-risk issues.

One submission suggested a national skills audit be undertaken to understand all sectors’ future needs. A number of stakeholders would like to see a national workforce plan be developed to help mitigate issues around workforce capacity and skills capability.

Feedback also emphasised the importance of utilising local and Indigenous knowledge in biosecurity.

Coordinated preparedness and response

Stakeholders highlighted the need for adaptable and scalable processes and systems that can respond to the changing threat environment and that are able to handle concurrent incursions in the future.

Stakeholders mentioned the important role traceability systems and processes can play in track and tracing activities in the event of an outbreak.

Sustainable investment

The commitment to funding was welcomed, with stakeholders noting the importance of settling a sustainable long term funding model for the biosecurity system. Other comments related to the need for funding to be responsive, transparent and accountable, and a greater role for risk creators in the funding space. Stakeholders emphasised the importance of engaging as many stakeholders as possible during this process, to assist sectors understand the need and enable support for any substantial changes to funding arrangements.

Stakeholders discussed the imbalances that exist in cost recovery and fee for payment services among the different sectors who must comply with biosecurity measures. There were significant differing views on this topic; some stakeholders are willing to pay more for improved biosecurity outcomes, whereas other stakeholders would like to see costs reduced.

Many stakeholders noted the strategy needed to be appropriately resourced to be implemented and deliver tangible results. Many submissions highlighted some organisations will require resourcing to deliver any actions provided in the strategy and future implementation planning.

Integration supported by technology, research and data

Timely information and data sharing with all stakeholders was a key concern. Stakeholders want to know about emerging biosecurity risks and changes in the operating environment as soon as possible to enable swift action and mitigate risks – and supported actions in this respect. Stakeholders are also hoping the national biosecurity strategy will improve the collective ability to collect, store and share data amongst stakeholders. Feedback suggested the strategy could focus on what data needs to be collected and identify any gaps. Stakeholders are keen to partner with government to develop more efficient systems that are interoperable to enable these activities.

Stakeholders would like to see investment and uptake in new technologies to increase performance and efficiency across the biosecurity system. Feedback discussed this with regard to the import and export IT systems and also in embracing technology such as robots and drones to increase efficiencies. Feedback highlighted that national collaboration and focus in this area could assist with identifying needs, faster development of solutions, increased suitability for the end user and improved uptake across Australia. Stakeholders also requested traceability technologies and processes be considered.

Feedback received through the consultation phase requested national research gaps, priorities and opportunities be identified for funding purposes. Stakeholders also mentioned the importance of working with Rural Research and Development Corporations and other research organisations. Stakeholders noted the importance of focusing on diagnostics and tools to assist with identification of pests and diseases, including pests of concern to the environmental sector.

Roles and responsibilities

Stakeholders felt there needed to be a clearer understanding of everyone's roles, responsibilities and relationships across the biosecurity system – both to support implementation of the

strategy but also to deliver better outcomes for the system. Stakeholders considered this was critical to a number of priority areas – including shared biosecurity culture and stronger partnerships.

Many submissions requested that specific stakeholders be named to clearly identify all the players in the system, specifically on the system diagram or in the national biosecurity statement text.

Implementation

Stakeholders felt the implementation approach in the strategy needed significantly more detail (note: implementation was one of the key topics where stakeholder feedback was explicitly sought during consultation). Accountability to delivering on the strategy is seen as key – with clear timelines, targets, goals and milestones needed.

Stakeholders saw the need for an explicit role for non-government stakeholders, that provided for genuine collaboration and co-design. Ensuring implementation and action planning was inclusive was seen as important. Setting clear expectations of those involved in implementation is required – noting that many stakeholders are not resourced to undertake additional roles. Some stakeholders noted implementation and the related stakeholder mechanisms should be tailored given many stakeholders are both resource and time poor. Suggestions included public forums, using a biosecurity roundtable approach or issues-based forums to ensure targeted involvement from stakeholders with the right expertise relevant to the topic. Some noted that it was important to ensure the right stakeholders were involved, not just the usual stakeholders.

Some stakeholders suggested advisory or working groups per priority area, with a number flagging Queensland's collaborative approach as an example of how to approach implementation.

Stakeholders noted that overall governance arrangements needed to be settled – including considering whether current governance mechanisms are fit-for-purpose and that there is adequate dedicated resourcing to drive implementation.

Ensuring synergies and coordination with existing strategies to avoid conflicts and duplication of effort was seen as a critical. The question of funding to support implementation was raised by a number of stakeholders.

Monitoring and evaluation

Performance should be measured against agreed metrics - with clear objectives and measures of success. Final actions (with more specificity) should determine the most appropriate performance measures. Some stakeholders commented that the current actions were too general to really determine clear performance measures – but actions should drive this aspect. Taking a program logic approach was suggested by some stakeholders.

Monitoring and reporting should be made public and be meaningful to stakeholders. Feedback channels, such as public stakeholder surveys, should form part of monitoring and evaluation – with both qualitative and quantitative measures. The use of broader biosecurity community data to monitor progress should also be considered. For example, setting indicators and providing a platform for all stakeholders to contribute information on progress.

The independence of both evaluation and the review process was seen as important – with transparency on the strategy’s performance (‘be honest where the strategy fails’) important.

Most stakeholders agreed with a five year review period – with the strategy to be refreshed if required at that time. Other timeframes suggested were every 2 years, or every 3 years. Complementing the longer review period was the need for regular monitoring and annual performance reporting. Some stakeholders noted that the strategy should be reviewed in the event of significant changes in the risk landscape.

Key gaps

Perceived gaps in the strategy included the failure to explicitly define known weaknesses and gaps in the system, and for these to drive actions. Some stakeholders felt there was too much weight placed on explaining what biosecurity is and why we need it, rather than focusing on future priorities and actions.

Stakeholders felt ‘prevention’ was not featured enough in the draft, both in specific priority areas (such as coordinated preparedness and response) and more broadly across the entire strategy. Stakeholders’ views were that prevention activities were critical - in order to preclude biosecurity risks from being realised in the first place. Feedback also mentioned prevention should be improved to prevent the spread of endemic pests, weeds and diseases within Australia, not just exotics.

Other feedback

A significant amount of feedback focused on areas solely in the Commonwealth’s remit, rather than national system as a whole. This feedback has been captured to inform further work by the Commonwealth, through the Commonwealth Biosecurity 2030 roadmap.

Appendix A

Stakeholder consultation questions

1) Scope of the strategy

- Do the proposed vision and purpose reflect what we want to achieve and how we want to evolve our system into the future?
- Are our 6 priority areas where we should focus our efforts in the future? Is anything missing?

2) Roles within the biosecurity system

- Can you see your current role within the biosecurity system reflected in the consultation draft?
- Do you think the 'How our biosecurity system works' diagram reflects your role and responsibilities in the biosecurity system?
- How do you see your own and others' roles changing into the future?

3) Biosecurity risks and opportunities

- Are there any key risks and opportunities not captured in the consultation draft?
- Do any of the biosecurity risks or opportunities outlined in the consultation draft have additional implications for our 6 priority areas?

4) Actions

- What are your views on the proposed initial actions?
- What other actions should be included to deliver our 6 priority areas, address biosecurity risks and capitalise on our opportunities for change?
- How can you contribute to achieving our 6 priority areas?

5) Implementation and review

- What mechanisms should be established to ensure stakeholders are involved in the further development of actions and implementation planning?
- How regularly should the strategy be reviewed?
- How should we monitor and evaluate the success of the national strategy and implementation plans?

Appendix B

List of submissions

Published submissions

- Alex Arbuthnot AM
- Animal Health Australia Industry Forum
- Animal Medicines Australia
- Apple and Pear Australia
- Association of Mining and Exploration Companies
- Atlas of Living Australia
- Australasian Plant Pathology Society
- Australian Academy of Technology & Engineering
- Australian Association of Bush Regenerators
- Australian Banana Growers' Council
- Australian Dairy Farmers
- Australian Eggs
- Australian Environmental Pest Managers Association
- Australian Food Sovereignty Alliance
- Australian Fresh Produce Alliance
- Australian Grape and Wine
- Australian Honey Bee Industry Council
- Australian Horticulture Exporters' and Importers' Association
- Australian Land Conservation Alliance
- Australian Museum
- Australian Pork Limited
- Australian Prawn Farmers Association
- Australian Research Data Commons
- Australian Veterinary Association
- Australian Walnut Industry Association, Chestnuts Australia, Hazelnut Growers of Australia, Pistachio Growers' Association, Summerfruit Australia (joint submission)
- Brij BugTrap Consultancy
- Cattle Council of Australia
- Cement Industry Federation
- Centre for Invasive Species Solutions
- Claire Taylor
- Colin Brame
- Commission for the Human Future
- CSIRO
- Dr Bruce Christie
- Dr Elisa Bayraktarov
- Dr Heather Channon
- Dr John Virtue
- Dr Mark Whattam
- Dr Ron Glanville
- Dr Sandra Baxendell
- EcoCommons Advisory Board
- ExoFlare
- Fruit Growers Tasmania

- Grain Guard WA
- Grain Producers SA
- GrainGrowers
- Growcom
- Heritage and Rare Fruit Network
- Hort Innovation
- International Forwarders & Customs Brokers Association of Australia
- Invasive Species Council
- J Toohey and Associates
- Local Government Association Queensland
- Matthew Harris
- Mo Markham
- National Farmers Federation
- NRM Regions Australia
- NRM Regions Queensland
- NSW Farmers
- NSW Seafood Industry Council
- Nursery & Garden Industry Western Australia
- Parks Victoria
- Ports Australia
- Primary Producers South Australia
- Pro Kinetics
- Produce Marketing Australia
- Prof. Andrew Robinson
- Queensland Farmers' Federation
- Robin Hansen
- SA Arid Lands Landscape Board
- SAFEMEAT
- Sheep Producers Australia
- South Coast Natural Resource Management
- South West Catchments Council
- Tasmania Department of Natural Resources and Environment
- Tomax
- Victorian Farmers Federation
- Vinehealth Australia
- WA Department of Biodiversity Conservation and Attractions
- Wildlife Health Australia
- Wool Producers Australia

Confidential submissions (not published)

- AgriFutures Australia
- Australia Post
- AusVeg
- Curtin University
- Greenlife Industry Australia Ltd
- La Trobe University
- Rautaki Solutions
- South Australia Health Food Safety

There were an additional 48 submissions from respondents, who have requested confidentiality and are not listed above.

AGRICULTURE SENIOR OFFICIALS' COMMITTEE

RESPONSE TO OUT-OF-SESSION AGENDA PAPER

To: AGSOC SECRETARIAT

FOR DECISION

AGSOC OOS 07/2022

National Biosecurity Strategy

Attached is an out-of-session paper for consideration by Agriculture Senior Officials' Committee members.

Please indicate your response to the recommendations in the space on this form, provide additional comments if required and sign and return to the secretariat at AMM-AGSOC@agriculture.gov.au by **MIDDAY on Friday, 15 July 2022.**

RECOMMENDATION	ADVICE
That senior officials:	
1. ENDORSE the draft national biosecurity strategy (<u>Attachment A</u>) , noting that the existing avian influenza case study is being replaced with a foot and mouth disease case study that will be circulated as soon as possible.	ENDORSED [] NOT ENDORSED [] Refer comments []
2. NOTE , if the strategy is endorsed, proposed next steps for implementation.	NOTED [] Refer comments []
3. ENDORSE the proposed arrangements for the strategy launch and broader stakeholder endorsement.	ENDORSED [] NOT ENDORSED [] Refer comments []
4. AGREE to a paper progressing to ministers with the same recommendations and content for endorsement at the Agriculture Ministers' Meeting on 20 July 2022.	AGREED [] NOT AGREED [] Refer comments []
Comments	

AGSOC Member's Name:

Signature:

Date:2022

Jurisdiction:

Contact Officer:




Australian Government
Department of Agriculture,
Fisheries and Forestry

Australia's biosecurity threats

Dr Mark Schipp
Australian Chief Veterinary Officer
20 July 2022



What is the probability of an exotic animal disease outbreak occurring in Australia in the next 5 years?




Disease	2021	2022
Foot and mouth disease	9 ¹ % (range 1 – 19% ²)	11.6% (range 3 – 20.5%)
Lumpy skin disease	8% (range 0 - 22%)	28% (range 4 – 56%)
African horse sickness	13% (range 1 – 31%)	Not assessed
African swine fever	21% (range 5 – 39%)	Not assessed
Total estimated probability	42%	56% (range 33 – 79%)

Table 1: the estimated probability of an internationally notifiable exotic animal disease incursion in the next 5 years.


¹ All percentage probabilities denotes the mean of participant estimates between the 0.1 quantile and 0.9 quantile

² All estimated ranges denote the 0.1 quantile and 0.9 quantile – providing an 80% coverage interval.

Consequences




Animal health & welfare
From mild illness to severely affected
animals unable to walk or feed




Economic impacts
A FMD outbreak could cost Australia \$80 billion
(over 10 years with 3% discount rate)


Global situation Foot and mouth disease




Global situation Lumpy skin disease



Global situation African swine fever



FMD in Indonesia




FMD outbreak declared on 9 May

351,000 head of cattle infected. 430,000 head of cattle vaccinated
Cases across Java, Sumatra, Kalimantan, Bangka, Lombok, Bali

 **FMD Reported outbreak**

Source: OIE WAHIS



Pathways into Australia

FMD



Import of
contaminated
products



Contaminated
clothing, vehicles
and equipment

LSD



Windborne
insects



Returning
livestock vessels
Returning planes



Contaminated
products

FMD preparedness & response

Official position – eradication



Vaccinate



Stamp out



No action

Indonesia

- Emergency declaration
- Quarantine & movement restrictions
- Decontamination
- Vaccination
- Surveillance
- Zoning
- Vector control

Near neighbours

Boosting LSD preparedness and response capability

Australia

- National LSD action plan
- EADP Taskforce
- Review of import requirements
- Communications
- Traveller/cargo/mail changes
- Assessment of risk pathways
- Industry collaboration
- LSD vaccine options


Biosecurity Operations

- Screening mail
- Arriving passenger measures
- Livestock vessel biosecurity
- Cargo assessments
- Communications

Australian support for Indonesia

- Vaccines
- Technical advice
- Visits to Indonesia
- FAO emergency field mission
- Funding

Traceability



Australian Veterinary Emergency Plan (AUSVETPLAN)

A series of technical response plans that describe the proposed approach to an emergency animal disease (EAD) incident

Provide science-based policy guidelines and a planning structure


Tell us how to respond (e.g. stamping out, movement controls, disinfection and disposal, testing procedures)



The policy is agreed to in advance allowing a rapid response when disease is detected

Vaccines





Stamp out
policy

Vaccination
Animals culled after

3 months until freedom

No vaccinations

3 months until freedom

Vaccination
Animals not culled after

6 months until freedom

No stamp out
policy

No vaccination

12 months until freedom

Vaccinations
Animals not culled after

12 months until freedom


Length of surveillance (without infection with FMDV) needed for freedom from FMD

3mth

6mth

12 mth

Regain
'free from FMD
without
vaccination'



Stamp out policy
Vaccinations stopped

No stamp out policy
Vaccinations stopped

Preventative
vaccinations

Clinical, virological,
serological surveillance

14 months until freedom

Clinical surveillance only

26 months until freedom

Clinical, virological, serological
surveillance

24 months until freedom

Clinical surveillance only

36 months until freedom

Clinical, virological,
serological
surveillance

8 months until freedom

Length of surveillance (without infection with
LSDV) needed for freedom from LSD

1yr


2yr

3yr

Regain
freedom from
LSD


Feral animals and FMD

Feral water buffalo distribution



Source: DSEWPac (2010) Feral animals on offshore islands database at <http://www.environment.gov.au/biodiversity/invasive/ferals/islands/index.html>

Feral pig distribution



Questions?



biosecurity.gov.au

Your first stop for biosecurity information



Australian Government
Department of Agriculture,
Fisheries and Forestry



Foot-and-mouth disease in Indonesia

National Talking Points – 21 July 2022

Approved

Current Situation

Note: these talking points have been developed to help raise awareness and encourage preventative measures. There has not been an incursion.

- FMD is a highly contagious disease which affects cattle, buffalo, pigs, sheep, deer, camelids and goats, which are those animals with a cloven hoof. It spreads through close contact between animals and can be carried on animal products, equipment, people's clothing or by the wind.
- In May 2022, an outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) was reported in cattle in Indonesia. Cases were first detected in April, and in July 2022 the disease was reported in Bali.
- The [World Organisation for Animal Health \(WOAH\)](#) issues updates on the status of FMD in Indonesia, as reported by Indonesia on the [Indonesian government's website](#).
- The emergence and rapid spread of FMD in Indonesia has changed its risk profile and the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (DAFF) has heightened border activities accordingly.
- Australia is providing support to Indonesia to combat the outbreak. Assistance includes advice from Australian technical experts, supply of vaccines and offers of financial support. This is in addition to assistance already being provided to combat lumpy skin disease, that was recently detected in Sumatra.
- More information about FMD is at agriculture.gov.au/famd

Detection of FMD in imported pork product

- DAFF recently conducted a purchasing and testing campaign of food for sale in supermarkets around Australia, one sample tested positive for FMD and African swine fever viral fragments.
- It needs to be clear that this does not mean there has been a disease incursion, because the virus was not live. False reporting could lead to impacts on our trade.



NOT FOR FURTHER DISTRIBUTION

- This sample was from pork floss offered for sale in Melbourne. Pork floss is a processed, dried meat product that can be imported if it meets strict import conditions.
- The product was processed, but investigations have not found evidence that the treatment met Australia's import requirements.
- DAFF biosecurity officers have seized the product from all linked supermarkets and a warehouse in Melbourne.
- A national recall notice was issued, requesting all packets that have not been consumed are returned to the department. Information for consumers on how to return the product is available at agriculture.gov.au.
- A number of other pork products for retail sale around Australia have also tested positive for ASF viral fragments. Officers are in the process of securing these products and undertaking investigations. Further information will be provided when these investigations have been completed.
- Recently a passenger was intercepted from Indonesia with a beef product that contained FMD viral fragments.
- While this shows the biosecurity system is effective, DAFF continues with its efforts to prevent an incursion, including testing meat products seized at the border from travellers and through the mail.

Traveller advice

- Anyone who travels to Indonesia, or any other country affected by FMD, must take steps to ensure they don't bring the disease back into Australia.
- Avoid interacting with livestock and going to farms in Indonesia. If you have had contact with livestock or visited farms, avoid contact with Australian livestock or farms for 7 days after your return.
- Before returning to Australia, ensure footwear and clothing is clean by washing your shoes and clothes to make sure they're free of any mud, animal manure and mucus. If they cannot be cleaned effectively, leave them behind.
- Declare on your incoming passenger card if you have been near livestock or in a rural area.
- Avoid bringing back any souvenirs or other goods that are made of hide or feature animal hair.
- Don't bring in any meat or food containing meat. Any leftover food served during your flight, or purchased at the airport, must be left on the plane.



Mailing risk goods to Australia

- It is illegal to bring frozen, chilled and freeze-dried foods, including meat and dairy products, into Australia without an import permit.
- Some goods can bring FMD with them, including meat, dairy and some animal products. Check what can come in before you order it online or ask your family overseas to send you goods.
- Check www.agriculture.gov.au/travelling/bringing-mailing-goods before you travel or mail goods to Australia. Some foods, animal and plant products can carry pests or diseases that you won't know are there.

Government measures

- Following official confirmation from Indonesian authorities that FMD had spread to Bali, new measures were immediately imposed to protect Australia from an FMD incursion. This is due to the high number of people who travel between Bali and Australia.
- These measures include:
 - the introduction of sanitation foot mats at international terminals for passengers arriving from Indonesia.
 - deployment of biosecurity detector dogs deployed in Darwin and Cairns airports
 - additional signage and the distribution of flyers at major airports, informing travellers of FMD risk and precautions
 - expanded social media campaigns, informing travellers of their biosecurity responsibilities
 - 18 new biosecurity officers in airports and mail centres
 - additional training of airport biosecurity staff
 - enhancement of mail profiling and inspections
 - biosecurity officers boarding planes on arrival
 - new biosecurity message on all inbound flights from Indonesia to reinforce Australia's strict biosecurity measures and provide FMD-specific advice to travellers.
- The Australian Government is exploring all practical measures that can be taken at the border to reduce the risk of FMD entering the country and will implement evidence-based measures on a case-by-case basis.



- The Australian Government has committed \$14 million in immediate funding to manage the increased threat of foot-and-mouth disease and lumpy skin disease, in addition to \$1.5 million to supply vaccines in Indonesia and \$500,000 to support industry-led assistance through Meat and Livestock Australia.
- The Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry has reviewed import permits for products from Indonesia that may carry FMD and suspended those of concern.
- It has also advised livestock industries to be alert, raised awareness at the border, provided advice to state and territory governments, and liaised with Indonesian counterparts.

Biosecurity and reporting

Feral animals

- Feral animals, including feral pigs, can be susceptible to FMD.
- It isn't possible to eradicate feral animals across Australia. However the AUSVETPLAN Wild Animal Response Strategy outlines procedures to manage wild animals in the event of an animal disease outbreak such as FMD.
- The Northern Australia Quarantine Strategy program carries out surveillance for animal diseases in livestock and feral animals across the north of Western Australia, the Northern Territory and Queensland and works closely with landholders, industry and communities to increase awareness of these risks.
- Livestock producers should put measures in place, where possible, to prevent feral animals coming into contact with their stock. This could include making sure boundary fences are in good order and developing a wild and feral animal control program.

Livestock owners

- All travellers have now been advised to avoid interacting with livestock and going to farms in Indonesia. If you have had contact with livestock or visited farms, avoid contact with Australian livestock or farms for 7 days after your return.
- Livestock producers must be alert for signs of disease in their animals. If animals are showing signs of illness that are consistent with FMD, this must be reported as a matter of urgency to the **Emergency Animal Disease Watch Hotline** on **1800 675 888** or to your local veterinarian.
- Feeding meat, animal products and imported dairy goods to pigs is illegal throughout Australia. This practice is known as feeding prohibited pig feed (swill) and can provide a high-risk pathway for FMD to enter Australia.



- All livestock owners should have stringent biosecurity measures in place on their property, and now is the time to get a Farm Biosecurity Plan in place. To access free farm biosecurity advice and resources visit **farmbiosecurity.com.au**.

Northern Australia

- Do not move live animals, meat and dairy products, untanned hides or skins, other animal products or soil between the Torres Strait Protected Zone and the Torres Strait Permanent Biosecurity Monitoring Zone or to mainland Australia without a permit and an inspection by a Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry biosecurity officer.
- Keep a watch for planes or boats in your region that may be carrying animals or animal products onboard. Also keep watch for food and garbage washed up on the beach that could potentially be contaminated with the virus. If you see any of these threats, contact a local ranger or your nearest Northern Australia Quarantine Strategy office.

About FMD

- FMD is a highly contagious animal disease that affects all cloven-hoofed animals including cattle, sheep, goats, camelids, deer and pigs. Cloven-hoofed animals are those with a divided toe. It does not affect horses or zebras. (Camelids include alpacas, llamas and camels).
- FMD virus is carried by live animals and in meat and dairy products, as well as in soil, bones, untreated hides, vehicles and equipment used with these animals. It can also be carried on people's clothing and footwear.
- FMD virus can survive in frozen, chilled and freeze-dried foods including meat and dairy products.
- FMD spreads rapidly through close contact between animals as the virus is excreted in breath, saliva, mucous, milk and faeces.
- FMD spread from farm to farm is also possible through virus particles carried on equipment and clothing, in mud or manure on footwear and vehicle tyres or by wind.
- The FMD virus can survive in some animal products (meat and dairy products) and infect animals who consume these products.

Clinical signs

- Cattle, pigs, sheep, buffalo, deer, camelids and goats may show fever, drooling and reluctance to move.
- These animals can suffer from blisters on the mouth, snout, tongue, lips or between and above the hooves on the feet.



- Blisters may be intact or ruptured, exposing raw tissue which is very painful.
- The free [Emergency Animal Diseases Field Guide for Veterinarians](#) has more specific information about FMD.

Human health

- There is no threat to human health from this disease. FMD is not the same as hand-foot-and-mouth disease which is a common disease in young children.

Vaccination in Australia

- Currently Australia is recognised as ‘free from FMD, without vaccination’. This allows Australia’s international trade to continue. If vaccination were implemented, Australia would lose this status, which would affect trade.
- The [decision of whether to vaccinate](#) and how to apply vaccination is complex and will depend on many factors including:
 - the nature of the outbreak
 - epidemiological considerations
 - logistical and resourcing issues
 - animal welfare considerations
 - industry and public attitudes
 - socio-economic considerations
 - trade implications
 - international standards
 - international experiences with the use of vaccination in previously free countries.
- The Consultative Committee on Emergency Animal Diseases (CCEAD) will consider the use of vaccination from day one of an FMD response.
- Australia has an overseas FMD vaccine bank and vaccine will be available for use if there is an incursion in Australia.

Impacts

- FMD is considered one of Australia’s greatest biosecurity threats.



- An incursion would have severe consequences for Australia's animal health and trade.
- An uncontrolled outbreak could lead to immediate closure of our meat export markets for more than a year. In 2022, ABARES estimated that a large FMD incursion across multiple states would have a direct economic impact of around \$80 billion.
- An FMD outbreak is not just a threat to the Australian livestock sector. It will impact other agricultural industries, particularly through supply chain demand. It could be felt well beyond farming communities, including impacts on hospitality and tourism, and the domestic supply of food products.

Government and industry preparedness

- Australian, state and territory governments are working closely with our livestock industries to stay-up-to date on the situation in Indonesia, and to highlight the need for vigilance and prevention activities.
- Australia has detailed, well-rehearsed FMD response plans and arrangements in place. Governments and industry's preparedness is continuously reviewed.
- The [AUSVETPLAN response strategy for FMD](#) is part of our national response arrangements. The plan sets out the nationally agreed approach that would be taken to respond to FMD if it occurred in Australia. The plan includes an assessment of the role of vaccination in responding to an incursion.
- Australia's Emergency Animal Disease Response Agreement (EADRA) documents nationally agreed arrangements for the cost sharing of compensation paid to affected livestock enterprises.
- Compensation payments are managed under jurisdictional legislation and processes which vary to some extent between individual states and territories and the Australian Government.
- [Find out more on EADRA](#) on the Animal Health Australia website.

History of the disease

- FMD outbreaks are common in Asia, the Middle East, South America and parts of Africa.
- Outbreaks of FMD in the United Kingdom in 2001 and 2007 resulted in millions of animals being destroyed and billions of dollars of revenue lost. The impacts of these outbreaks were felt way beyond livestock owners. There were significant impacts on on tourism, small businesses, and schools. Mental health impacts were also a significant aftermath.
- Taiwan reported several outbreaks beginning in February 2009.



NOT FOR FURTHER DISTRIBUTION

- In 2010, both Japan and the Republic of Korea experienced large FMD outbreaks which required extensive programs to control the disease. The 2010–11 Korean outbreak is estimated to have cost the government some 3 trillion won, equivalent to about \$US 2.7 billion.

Farley, Lisa (PIRSA)

From: Jones, Lucas (PIRSA)
Sent: Wednesday, 15 June 2022 9:30 AM
To: Rhodes, Nathan (PIRSA)
Subject: Hansard- FMD
Attachments: LC.2022 06 04.PUBLISH-4-20014.pdf

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

Hi Nathan,

Can you advise if you see any issues with the discussion around foot and mouth?

Regards

Lucas

Lucas Jones | Senior Ministerial Advisor
Office of the Minister for Primary Industries and Regional Development
Office of the Minister for Forest Industries

Level 10, 1 King William Street, Adelaide | GPO Box 1671 Adelaide SA 5001
P: +61 8 8226 2931 | **M:** 0418 927 490 **E:** lucas.jones@sa.gov.au



**Government of
South Australia**

[Proof]



Fifty-Fifth Parliament

First Session

SOUTH AUSTRALIA

PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES

(HANSARD)

Tuesday, 14 June 2022

LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL

Confidential and Subject to Revision

Corrections to be returned via the Change Request form by 1pm on the day following the above sitting day

We are dedicated to trying to eradicate fruit fly in the Riverland and, indeed, in South Australia. The pest-free area is a valuable competitive advantage, particularly for international markets. The \$1.3 billion horticulture industry is of incredible importance to our state, and that, of course, is why it's very important that, despite the wish to score political points, we don't make fruit fly a political football. It's really important that we have a bipartisan approach to this, and that's certainly the approach that I took when I was in opposition.

It's important to recognise and acknowledge the importance of the industry. It's important to recognise and acknowledge the very hard work that all the stakeholders in this very difficult challenge have been putting in. That includes my department, it includes the Riverland Fruit Fly Committee and it includes the many industry members who have been involved in the eradication efforts and in consultation around the best way forward.

It's incredibly important that we actually work together on this, because this is an issue not just for fruit growers and this is an issue not just for the Riverland; this is an issue for our state. It's important for our state economy, and it's important for the many thousands of people who work within the horticulture industry and the indirect jobs that flow from it.

So, my question could perhaps be (if I were to ask questions; of course I am answering them here): were similar questions asked of the previous minister in the Liberal government about the way the funding was established? Is it only now that there is some implied problem with reacting to outbreaks by going to seek the funding needed to address them? This is exactly the same process—exactly the same process—in terms of accessing funding that was used by the former Liberal government. They have dealt with fruit fly for two years prior to the change of government. They accessed funding by going back to DTF if and when more funding was required to address these eradication attempts. That is exactly what I have been doing and exactly what I will continue to do.

FOOT-AND-MOUTH DISEASE

The Hon. N.J. CENTOFANTI (Leader of the Opposition) (14:32): I seek leave to make a brief statement before asking the Minister for Primary Industries and Regional Development a question regarding the budget.

Leave granted.

The Hon. N.J. CENTOFANTI: The Indonesian government reported at the end of May that more than 20,000 livestock had been infected by foot-and-mouth disease in 16 provinces. Foot-and-mouth disease is a contagious viral disease of livestock which, if present in Australia, could have catastrophic consequences for both animal health and trade. In the budget papers released on 2 June, biosecurity targets for 2022-23 included 'emerging high-level threats of Lumpy Skin Disease, African Swine Fever and Avian Influenza'.

My question to the minister is: given the current outbreaks of foot-and-mouth disease in Indonesia, why wasn't this potential catastrophic disease included as a priority or target in her department's budget?

The Hon. C.M. SCRIVEN (Minister for Primary Industries and Regional Development, Minister for Forest Industries) (14:33): I thank the Leader of the Opposition for her question. While there has been no official declaration of foot-and-mouth disease in Australia, as mentioned there have been outbreaks in Indonesia. Despite the fact that there is no official declaration in Australia, the Australian government's Department of Agriculture, Water and Environment is engaged with Indonesia on a constant basis. In the event that an exotic animal disease occurs, it is centrally coordinated through the Consultative Committee on Emergency Animal Disease (CCEAD).

The financial support required is requested through Treasury and relevant federal agencies, which is also how fruit fly has been managed over the last two years. I am advised that, should foot-and-mouth be detected in South Australia, the State Emergency Management Committee would also be activated. We continue to work closely with the federal government, our colleagues interstate and our local livestock industry, remaining alert to any developments.

It is appropriate that we take great stock of any risks in terms of foot-and-mouth disease, because it is indeed one of Australia's greatest livestock biosecurity risks. The April 2022 outbreak

was detected in cattle in Indonesia. It has also been detected in East Java and Sumatra. It is indeed likely that it is now more widespread.

The Australian government has offered assistance to Indonesia to combat and contain the foot-and-mouth disease outbreak. This comes on top of the assistance already being provided to respond to an outbreak of lumpy skin disease recently detected in Sumatra. It is likely that this outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease in Indonesia will take many years to eradicate. This biosecurity threat will remain a high risk to Australia for the near future.

I have mentioned in this place before that a foot-and-mouth disease outbreak would have devastating impacts on Australia's livestock industry, with severe economic losses due to the shutdown of Australia's export markets for live animals, meat and animal products. I have also mentioned, I think in the last question time, the estimated impacts in dollar terms of a foot-and-mouth disease outbreak.

PIRSA will be working closely with our state peak industry bodies and nationally through working groups to contribute to both national and state preparedness activities. PIRSA's key areas of activity for preparedness will be enhanced surveillance to ensure early detection of disease and planning to ensure a rapid and effective response should detection of this disease occur in Australia. This will include a communication strategy to complement the national efforts being undertaken.

I am also advised that many of the preparedness activities being undertaken for a potential lumpy skin disease outbreak will address the threat of foot-and-mouth disease. An industry task force has been established to work on preparedness activities, and the resourcing required will be extensive. It is expected that foot-and-mouth disease preparedness and costings will be raised at national cabinet.

FOOT-AND-MOUTH DISEASE

The Hon. N.J. CENTOFANTI (Leader of the Opposition) (14:36): I seek leave to make a brief statement before asking the Minister for Primary Industries and Regional Development a question regarding foot-and-mouth disease.

Leave granted.

The Hon. N.J. CENTOFANTI: The New South Wales government has announced \$164 million in funding to address growing biosecurity concerns that threaten the agricultural industry. With outbreaks of foot-and-mouth disease and lumpy skin in Indonesia, New South Wales Deputy Premier and Minister for Regional New South Wales, Paul Toole, has said, 'We want to make sure biosecurity does not become the next big issue.' My questions to the minister are:

1. Will the Malinauskas Labor government follow the strong leadership of New South Wales and emulate its investment to address biosecurity concerns that threaten South Australia's agricultural industry?

2. What efforts are being made by the Malinauskas Labor government to investigate the development and/or acquisition of appropriate vaccines which would allow livestock to be vaccinated against the disease whilst keeping trade open?

3. What is her government doing to make sure foot-and-mouth disease does not become the next big issue for South Australia's livestock industry?

The Hon. C.M. SCRIVEN (Minister for Primary Industries and Regional Development, Minister for Forest Industries) (14:37): As I mentioned in answer to the previous question, we are working closely with our national colleagues and also in cross-jurisdictional forums to ensure that this issue is addressed.

ABORIGINAL VETERANS COMMEMORATIVE SERVICE

The Hon. R.B. MARTIN (14:38): My question is to the Minister for Aboriginal Affairs.

Members interjecting:

The PRESIDENT: Order!

Farley, Lisa (PIRSA)

From: Rhodes, Nathan (PIRSA)
Sent: Tuesday, 2 August 2022 9:03 PM
To: Jones, Lucas (PIRSA)
Cc: Carr, Mary (PIRSA); Doroudi, Mehdi (PIRSA)
Subject: Ministers speaking points 4082022 LSA webinar.docx
Attachments: Ministers speaking points 4082022 LSA webinar.docx

OFFICIAL

Hi Lucas – attached are some proposed speaking points for Minister Scriven for the Livestock SA industry forum on Thursday evening. Given May Carr will follow Minister Scriven and will cover the actions that we are delivering to prepare, I have tried to keep this high-level and broad.

Happy to add or amend as necessary.

Thanks, Nathan

Livestock SA Emergency Animal Disease Industry Forum – Speaking Points for Minister Scriven

- Good evening everyone and thank you for being online to discuss an issue of such significance and of critical importance to Australian agriculture.
- I was pleased to hear that the PIRSA-Industry EAD workshop today was a success and that the discussions held were a great first step in state level preparedness for emergency responses. I thank the participants from across industry who have contributed to the workshop and Livestock SA, Pork SA, and the South Australian Dairy Association for their leadership in organising the event.
- The biosecurity environment in our region has been shifting for a number of years now, but has become increasingly rapid as first African Swine Fever, then Lumpy Skin disease spread through south east Asia and most recently Indonesia losing its disease free status for Foot and Mouth disease bringing diseases closer to our shores.
- This is cause for concern. However, Australia has a strong biosecurity system that is unique around the world. It has served us well for many years, and continues to adapt to shifting global biosecurity threats, to ensure it continues to protect our agricultural industries and way of life.
- The detection of Lumpy Skin Disease and then Foot and Mouth Disease in Indonesia was not the start of South Australia's preparation and preparedness to respond to possible future incursions. It did however highlight that our unique biosecurity status cannot be taken for granted, and it is constantly threatened by possible incursions from our near neighbours and those further afield.
- The SA Government understands the risks and impacts posed by these threats and is committed to doing everything it can to assist both the commonwealth and industry to ensure that South Australia, and Australia, remain free of these damaging exotic diseases.
- PIRSA has a long-running well supported disease surveillance and EAD preparedness program, which is focused on detecting EAD quickly, and readying the agency to implement a fast and effective eradication response.
- The Government is seeking to take a bipartisan approach to biosecurity matters. These issues have such significant ramifications for Australian agriculture that the Parliament needs to be as united as possible in support of South Australian agriculture.
- To that end, my department has briefed the Shadow Minister for Primary Industries on the current state of Foot and Mouth disease in Indonesia, and the readiness we have in place for a possible incursion.
- Tomorrow (Friday 5 August), my department will offer a similar briefing to all regional members of parliament. It is important that we all understand the seriousness of the current situation, but also understand the damage that can be done by injudicious public statements. Our public messaging and media reporting is observed by our international trading partners, and sensationalist and inaccurate reporting can harm our trading relationships.
- My department has also been active in briefing the government, including the State Emergency Centre, and is scheduled to brief the State Emergency Management Committee later this month. These briefings are necessary preparation for the future, and are not because we have the disease in this country.
- I have spoken with agriculture ministers from all jurisdictions on the national actions being undertaken to improve our border controls in response to the heightened risk.
- We have seen action at Adelaide Airport International Arrivals, which includes the installation of sanitisation mats on arrival, and increased screening of passengers on flights from Bali.

- The detection of illegal meat products on a passenger, shows the measures are necessary and are working.
- The Australian Government also used Federal powers for the first time at Adelaide Airport, to give additional powers to their biosecurity officers to further enhance their ability to detect non-compliance.
- Senior PIRSA officers are active participants in the EAD Taskforce, which while originally focused on preparedness for an incursion of LSD, is now also considering FMD.
- There are a number of other actions underway at a state level that will boost both the government and industry preparedness for such a response, and today's workshop is part of that. The Chief Veterinary Officer Mary Carr will speak further about those other actions.
- Thanks to Livestock SA for providing this opportunity to speak with you all this evening, and I look forward to hearing your questions and concerns.

Farley, Lisa (PIRSA)

From: Rhodes, Nathan (PIRSA)
Sent: Wednesday, 27 July 2022 7:01 PM
To: Spencer, Meagan (PIRSA)
Subject: National Biosecurity strategy
Attachments: 20210726_National_Biosecurity_Strategy_draft no signatures.pdf

Hi Meagan

Attached is the near final version of the NBS - just awaiting signatures. I saw you have sent through the ministers signature - thank you. I will forward it to the Commonwealth.

Regards Nathan

Nathan Rhodes - Executive Director

0412 376 450

DRAFT


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
NATIONAL BIOSECURITY STRATEGY

Connected

Resilient

Shared





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Acknowledgement of Country

We acknowledge the Traditional Custodians of Australia and their continuing connection to land and sea, waters, environment and community. We pay our respects to the Traditional Custodians of the lands we live and work on, their culture, and their Elders past and present.

Ministerial foreword

We are pleased to present Australia's first National Biosecurity Strategy – our strategic roadmap for Australia's biosecurity system over the next 10 years.

Our biosecurity system plays a critical role in maintaining a strong agricultural sector, supporting our environment, biodiversity and the way of life we all enjoy. However, the risks we're facing are closer and more threatening than ever before. This has never been clearer than current efforts to combat foot-and-mouth disease outbreaks in neighbouring countries.

Our system – collectively – needs to be continually strengthened so that we can better address these challenges as they emerge. This national strategy – a product of the combined thinking of government, industry and the community, and developed with the support of a reference group of biosecurity stakeholders – provides the path ahead, guided by 6 priority areas to coordinate our efforts.

We look forward to working with industry, environmental groups, Traditional Owners, research organisations, and the community to develop a more connected, resilient and shared national biosecurity system that is up to the task of countering the threats facing Australia.

Drafting note:
signatures to be inserted

NATIONAL BIOSECURITY STRATEGY REFERENCE GROUP

Australian Banana Growers' Council	National Farmers' Federation
CSIRO	Seafood Industry Australia
Freight and Trade Alliance	Torres Strait Regional Authority
Invasive Species Council	Rural Research and Development Corporations representative – Australian Pork Limited

Purpose of the National Biosecurity Strategy

WHAT IS THE NATIONAL BIOSECURITY STRATEGY?

The biosecurity risks facing us are becoming increasingly complex and harder to manage. In this challenging and changing environment, we need to continually evolve our system to ensure our biosecurity remains strong.

The National Biosecurity Strategy guides this evolution.

Our national system is greater than the sum of its parts. It's a multilayered network of people, critical infrastructure and technology, partnerships, processes and regulatory activities that function cohesively overseas, at our border and within Australia to protect our national interests.

Our strategy builds from this solid foundation, uniting us behind a collective vision and purpose to enhance the significant capability already within our biosecurity system.

As we all share the benefits of our biosecurity system, we all have a valuable role to play in supporting it. This strategy will help us to work more effectively together, driving improved collaboration, innovation, awareness and behavioural changes at local, regional, national and international levels.

This strategy outlines the current and future biosecurity environment and includes priority areas with initial actions for implementation. Importantly, it also sets the approach for us to work together to develop additional actions, drive its implementation and monitor our progress.

This strategy's scope covers exotic and established pests, weeds and diseases, including zoonotic diseases, but does not extend to human biosecurity.

It is informed by, and builds on, existing strategies and plans and the considerable efforts already being undertaken by the Australian, state and territory governments, industry, Indigenous Australians, landowners and managers, environmental groups and the community. The strategy was developed in consultation with these stakeholders, overseen by the National Biosecurity Committee (NBC).

Our 10-year strategy is a living document that will be reviewed every 5 years or sooner if there is a significant change to the risks, challenges or opportunities facing us.



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

EVOLVING AUSTRALIA'S BIOSECURITY SYSTEM

Our land, air, seas and waterways are deeply interwoven with our way of life – our people, environment and economy – which is why our biosecurity system is so valuable.

It's what protects us and the communities we live in from the harmful impacts of exotic and established pests, weeds and diseases. Even a single outbreak can have potentially devastating, costly and far-reaching impacts for Australia.

While our biosecurity system has served us well, biosecurity risks are growing and increasing in complexity, driven by factors such as climate change, unpredictable trade and travel patterns and changes in land use.

More than ever before – as highlighted by foot-and-mouth disease and lumpy skin disease outbreaks on our doorstep – we are dealing with multiple risks, on multiple fronts, at the same time.

To ensure we continue to meet the challenges of today and tomorrow, we must act now and evolve how we work together.

OUR VISION FOR AUSTRALIA'S FUTURE BIOSECURITY SYSTEM

A biosecurity system that protects Australia and our way of life –

Connected

Resilient

Shared

SHARED PURPOSE BRINGING US TOGETHER

A risk-based system underpinned by science that protects Australia's people, our environment, economy and lifestyle from the biosecurity threats of today and tomorrow.

6 PRIORITY AREAS TO EVOLVE OUR SYSTEM

To achieve our vision and purpose, we will act in 6 priority areas. Our 6 priority areas have guided the development of initial actions and will help us to focus our efforts in the areas with the biggest impact.



Shared biosecurity culture

We will enhance our **culture of biosecurity action** so that everyone understands its importance and plays their part.



Stronger partnerships

We will strengthen and expand **partnerships and networks** between all stakeholders at local, regional, national and international levels.



Highly skilled workforce

We will develop and sustain a **highly skilled workforce** to ensure we have the right capability and capacity, in the right place, at the right time.



Coordinated preparedness and response

We will boost our system's **adaptability and its capacity** to prevent, detect, manage, respond to and recover from outbreaks.



Sustainable investment

We will ensure **funding and investment** is sufficient, co-funded, transparent, targeted to our priorities and sustainable for the long term.



Integration supported by technology, research and data

We will create a more **connected, efficient and science-based** system to facilitate more timely, informed and risk-based decisions.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

WE WILL TAKE ACTION IN OUR 6 PRIORITY AREAS



Shared biosecurity culture

Build on and develop national awareness and education programs

Drive positive biosecurity behaviours and incentivise compliance

Revitalise national communication, engagement and reporting mechanisms

Determine opportunities to embed biosecurity as a consideration into broader decision-making, risk and business planning



Stronger partnerships

Enhance partnerships and engagement with Indigenous Australians

Collaboratively review and refine roles and responsibilities

Review governance arrangements to ensure they include relevant stakeholders

Strengthen the involvement of environmental agencies and environmental and community groups

Identify and implement opportunities for greater industry and community involvement in decision-making bodies

Deepen international partnerships and capacity building

Strengthen understanding of antimicrobial and pesticide resistance and zoonotic pathways

Coordinate our international advocacy efforts to help shape global standards, rules and conditions



Highly skilled workforce

Identify current and future skills needs in key areas

Develop a national workforce strategy to build, retain and deploy capability

Build upon and expand existing cooperative and partnership arrangements

Strengthen professional development programs



Sustainable investment

Work together to identify funding needs and determine priorities

Strengthen frameworks to agree and deliver priority investments

Advance co-funding and investment strategies with stakeholders

Increase the transparency of biosecurity funding

Complete the development of a system performance and evaluation framework



Coordinated preparedness and response

Undertake and promote regular national preparedness exercises

Advance regionally based planning activities

Continually review and update risk information to inform priorities

Actively embed continuous learning

Strengthen traceability arrangements

Enhance our national surveillance and early detection arrangements

Evolve our national information management frameworks



Integration supported by technology, research and data

Continue to invest in and roll out transformative technologies to digitise and automate processes

Increase stakeholder coordination to prioritise, drive and deliver national research outcomes

Actively share data and research widely

Enhance the accessibility and use of surveillance and interception data

Further support innovations to build science and research capacity

Encourage the uptake of existing and emerging technologies, systems and processes

Increase the use of citizen science, Indigenous knowledge and on the ground insights

Encourage greater private sector investment in the development and delivery of biosecurity innovations

OUR WAY FORWARD DRIVING COLLABORATIVE ACTION

More than 30 initial actions across our 6 priority areas have been developed in collaboration with stakeholders.

Our next steps will be to:

- identify those initial actions that can be implemented immediately
- design a national implementation plan that sets out governance arrangements and guides future planning
- develop a national action plan that builds upon our initial actions and establishes a framework for monitoring and evaluation to keep us accountable.

As we all share in the success of our biosecurity system, a diverse range of stakeholders will be involved in developing, delivering and reviewing progress against the national action plan.

The plan will also be complemented by sector based, regional or other action plans developed by stakeholders.

The NBC will ultimately oversee the strategy's implementation, working with a National Biosecurity Strategy Implementation Committee comprised of biosecurity stakeholders.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

WHAT IS BIOSECURITY?

Australia is free from many harmful pests, weeds and diseases found elsewhere in the world. Our animal, plant, human and environmental health outcomes rely on strong biosecurity – that is, the controls and measures to manage the risk of these pests, weeds and diseases entering, emerging, establishing or spreading within Australia.

KEY BIOSECURITY TERMS

EXOTIC

A pest, weed or disease that is not currently known to be present in Australia, or, if present, is subject to a nationally agreed eradication program.


ESTABLISHED

A self-sustaining pest, weed or disease that occurs in Australia and is not regarded as eradicable. An established pest, weed or disease may be widely distributed across Australia or regionally distributed. A regionally distributed established pest, weed or disease may be the subject of management measures to mitigate further spread.

THE REACH AND IMPACT OF OUR BIOSECURITY SYSTEM

SCALE OF BIOSECURITY ACTIVITY ACROSS AUSTRALIA

 **115m**
mail items received on average each year over five years (2016-17 to 2020-21)

 **2.6m**
shipping containers arrived in Australia (2020-21)


 **OVER 15,100**
inspections were conducted on international vessels (2020-21)

 **OVER 2,600**
detections made post-biosecurity control (2020-21)

SAFEGUARDING AUSTRALIA'S INDUSTRIES, ENVIRONMENT, LIVELIHOODS AND WAY OF LIFE

 **1.6m**
jobs across the agricultural supply chain


 **\$251.5b**
total flow of benefits per year arising from assets vulnerable to biosecurity hazards, including infrastructure, agriculture, forestry and seafood industries and companion animals (2021 estimate)

 **\$73.5b**
in gross value of agricultural, forestry and seafood production (2020-21 estimate)


 **\$52.3b**
in agricultural, forestry and seafood exports (2020-21 estimate)


 **\$50.4b**
direct tourism contribution to Australia's GDP (2019-20 estimate)


ACTUAL AND POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF OUTBREAKS AND INCURSIONS

 **\$80b**
direct economic impact to Australia over 10 years in present value terms in the event of a large multi-state foot-and-mouth disease outbreak (2020-21 estimate)

 **\$5b**
annual cost to Australia for weed control measures and lost production (2018 estimate)

 **\$1.3b**
potential cost to our producers and consumers of pollination-dependent crops over 30 years in the event of a varroa mite incursion (2012 estimate)

 **\$390b**
cost of damages due to invasive species over the past 6 decades (2021 estimate)

 **MORE THAN 380 NATIVE SPECIES**
of plants have proved capable of being infected by myrtle rust, with this number likely to grow (2020 estimate)

 **\$7.8-11.1b**
potential cost to Australian horticultural industries over 50 years in present value terms if a worst-case *Xylella fastidiosa* incursion occurred (2021 estimate)

Why Australia needs biosecurity

We all enjoy the benefits of biosecurity. It's what protects our plants, animals and ecosystems, enables us to generate high-quality primary produce, provides access to export markets and supports our trusted international reputation with trading partners.

Strong biosecurity also supports other strategic priorities for Australia, from bioterrorism and national security, through to pandemic management and global food security.

As the risk landscape rapidly changes, our natural and productive ecosystems are becoming increasingly vulnerable to biosecurity risks. These risks can devastate native wildlife, impact our agricultural, seafood and forestry industries and compromise our clean air, water and land.

Even though our biosecurity system has served us well, we face the challenge of managing a range of growing and changing threats. We can't reduce our biosecurity risk to zero and even a single outbreak has the potential to affect our prosperity, environment, national security, ability to trade and way of life.

Pest, weed and disease outbreaks can potentially lead to:

- devastating impacts to agricultural and horticultural industries and their supply chains through lower yields or damage to crops, produce, livestock or fisheries, as well as increased costs for protection, response or ongoing management activities. These costs are often passed onto customers.
- damage to our unique natural environment and ecosystems, plants and animals.
- an inability for Australian primary producers to access export markets, as well as possible reputational damage to our premium, high-quality produce.
- detrimental impacts to land and sea Country of value to Indigenous Australians and the wider community.
- delays in access to essential produce due to supply chain disruptions and the impact of biosecurity response activities on stock levels or distribution channels.
- negative impacts on our amenity, cultural heritage, way of life and human health. COVID-19, for example, demonstrated the significant impact zoonoses can have on our health, economy and day-to-day lives.

A strong, resilient and adaptable biosecurity system is critical to ensure we manage these increasingly complex risks.



Image: Mark Stevenson

FOOT-AND-MOUTH DISEASE

Foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) is a highly contagious animal disease that affects all cloven-hoofed animals, in particular cattle, sheep, pigs, goats and deer. FMD is of major concern because of the number of susceptible species and its highly contagious nature which makes it more difficult to control and eradicate. The virus can be spread via aerosols, in saliva, faeces and semen, on equipment, vehicles and footwear, as well as in meat and dairy products.

A widespread outbreak of FMD would have significant consequences for Australia's animal industries, with the closure of export markets potentially resulting in a direct economic impact of around \$80 billion over 10 years. Additionally, large numbers of animals may have to be slaughtered and many farmers, livestock and feed transporters, meat processors and other industry members would be severely affected, with significant flow-on effects to regional communities.

Australia has strict, well-established processes to manage the biosecurity risks associated with travellers, crews, and livestock vessels returning to Australia from countries with FMD. These include profiling for biosecurity screening, detailed assessments and inspections by biosecurity officers of passengers upon arrival at their first point of entry in Australia. These measures have been expanded given the presence of FMD in Indonesia.

The most significant risk for entry of FMD into Australia is through illegal importation of meat and dairy products from infected animals that is then fed to pigs (known as swill feeding). The Australian Government has worked with states and territories, as well as industry, to establish nationally agreed definitions of swill feeding, and to improve compliance with the ban on swill feeding in Australia.

Australia maintains a FMD vaccine bank internationally. This contains enough FMD antigens to provide protection against the circulating strains of FMD that pose a risk to Australia's livestock industries.

The Australian, state and territory governments, together with the affected production industries, have rapid and effective emergency response plans in place to manage potential outbreaks. These have been, and continue to be, exercised to ensure we can act effectively should this be required.

The Australian Government continuously works with our closest neighbours, including Indonesia, Timor-Leste and Papua New Guinea, to help improve their FMD preparedness and response capability and the early diagnosis of the disease, by providing technical expertise and assistance in vaccine procurement.

KEY – IMPACTS

- Amenity
- Economy
- Environment

KEY – PRIORITIES

- Shared biosecurity culture
- Highly skilled workforce
- Sustainable investment
- Stronger partnerships
- Coordinated preparedness and response
- Integration supported by technology, research and data

How our biosecurity system works

Australia's biosecurity system is multilayered with prevention, management and response activities undertaken overseas, at and within our borders, including our external territories. Our system relies heavily on the support of all stakeholders, such as governments, industry, research organisations, agricultural and environmental groups, Indigenous communities and individuals.

Without strong partnerships at all levels, we can't have a strong biosecurity system.

OVERSEAS

The Australian Government and importers work with overseas counterparts to identify and mitigate biosecurity risks before they reach our border, while also undertaking capacity building activities, including in the Indo-Pacific region, to further our biosecurity, trade, security and national interests. Officials facilitate trade in line with our international obligations, apply import conditions and controls, and engage in risk and intelligence gathering, analysis and horizon scanning. Our overseas partners and industry provide vital intelligence on risks and traceability of products to support this work.


AT OUR BORDER

Robust regulatory, surveillance and quarantine arrangements are in place to prevent, detect and intercept risks at our national border before they can do us harm. The Australian Government operates border controls, including screening, assessment, inspections and quarantine processes, to support this effort. Travellers have a role to play through their awareness of the importance of biosecurity and declaring goods if required. Industry also helps to protect us by having systems in place to proactively manage risks, applying treatments where needed and participating in surveillance activities.


WITHIN AUSTRALIA

Industry, governments, Natural Resource Management (NRM) organisations, environmental groups, landowners and managers and the wider community work at regional and local levels to prevent, plan for, detect and respond to outbreaks. The Australian, state and territory governments lead regulatory activities. Industry and governments coordinate and fund management and response activities under a range of deeds and agreements and all system participants work together on the ground to reduce the possibility and impact of further spread within and across borders. The general public plays a critical role in surveillance and the reporting of pest, weed and disease outbreaks. Research organisations work to enhance our understanding of biosecurity risks and examine new approaches to improve our system in areas like diagnostics, containment and treatments.

Our biosecurity system includes a wide range of stakeholders, from Traditional Owners, veterinarians, park rangers, landowners, farmers, entomologists and many more. The [National Biosecurity Statement](#) (2018) provided an overview of stakeholder roles and the national strategy builds from this strong foundation. One of our initial actions will see us work together to ensure everyone's roles are clear and reflect the future needs of our system.



OUR BIOSECURITY SYSTEM IN ACTION



RESPONSIBILITIES

- Australian Government
- State, territory and local governments
- ▲ Industry
- ◆ Research organisations
- ◆ Representative bodies (e.g. peak bodies, NRM organisations, environmental and community groups etc.)
- ◆ Individuals and communities

Biosecurity activity categories sourced from Centre of Excellence for Biosecurity Risk Analysis (CEBRA), Year 1 Report: Valuing Australia's Biosecurity System, Project 1607A – Milestone 6, 28 November 2017, University of Melbourne.

KHAPRA BEETLE

PEST, WEED AND DISEASE
OUTBREAKS CAN HAVE
FAR-REACHING IMPACTS

KHAPRA BEETLE COULD COST
AUSTRALIA
\$15.5B OVER 20 YEARS
IF IT BECAME ESTABLISHED
(2014 ESTIMATE)

**In 2020-21, responses to 20 interceptions
of the khapra beetle (*Trogoderma granarium*)
were managed across Australia.**

Changes in global trade patterns, such as increased volumes of goods, container movements and declining container hygiene are some of the drivers of recent increases in khapra beetle interceptions.

KHAPRA BEETLE

Smaller than a grain of rice, khapra beetle is a serious pest that can contaminate stored grains, rice, oilseeds and dried foodstuffs. It is not established in Australia. Khapra beetle can cause losses of up to 75% from direct feeding. Infested produce also becomes contaminated with beetles, cast skins and hairs from larvae, which can pose a health risk and are difficult to remove from storage structures and transport vessels.

If it were to establish here, many of our trading partners would refuse to buy our stored produce, particularly grains. Given Australia exports 65 to 75% of the grain we grow to more than 50 countries, this could cause significant economic losses.

Responding to a khapra beetle (or another exotic pest, weed or disease) outbreak can have wide ranging impacts across the supply chain.

AUSTRALIA
EXPORTS
65-75%
OF THE GRAIN
WE GROW

EXPORTING
TO MORE THAN
50
COUNTRIES

THE KHAPRA BEETLE IS SMALLER
THAN A GRAIN OF RICE

Image: *Khapra beetle adult and
larva on grains of rice*



**AFFECTED CUSTOMERS
HAD THEIR PURCHASES
REPLACED AND THE GOODS
WERE FUMIGATED**

The incident affected around 300 retail customers across Australia who had their homes and cars inspected and treated with insecticides, with some of their food and pet food collected for destruction. This response prevented the pest from establishing in Australia which could have been severely damaging to our domestic grain producers.



**IMMEDIATE ACTION WAS
TAKEN ACROSS OUR
BIOSECURITY SYSTEM**

The retailer worked closely with the Australian Government to remove the goods that were in this consignment from sale across Australia. It secured those goods that had made their way through the supply chain – from the port to the warehouse, to the distributor, to retailers and to customers' homes.



**OCTOBER 2020
A DETECTION IN
IMPORTED GOODS**

The Australian, state and territory governments began investigating and managing a detection of khapra beetle in a container of goods imported by a large retailer. This detection was initially reported by a member of the public who found khapra beetle in packaging material and notified biosecurity officials.

**FURTHER BIOSECURITY
MEASURES WERE
IMPLEMENTED**

Additional urgent measures were developed by the Australian Government in consultation with industry to better safeguard our agricultural sector and economy. This included stricter import conditions for high-risk goods and changes to container management. State and territory governments continue to undertake further monitoring and surveillance activities.

We are facing a changing biosecurity environment

Managing biosecurity risks is becoming more complicated as we face a range of compounding challenges on multiple fronts.

CHANGING OR INCREASING BIOSECURITY RISKS



> CLIMATE CHANGE

is impacting the global environment, causing changes in weather patterns and more extreme weather events. It is altering the habitat, range and distribution of many pests, weeds and diseases, as well as increasing their ability to spread and establish in new areas.

For example, the buffalo fly, a harmful parasite that can irritate beef cattle, interrupt feeding and cause sores, is already present in Australia's north and has been moving further south as the climate changes. It is predicted that it will establish itself in South Australia and Western Australia by 2030.

Established pests, weeds and diseases reduce the ability of our natural ecosystems, plants and animals to cope with changing climatic conditions. As climate change increasingly affects global plant and animal habitats, it will have flow-on impacts for biosecurity risks associated with changes in trade and travel patterns and the effectiveness of our existing control measures.



> SHIFTING TRADE AND TRAVEL PATTERNS

have seen Australia's supply chains, trading partners and demand for goods continuously evolve and increase in complexity. This is changing the biosecurity risks reaching our international and domestic borders, while impacting how we work with trading partners and each other.

The increased movement of people, equipment and goods increases biosecurity risks, by providing more opportunities for pests, weeds and diseases to spread. Within Australia, interstate road freight is predicted to increase by 1.7% every year until 2030. Additionally, predicted increases in trade and vessel movements will result in a greater likelihood of the introduction of marine pests like Asian green mussel (*Perna viridis*), which poses a serious threat to our aquaculture, native species and ability to export seafood.



> DECREASING BIODIVERSITY

driven by invasive species, climate change and changing land uses weakens the resilience of our ecosystems to future outbreaks. It is estimated that 8 out of 10 land-based threatened species are at risk due to invasive species. This is a growing problem in Australia, and our external territories, which have unique and fragile ecosystems.

Around 20 new weed species are unintentionally introduced or become unmanaged populations each year, displacing native plant life and changing entire ecosystems, while creating fuel for bushfires and choking our waterways.

Additionally, the loss of genetic diversity in certain crops such as bananas, which are 95% Cavendish variety in Australia, exposes us to higher levels of risk in the event of a pest, weed or disease outbreak.



> CHANGING LAND USES

are altering the interface between urban and non-urban areas and the environment. As our population grows and spreads, it brings people closer to wildlife, natural habitats and agricultural areas, potentially increasing biosecurity risks. COVID-19 restrictions have accelerated this change in some areas, acting as a driver for Australians to relocate from our cities to regional centres in search of a different lifestyle.

As cities grow and peri-urban environments change, the risk of the introduction and spread of pests, weeds and diseases may increase through land development, habitat loss and the movement of people and goods into new areas. These changes to our urban and natural environment will also expose new people to biosecurity who may have limited awareness of its importance.



> INCREASING BIOSECURITY RISKS OVERSEAS

including in the Indo-Pacific, make us more susceptible to pests, weeds and diseases entering Australia. We have so far kept out many high-risk animal diseases such as rabies, foot-and-mouth disease, lumpy skin disease and African swine fever. These diseases have the potential to spread rapidly and will have devastating impacts if they were to enter Australia due to the movement and location of livestock and the presence of pest animals, like feral pigs. Geographically some of these diseases are only 5 km from Australian shores, with the movement of people, goods and marine infrastructure creating additional risk.

Climate change is altering the movement patterns of some species and increasing arrival risks through natural pathways like wind and tide. Pests such as fall armyworm, citrus canker, fruit flies and rust species can be wind borne, making them harder to track and limiting prevention and risk management options.

Australia's vast northern coastline is the frontline for many of these risks, with modern biosecurity infrastructure, trained people and strong surveillance activities critical to protecting our nation.



> ILLEGAL ACTIVITY

has increased in recent years, leading to a higher risk of biosecurity threats. The growth and increasing complexity of trade and online shopping – exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic – has inadvertently opened new pathways for illegal plants and animals to reach Australia, impacting biosecurity risks. The increasingly lucrative illegal trade in plants and animals was valued at US\$7-23 billion per year globally in 2016.

Additionally, increasing illegal fishing practices heighten the risk of exotic marine animals invading Australian waters, with poorly maintained vessels often harbouring marine pests on their infrastructure above and below the waterline.



> MAJOR GLOBAL DISRUPTIONS

such as the COVID-19 pandemic, can shock supply chains and impact the movement of goods and people. While these changes are often temporary, they can act as a catalyst for permanent changes in behaviour and supply chain pathways. For example, retailers may seek to change or diversify suppliers to improve supply chain reliability and manage business continuity risks. Other global events, such as war and natural disasters, can also impact trade and pathways, increasing or changing the biosecurity risks that can reach our border. System resilience, adaptability and responsiveness are critical to maintaining strong biosecurity in the face of an uncertain and changing environment.




Image: Alejandro Santillana

RED IMPORTED FIRE ANT

Discovered in South East Queensland (SEQ) in 2001, red imported fire ants (fire ants) are highly destructive. They can destroy crops, damage machinery, render land unusable, and hurt or kill animals and humans.

Studies have shown that there is potential for the fire ants to cost our economy \$45 billion over 30 years if their spread is left uncontrolled (2017 estimate).

Measuring just 2–6mm, fire ants are small, and their nests are often difficult to detect, especially during the warmer months. Fire ants are also extremely mobile and adaptable, flying, rafting on water, and hitching a ride in organic materials.

Unlike other countries, including the United States and China, Australia is committed to eradicating fire ants through the National Fire Ant Eradication

Program. The program is Australia's largest biosecurity eradication initiative and is committed to ridding the nation of one of the world's most invasive pests.

Funded by all Australian state and territory governments and the federal government, the program is governed by a National Steering Committee made up of representatives from each of the funding partners and led by an independent chair.

In partnership with local landowners, the program has stopped the fire ants from spreading at rates experienced overseas and confined them to a small area of SEQ. It is estimated that without the interventions undertaken by the program, fire ants would have spread as far north as Bowen, west to Longreach and south to Canberra by now.

KEY – IMPACTS



KEY – PRIORITIES



LUMPY SKIN DISEASE

Lumpy skin disease (LSD) is a highly infectious disease of cattle and water buffalo. It can cause painful skin lesions on infected animals, with animal health, welfare and production impacts. The disease is spread primarily by biting insects like flies, mosquitos and ticks – and can also be spread by contaminated equipment.

LSD is not currently present in Australia. However, it poses a serious and increasing threat given its rapid spread throughout Asia and its ability to be transmitted by wind borne insects. If LSD reaches our shores it will significantly impact domestic and international trade and cause severe economic losses for our cattle and water buffalo industries. If wild buffalo populations and cattle in northern Australia's extensive rangelands were exposed to LSD, reservoirs of the virus could establish, making eradication extremely difficult.

Biosecurity stakeholders are working closely together to prepare for an outbreak of LSD. Efforts are being focused in northern Australia, and include enhanced



surveillance activities, dedicated public awareness campaigns, training of producers and Indigenous and park rangers, additional animal inspections, partnering with Indigenous landowners and more.

The Australian Government is also supporting our near neighbours in their ongoing efforts to prevent and control the spread of LSD within the region.

CHARRU MUSSEL

The charru mussel (*Mytella strigata*) is an exotic marine pest not present in Australia that is spread through international shipping and threatens Australia's unique marine ecosystems and economy. The mussel forms dense clusters that outcompete native marine species, impact aquaculture production, damage infrastructure and foul vessels.

Native to the waters of South and Central America, the charru mussel has spread rapidly through North America and Asia. Like many marine pests, charru mussels can hitch a ride on boats and ships, either as biofouling or as larvae in a ship's ballast water. Charru mussels have been detected on vessels heading to Australia but have been successfully eradicated.

A combination of national regulations and surveillance activities are used to keep this pest out of Australian waters. As a further line of defence to prevent the



introduction of this and other marine pests, surveillance programs are also run by Australian, state and territory governments around the country.

Innovative tools like underwater drones and analysis of environmental DNA are used to support these activities. National education and engagement activities are employed to engage communities and users of Australia's vast coastline and marine environments in biosecurity.

KEY – IMPACTS



KEY – PRIORITIES



VARROA MITE

Internal and external mites of bees, including varroa mite (*Varroa destructor* and *Varroa jacobsoni*) are National Priority Plant Pests. Varroa mite, particularly *Varroa destructor*, weakens and eventually kills European honeybees (*Apis mellifera*). An outbreak, like the 2022 detection in Newcastle, NSW, could have significant repercussions for our economy, potentially costing producers and consumers of pollination-dependent crops – like almonds and pears – \$1.3 billion over 30 years (2012 estimate).

Australia is currently the only inhabited continent to successfully prevent the pest from establishing itself. While varroa mites have been detected on arrived bee swarms several times at ports across Australia, such as at the Port of Townsville (2016, 2019, 2020 – *Varroa jacobsoni*) and the Port of Melbourne (2018 – *Varroa destructor*), each time the swarms and the mites have been successfully eradicated or destroyed upon entry. This success is down to our strong partnerships, robust surveillance methods and coordinated preparedness activities across the system. National response arrangements were similarly agreed for the 2022 Newcastle outbreak.

The National Varroa Mite Eradication Program was established in 2016 after varroa mite (*Varroa jacobsoni*)



Image: *Varroa destructor*

was detected in Townsville. It was co-funded by industry, including the Australian Honey Bee Industry Council, state and territory governments and the Australian Government under national response arrangements. This covered important surveillance activities like GPS tracking, community awareness campaigns and extensive inspections of bees and their colonies, including the examination by entomologists of around 880,000 honeybee wings in 2019-20 alone. *Varroa jacobsoni* was declared eradicated in 2021 following the success of the program.

Across Australia, the close collaboration between governments, industry and the community has allowed for the rapid and transparent sharing of resources and information to effectively prepare for and eradicate this pest. The 2022 outbreak highlighted the importance of such relationships, with response activities addressing potential impacts to commercial industries, recreational beekeepers and the environment.

PANAMA TR4

Panama disease tropical race 4 (TR4) is a National Priority Plant Pest that affects bananas and is present in parts of Australia. The pest blocks the tissues that carry water and nutrients in banana plants, eventually killing them. Without management, it could devastate Australia's banana industry. Panama TR4 can live in soil for decades without a host and is spread easily in contaminated soil, plant material and water. There is currently no cure for the disease and our only defence is to implement effective separation and decontamination processes. The success of these prevention and management measures relies on strong partnerships and awareness of system stakeholders, as well as sustainable funding to support ongoing activities.

The Panama TR4 Program is a joint initiative between the Queensland Government and the Australian Banana Growers' Council (ABGC) to control and contain the disease. Since the region's first detection in 2015, the program has focused on early detection through surveillance on commercial banana farms in Far North Queensland and compliance activities on



Image: T. Pattison, DAF

known infested properties. The program also seeks to generate community support for efforts to protect against the disease through communications and engagement activities.

With the ABGC co-funding the Panama TR4 Program since 2019, a management board of equal government and industry representation has been established to govern and deliver the program's strategic direction until mid-2023. Beyond July 2023, industry will lead disease management. Continued success will require us to harness the potential of our shared biosecurity culture, supported by broad community engagement and awareness activities.

Our opportunities for meaningful change

To meet the biosecurity risks of today and arm ourselves for the new and increasing risks coming our way, we must continue to evolve our system. This requires us to go beyond scaling our current efforts to enhance how we work together and leverage opportunities for improvement.

Engaging everyone in the biosecurity system is a fundamental opportunity to create a stronger system that is action oriented and raises awareness of risks, shared benefits and outcomes. This will rely on fostering a greater understanding and valuing of biosecurity, as well as behavioural change across the entire system to enhance prevention, preparedness, surveillance and reporting activities. The National Biosecurity Statement, developed in 2018, provides a solid starting point for the sharing of ownership across the biosecurity system.

Engaging at a grassroots level by promoting on-farm and on-land biosecurity, utilising citizen science and working more closely with Indigenous Australians, provides an opportunity to improve our system. Additionally, enhancing our engagement with international organisations and trading partners on biosecurity can help us to mitigate risks before they reach our shores. We have a significant opportunity to build upon and complement previous and existing activities (such as the Decade of Biosecurity) to connect, motivate, and empower a broader range of stakeholders, including the community.

Opportunities exist in the north to support and enhance existing biosecurity efforts. The north of Australia, home to some of our key primary production and tourism growth areas, faces a high risk of threats entering via natural pathways. The Northern Australia Biosecurity Strategy provides a platform for us to focus our efforts on high priority activities. These activities include expanding our Indigenous Ranger programs and capability, increasing surveillance and diagnostic capacity and capabilities, addressing regional skills needs in key areas and improving data collection.

A more flexible, improved risk-based regulatory system is needed to drive more efficient and harmonised processes using targeted and adaptable regulatory frameworks that provide benefits to all stakeholders. We have significant opportunities to facilitate coordinated data sharing and operationalise innovations in technology to support faster, risk-based decision-making and traceability. Co-regulation with industry can also provide material benefits to all stakeholders in managing risk and streamlining processes when they are carefully designed and supported by harmonised compliance frameworks.

Enhancing environmental biosecurity efforts will help us to conserve, restore and care for our land, sea and aquatic ecosystems, protect native plants and animals and support our biodiversity. We have the opportunity to improve outcomes through targeted awareness and engagement with environmental groups and the wider community, better coordinated research activities and enhanced risk analysis and biosecurity management for pests, weeds and diseases that impact our environment.

Funding and investment is currently sourced from all levels of government, industry and the community through a variety of models, reducing the transparency of system-wide investment. Funding has been under recent strain due to the evolving risk environment and growing demand for resourcing. We have the opportunity to work together across government, industry and the community to assess and reset our funding and investment frameworks to ensure they are fit for purpose, targeted to our priorities, sustainable in the longer term and that all biosecurity participants contribute equitably. Increased funding and investment transparency will help to keep us accountable for achieving our priorities.

Closer collaboration at regional and local levels through on the ground coordination and locally driven solutions could support better biosecurity outcomes. In addition to the potential to improve collaboration amongst the state and territory governments and with the Australian Government, opportunities exist for diverse stakeholder groups to work more closely together at regional and local levels. This includes industry, NRM organisations, landowners and managers, local governments, farmers and Traditional Owners. This collaboration will help to implement biosecurity priorities matched to regional needs, support prevention and preparedness activities, collect data and measure results consistently, coordinate mutually beneficial activities and maintain open and continuous communication.

Additional skills and infrastructure are required to support a more responsive biosecurity system as the skills of our people and the infrastructure that supports them are the foundation of our system. We have a skilled workforce with deep and diverse technical expertise, but there are capacity constraints and recruitment and retention challenges, particularly in a range of specialist capabilities and in regional areas across Australia.

Our laboratories, research facilities, national collections and quarantine centres are critical biosecurity assets for our nation. We need to continue to modernise national infrastructure to support emerging technologies and achieve a more adaptive system. We will only realise the benefits of new approaches and innovative technologies, like High-Throughput Sequencing and environmental DNA, if we have the skilled people and the supporting infrastructure necessary to operationalise them. We have an enormous opportunity to plan for the skills and critical infrastructure needed going forward and to create an environment where innovation and new and more efficient ways of working are actively encouraged.

Understanding the changing risk environment and enhancing the way we share threat information is critical to maintaining a strong system. Biosecurity risks are constantly evolving and as threats change, our risk profile and the way we need to work together changes. For example, climate risks will be important to consider to improve our decision-making and mitigate risk. Improved outcomes can also be achieved by continuing to leverage the One Health approach, recognising that the health of our people, animals and shared environment are interconnected. This is particularly important for antimicrobial resistance and zoonotic pathways. The early 2022 outbreak of the viral zoonotic disease Japanese encephalitis clearly demonstrates the importance of using a One Health approach to addressing risks.

We have the opportunity to better share risk information and threat assessments with a wider range of biosecurity stakeholders to improve our understanding of the changing environment and support investment, preparedness activities and research prioritisation.

It's time to evolve how we work together

The only way we can build an even stronger biosecurity system is to evolve how we work together.

Australia's biosecurity is underpinned by the 2019 Intergovernmental Agreement on Biosecurity, which provides a strong foundation to focus our collective efforts and supports wide-ranging partnerships.

However, as the challenges facing us continue to build, we need a renewed focus on enhancing our national biosecurity capacity and capability and fostering an action-focused and inclusive culture.

WHERE WE'RE GOING


In the future, we will more efficiently and effectively manage biosecurity risks.

Key to our success will be the adaptability and sustainability of our prevention, preparedness, surveillance, response, management and recovery systems, combined with a collaborative culture that encourages action and embeds continuous learning.

Everyone will know why biosecurity is important, care about it, understand their role and how they should play their part to ensure that our biosecurity remains strong.

HOW WE'LL GET THERE

We will work together to act in 6 priority areas. These priorities will guide our efforts so that we have the biggest impact and remain on track as we move into implementation planning.



VISION

A biosecurity system that protects Australia and our way of life –

Connected

Resilient

Shared

SHARED PURPOSE

A risk-based system underpinned by science that protects Australia's people, our environment, economy and lifestyle from the biosecurity threats of today and tomorrow.

PRIORITIES AND ACTIONS TO REALISE OUR VISION

Enhancing our capability and embedding advancements in technology and research are key enablers of our strategy. However, improving our system will also rely heavily on strengthening our biosecurity culture – the way we think, behave and work together – to promote awareness, drive coordinated action and complement efforts already underway, such as the Decade of Biosecurity.

Initial actions in our 6 priority areas have been collaboratively developed to support our vision and purpose and will be further built upon as part of implementation planning. Our next steps will be to identify initial actions for immediate implementation and to work together to develop a national implementation plan and national action plan that will drive the delivery of our priorities.

WE WILL TAKE ACTION IN 6 PRIORITY AREAS:



Shared biosecurity culture

We will ensure all Australians understand what biosecurity is and are empowered to act to support our system. We will create a culture of action in which we all care about, contribute to and are responsible for, our biosecurity. We all enjoy the benefits that effective biosecurity brings, just as we all share the consequences of our system’s failures.

Initial actions:

- Build on and develop national awareness and education programs – including introducing biosecurity into curricula – to deepen understanding of, and commitment to, Australia’s biosecurity and encourage community and industry stewardship in the system.
- Progress innovative approaches to drive positive biosecurity behaviours and incentivise compliance, including through social and behavioural research, leveraging community and other networks and exploring new channels of engagement, such as with culturally and linguistically diverse communities.
- Revitalise and continue to collaborate through national communication, engagement and reporting mechanisms, as well as relevant fora and symposia, to encourage greater knowledge sharing, build trust and increase transparency.
- Determine opportunities to embed biosecurity as a consideration into all levels of government, community, industry and other stakeholders’ broader decision-making, risk and business continuity planning.



Stronger partnerships

We will strengthen and expand partnerships with all stakeholders at local, regional, national and international levels to leverage our different expertise, resources and knowledge for greater impact and to support better biosecurity outcomes. Underpinning these partnerships will be mutual trust, formal recognition, transparency and a clear understanding of the importance of everyone’s role.

Initial actions:

- Enhance partnerships and engagement with Indigenous Australians to ensure Indigenous interests are incorporated and participation is enabled in the design and delivery of biosecurity outcomes and initiatives.
- Collaborate with a diverse range of biosecurity stakeholders to review and refine roles and responsibilities, providing flexibility to adapt as the system evolves.
- Review governance arrangements to ensure that they include relevant stakeholders in the design, development and implementation of national policies, programs and regulatory arrangements.
- Strengthen the involvement of environmental agencies and environmental and community groups to enhance biosecurity outcomes.
- Identify and implement opportunities for greater industry and community involvement in decision-making bodies.
- Deepen international partnerships and capacity building, including in the Indo-Pacific, to increase engagement, harmonisation, skills exchanges and information sharing on national priority pests, weeds and diseases.
- Work together to strengthen the understanding of antimicrobial and pesticide resistance, and zoonotic pathways - including surveillance and monitoring.
- Coordinate our international advocacy efforts to help shape global biosecurity standards, rules and conditions to support strong biosecurity in Australia.



Highly skilled workforce

We will develop and sustain the pipeline of biosecurity skills needed for the future, within government, industry and the community. We will ensure our people can be deployed when and where they are needed, and that they have the right skills by providing targeted capability and capacity building, education and training.

Initial actions:

- | | | |
|--|--|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Investigate national skills to identify current and future needs in key areas, such as science, data, new technologies and regulatory capabilities, considering the findings of existing industry and government workforce strategies. Develop a national biosecurity workforce strategy to build, develop, retain and deploy | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> capability across the system, including surge support for responses, taking into account regional needs across Australia. Build upon and expand existing cooperative and partnership arrangements to leverage the expertise and capability of biosecurity stakeholders to support system needs where there are mutual benefits. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Strengthen professional development programs and exchanges between biosecurity stakeholders to facilitate knowledge and information sharing, improve skills and support workforce retention. |
|--|--|--|



Coordinated preparedness and response

We will enhance our preparedness and response capability through improved coordination, regional planning, increased collaboration and faster information and data sharing to support our system's resilience and adaptability.

Initial actions:

- | | | |
|--|--|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Undertake and promote regular national preparedness exercises with biosecurity stakeholders to test and improve our collective readiness and increase public awareness of significant biosecurity threats. Advance regionally based planning activities to better align effort, integrate biosecurity practices and facilitate greater education and awareness opportunities. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Continually review and update risk information, including through regular strategic threat assessments, to inform priorities and share this with stakeholders. Actively embed continuous learning supported by enhanced post-incident reviews and evaluation practices to ensure lessons are captured and incorporated. Strengthen traceability arrangements to support improved biosecurity outcomes. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Enhance our national surveillance and early detection arrangements to ensure they are robust given the changing threat environment, drawing on the expertise and capabilities of biosecurity stakeholders. Evolve our national information management frameworks to ensure they are fit for purpose, interoperable and promote seamless information exchange. |
|--|--|--|



Sustainable investment

We will develop long-term sustainable biosecurity funding and investment approaches, including new funding streams and models, that recognise the value of government, industry and the community investing in biosecurity to support the system's growing needs and priorities. We will ensure these approaches are efficient, equitable, adaptable, transparent and are responsive to the changing risk environment.

Initial actions:

- | | | |
|---|---|---|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Work together to identify funding needs and determine priorities, including for critical assets, infrastructure and research. Strengthen frameworks to agree and deliver priority investments having regard to the level of risk and benefits from activities and to | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> increase efficiency by reducing duplicative investments and processes. Advance co-funding and investment strategies with stakeholders, including models that consider key risk creators and system beneficiaries in an equitable manner. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Increase the transparency of biosecurity funding to support improved accountability. Complete the development and implementation of a system performance and evaluation framework to inform future investment decisions. |
|---|---|---|



Integration supported by technology, research and data

We will create a more connected and efficient system in which we better leverage existing and new technology, research and data to facilitate more timely, informed and risk-based decisions. We will continue to deliver our biosecurity research priorities, informed by national biosecurity research, development and extension (RD&E) strategies. We will develop, share and embed new technologies in areas such as traceability, surveillance, screening, data analytics, treatments and diagnostics.

Initial actions:

- | | | |
|--|--|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Continue to invest in and roll out transformative technologies to digitise and automate processes, and support rapid and accurate detection, identification, traceability and response. Increase coordination and engagement with biosecurity stakeholders, including research and development bodies, to prioritise, drive and deliver national research outcomes. Actively share data and research to streamline research efforts and facilitate | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> the adoption of outcomes, ensuring that they are accessible, interoperable and reusable where practical. Enhance the accessibility and use of surveillance and interception data to support effective and seamless decision-making by all stakeholders. Further support innovations to build science and research capacity in areas such as pathway risk assessments, species identification and treatments. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Encourage the uptake of existing and emerging technologies, systems and processes across the biosecurity system. Increase the use of citizen science, Indigenous knowledge and on the ground insights as valued sources of expertise, data and information. Encourage greater private sector investment in the development and delivery of innovations that provide for better biosecurity outcomes. |
|--|--|--|

Our way forward: Driving collaborative action

The strategy sets our future vision and priorities and outlines more than 30 initial actions for implementation. Realising our vision will only be possible through our collective efforts, as biosecurity affects all of us.

Our next steps will be to:

- identify those initial actions that can be implemented immediately
- design a national implementation plan that sets out governance arrangements and guides future planning
- develop a national action plan that builds upon our initial actions and establishes a framework for monitoring and evaluation to keep us accountable.

To support the achievement of the strategy's vision and priorities and to help drive coordinated and collaborative activity across Australia, a diverse range of stakeholders will be involved in implementation, underpinned by an inclusive governance approach.

A National Biosecurity Strategy Implementation Committee (NIC) will be established, consisting of biosecurity stakeholders, including representatives from plant and animal industries, freight and logistics, aquatic industries, environmental groups, research organisations and Indigenous stakeholders. The NIC will work together with the NBC to develop, oversee, implement, monitor and review the national implementation plan and the national action plan.

They will initially be supported by expert stakeholder working groups for each priority area, who will further build upon and refine the initial actions in this strategy for inclusion in the national action plan.

A COLLABORATIVE APPROACH WILL DRIVE IMPLEMENTATION TO ACHIEVE OUR VISION AND PURPOSE





IMPLEMENTATION PRINCIPLES

We will work together to develop and implement actions in our priority areas to strengthen our system.

To be successful, implementation will:

- be an **inclusive process** that includes collaboration with a broad range of stakeholders to develop, implement and monitor action plans
- provide a **range of different opportunities and avenues** for stakeholders to contribute and provide input
- **align with and complement** other relevant strategic agendas and activities where possible, to avoid duplication and siloing of effort
- have clear governance arrangements that embed opportunities for **greater stakeholder involvement in decision-making**, supporting our priority to enhance our shared biosecurity culture

- include mechanisms to ensure we are all **accountable** for implementation and that we **transparently** monitor and evaluate our progress
- focus on tangible actions in each of our priorities to deliver a **more resilient system** that can adapt to changes in our risk environment and is responsive to emerging opportunities and challenges.

COORDINATED IMPLEMENTATION


Implementing the strategy will be underpinned by a national implementation plan and national action plan, complemented by other local, regional or sector-based action plans.

To kick-start the strategy’s implementation, we will identify those initial actions that can be implemented immediately and commence their delivery as soon as possible.

To guide our longer-term efforts, a **national implementation plan** will be developed during a 6 to 12 month planning stage. This will outline the governance structure and framework for implementation over the next 10 years.

The implementation plan will support a **national action plan**, which will also be developed during the planning stage. The plan will build upon the initial actions in this strategy and detail the efforts needed to deliver our vision and priorities, ensuring they are specific, measurable, achievable, realistic and timely. It will include a monitoring and evaluation framework to provide transparency on who is responsible for specific activities and to support ongoing monitoring and reviews.

The national action plan will be complemented by sector based, regional or other action plans developed by stakeholders.



Engaging with our stakeholders – implementation will be informed by ongoing broader consultation, such as surveys, meetings, workshops and other fora, to ensure it is a collaborative and inclusive process.

Monitoring our progress:

- Progress against the national action plan will be monitored regularly to keep us on track and ensure that we adapt where needed, remaining focused on the continual improvement of our system.
- An annual report will be developed to provide an update on the strategy’s implementation, emerging issues and stakeholder priorities.
- A formal review of the strategy will be undertaken after 5 years, or sooner if there is significant change to the risks, challenges or opportunities facing us.

OVERVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS



Appendix

OUR BIOSECURITY SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE

Our system is supported by a mature and dynamic architecture of agreements, arrangements, deeds and statements between governments, plant and animal industries, environmental groups and research organisations. This is complemented by reviews undertaken by the Inspector-General of Biosecurity, CSIRO and other stakeholders.

Australia is also a signatory to a range of international biosecurity, trade, health and environmental agreements, including measures outlined by the World Trade Organization, International Plant Protection Convention, World Organisation for Animal Health and the World Health Organization.

The Intergovernmental Agreement on Biosecurity (IGAB) sets out commitments for governments, outlines agreed national goals and objectives and clarifies roles and responsibilities.

The IGAB also establishes the NBC. The NBC provides advice to the Agriculture Senior Officials Committee (AGSOC) on national biosecurity issues, and progresses the implementation of the IGAB. AGSOC reports to ministers responsible for primary industries.

The NBC is responsible for managing a national, strategic approach to biosecurity risks that could impact agricultural production, the environment, community wellbeing and urban amenity.

The NBC is supported by several sectoral committees – the Animal Health Committee, Environment and Invasives Committee, Marine Pest Sectoral Committee and Plant Health Committee – and the National Biosecurity Communication and Engagement Network, as well as ongoing expert groups and short-term, task-specific groups.

Formal emergency preparedness and response agreements establish arrangements for responding to exotic pests, weeds and diseases that are detected within Australia and have the potential to impact animal, plant or human health, or the environment. These agreements are the:

- Emergency Animal Disease Response Agreement (EADRA)
- Emergency Plant Pest Response Deed (EPPRD)
- National Environmental Biosecurity Response Agreement (NEBRA).

These arrangements are formal agreements between governments and (where relevant) industry signatories, and as appropriate, Animal Health Australia (AHA) and Plant Health Australia (PHA).

The arrangements cover the management and funding of responses to pest, weed and disease outbreaks, or where a pest, weed or disease primarily impacts the environment and/or social amenity (where the response is for the public good).

AHA and PHA are the custodians of the EADRA and EPPRD respectively and are national coordinators of key government-industry biosecurity partnerships in the areas of animal and plant health, producing and inputting into strategies and plans to guide these efforts. AHA and PHA, as well as other peak bodies such as Wildlife Health Australia (WHA), facilitate a national approach to enhancing Australia's animal and plant biosecurity systems, through awareness, preparedness and emergency response management.

The National Biosecurity Statement was finalised in 2018 and outlines national biosecurity goals, roles and responsibilities and principles for managing biosecurity risk. The strategy builds from this strong foundation.

Government strategies

The Australian, state and territory, and local governments have published a range of strategies, roadmaps and reviews that outline the goals, objectives, priorities and frameworks for the biosecurity system within their jurisdiction.

Peak research organisations and environmental biosecurity stakeholder publications

Research organisations and environmental groups are instrumental in the protection and continual enhancement of our biosecurity system. This includes organisations such as the CSIRO, Rural Research and Development Corporations and tertiary institutions. Research organisations develop strategies, research and position papers, and actions that explore and inform initiatives and outline innovative approaches in science, research and collaboration.

Environmental groups, such as regional NRM organisations, play a critical role in environmental biosecurity, regional planning, natural resource management and policy advocacy. A diverse range of Indigenous stakeholders, including Indigenous organisations and land-holding and native title bodies, are involved in biosecurity-related land and water management including surveillance activities. Surveillance activities are also enhanced by on-farm biosecurity and citizen science initiatives which support education, collaboration and capacity building.

Industry strategies and position papers

Industry peak bodies who understand and acknowledge the shared benefits of a strong and resilient biosecurity system are consistent advocates for its improvement. Importantly, they publish, in consultation with their members, an array of ambitious and considered strategies and position papers that seek to make a case for reform, action and investment.

System stakeholders work together on a range of holistic plans and strategies, such as PlantPlan 2021 and Animalplan 2022 to 2027. Animalplan was recently developed through collaboration between relevant animal health stakeholders from government, industry, research and other sectors as Australia's first national action plan to strengthen our animal health system, including our preparedness and ability to respond to emergency animal diseases such as foot-and-mouth disease.



DRAFT

Farley, Lisa (PIRSA)

From: Rhodes, Nathan (PIRSA)
Sent: Thursday, 4 August 2022 3:36 PM
To: Jones, Lucas (PIRSA)
Subject: RE: FMD standard response.

OFFICIAL

Its coming up with a covering minute – two versions – one dealing with Commonwealth border issues and one with state preparedness issues.

Nathan Rhodes | Executive Director

0412 376 450

From: Jones, Lucas (PIRSA) <Lucas.Jones@sa.gov.au>
Sent: Thursday, 4 August 2022 3:34 PM
To: Rhodes, Nathan (PIRSA) <Nathan.Rhodes@sa.gov.au>
Subject: RE: FMD standard response

OFFICIAL

Thanks Nathan.

From: Rhodes, Nathan (PIRSA) <Nathan.Rhodes@sa.gov.au>
Sent: Thursday, 4 August 2022 11:28 AM
To: Jones, Lucas (PIRSA) <Lucas.Jones@sa.gov.au>
Subject: RE: FMD standard response

OFFICIAL

Yes it has been drafted – I'll follow up

Nathan Rhodes | Executive Director

0412 376 450

From: Jones, Lucas (PIRSA) <Lucas.Jones@sa.gov.au>
Sent: Thursday, 4 August 2022 11:20 AM
To: Rhodes, Nathan (PIRSA) <Nathan.Rhodes@sa.gov.au>
Subject: FMD standard response

OFFICIAL

Hi Nathan,

Will your team be sending through a draft standard FMD response soon for the office to consider using as discussed previously?

Regards

Lucas

Lucas Jones | Senior Ministerial Advisor
Office of the Minister for Primary Industries and Regional Development
Office of the Minister for Forest Industries

Level 10, 1 King William Street, Adelaide | GPO Box 1671 Adelaide SA 5001
P: +61 8 8226 2931 | **M:** 0418 927 490 **E:** lucas.jones@sa.gov.au



**Government of
South Australia**

Farley, Lisa (PIRSA)

From: Doroudi, Mehdi (PIRSA)
Sent: Monday, 15 August 2022 1:50 PM
To: Scriven, Clare (PIRSA)
Cc: Spencer, Meagan (PIRSA); Jones, Lucas (PIRSA)
Subject: Southern Australia Exotic Animal Disease Scenario
Attachments: Agenda - Southern Australia Exotic Animal Disease Scenario based discuss....pdf;
 Participant Guide - Southern Australia Exotic Animal Disease Scenario Ba....pdf

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

Hi Minister, please see attached and below in relation to tomorrow's national exercise. Please let me know if any questions. I see you in Port Lincoln Wednesday morning. Regards Mehdi

Colleagues,

As you may be aware, the recently established joint interagency taskforce on exotic animal disease preparedness is conducting a series of activities to inform advice to government about the current level of national preparedness. The second activity is a scenario-based discussion, to understand the pressure points and issues in responding to a foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) or lumpy skin disease (LSD) incursion.

Participants will include senior officials from biosecurity/agriculture and emergency management agencies, as well other relevant government stakeholders from the Victoria, New South Wales, Tasmania, South Australia and Australian Capital Territory. Delivery will be face-to-face or virtual per the details provided below – please indicate if you wish to attend in person when accepting the invite so we can coordinate occupancy.

Face-to-face participants	Virtual participants
Police Communications Building 20 Carrington Street Adelaide, South Australia Please note: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mask are to be worn when walking around the building Please ensure a RAT test is completed prior to attending the meeting 	Per MS Teams details shown below

Additional information will be circulated in the coming days to assist participants prepare for the session.

We look forward to working collaboratively with you on this matter.

Sincerely,

Joe Buffone PSM
 Director General
 Emergency Management Australia Group
 Department of Home Affairs
 T: (02) 5127 7243 | M: +61400904866 | E: joe.buffone@homeaffairs.gov.au

OFFICIAL: Sensitive



Australian Government

Southern Australia Exotic Animal Disease

Participant Guide



Exotic Animal Disease Preparedness Joint Interagency Taskforce

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

Version	Date of issue	Author	Comments
V0.01	11/08/2022	Exotic Animal Disease Preparedness Joint Interagency Taskforce	Draft version

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Acknowledgement of Country

We acknowledge the Traditional Custodians of Australia and their continuing connection to land and sea, waters, environment and community. We pay our respects to the Traditional Custodians of the lands we live and work on, their culture, and their Elders past and present.

Background

To ensure Australia is effectively prepared to respond to an exotic animal disease (EAD) incursion the Joint Interagency Taskforce - Exotic Animal Disease Preparedness (the Taskforce) will explore the current levels of on-shore preparedness for foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) and lumpy skin disease (LSD).

A scenario-based discussion activity will be conducted with senior officials from southern Australian jurisdictions (Australian Capital Territory, Victoria, New South Wales, Tasmania and South Australia). This activity may also identify additional actions necessary to enhance preparedness for FMD/LSD.

Aim

This scenario-based discussion aims to understand the pressure points and issues relative to the southern jurisdictions' capacities and capabilities, including those to operationalise AUSVETPLAN strategies in response to an LSD and/or FMD incursion.

Objectives

The objectives are to understand the pressure points and issues relating to:

- a. coordination architecture
- b. movement controls
- b. tracing and surveillance
- c. vaccination
- d. destruction, disposal and decontamination of animals, animal products and infected premises.

As well as the direct impacts on agricultural producers the activity will also seek to understand second and third order consequences.

Scope

In scope

- FMD and LSD
- Coordination architecture and arrangements
- AUSVETPLAN Disease Strategies for FMD and LSD
- Potential hazards that may impact a response
- Animal welfare, environmental and social impacts
- Capabilities and capacities to support response activities
- Effects of legislation on response.

Out of scope

- Consideration of other biosecurity emergency diseases
- Emergency Animal Disease Response Agreement (EADRA)
- Long-term recovery measures
- Legislation changes.

Exercise logistics

Exercise date

Activity type	Date	Time
Scenario based discussion	Tuesday, 16 August 2022	13:00 – 16:00 ACST

Teams details

Microsoft Teams meeting

Join on your computer or mobile app

[Click here to join the meeting](#)

Meeting ID: 478 085 703 128

Passcode: deowzW

[Download Teams](#) | [Join on the web](#)

Or call in (audio only)

[+61 2 7208 4914,578835004#](#) Australia, Sydney

Phone Conference ID: 578 835 004#

Location and venue

Police Communications Building

20 Carrington Street

ADELAIDE SA 5000

Alternatively, you can join the Microsoft Teams Live Event online. A link to the online event will be distributed via email.

Exercise conduct

Outline

The scenario-based discussion will be delivered in a hybrid model with participants located together or attending virtually and observers viewing the event online via a Microsoft Teams meeting. The scenario-based discussion will be conducted over three hours.

Scenario – **EXERCISE ONLY**

Northern Australia is currently responding to a lumpy-skin-disease incursion and southern resources have been deployed to assist with response activities.

Following a significant amount of rainfall in Victoria, a pig farmer notices that four pigs are lame however he assumes this is due to the soft ground and does not investigate further.

Five days later, the farmer notices blisters and ulcers forming on the top of the snouts of the pigs and there are now more animals showing signs of lameness, with some lying down and refusing to move. A number of farmers from this region have travelled to the National Farmers Federation conference in Launceston. Due to the wet conditions the farmers shoes and some belongings have been contaminated with mud and soil.

There are a number of farms in the area that have a mixed array of susceptible animals which include dairy and meat cows, sheep and goats. The sheep and goat farms neighbour the affected pig farm and there are often problems with the animals getting through fences and moving between properties.

The concerned farmer calls the local vet to seek advice. The vet takes samples which are sent to a lab and are confirmed to be positive for FMD. The lab's Director calls the jurisdictions Chief Veterinary Officer who in turn advises the Australia Chief Veterinary Officer. The farmer is advised of a presumptive diagnosis and the property is placed under quarantine while the samples are sent to the Australian Centre for Disease Preparedness (ACDP).

Tracing confirms that a truckload of pigs from the affected farm in Victoria were transported to New South Wales three days prior to the blisters and ulcers forming.

Concurrently, a number of farmers across South Australia are beginning to report cattle displaying clinical signs of FMD following their purchase at sale yards in Naracoorte.

Threat effects

Most likely

First order consequences

- Multi-jurisdictional outbreak in Southern Australia
- Initial 72hr national livestock "Stand Still" declared
- Infections detected in feral animal population adjacent to outbreak
- Exports will cease initially, domestic consumption will be reduced

Secondary and tertiary consequences

- Supply chains will be disrupted for multiple reasons (e.g., COVID, severe weather, etc)
- COVID and natural disaster fatigue across government, industry and the community
- Protests and trespass from issue motivated groups
- Significant mental health issues within communities

Most dangerous

First order consequences

- Multi-jurisdictional outbreak in Northern and Southern Australia, goes undetected for some time
- Concurrent domestic natural disaster
- Initial 72hr national livestock "Stand Still" declared
- Infections detected in multiple/widespread feral animal populations
- Exports will cease for an extended period, enduring loss of markets, domestic consumption will be reduced

Secondary and tertiary consequences

- Supply chains severely disrupted
- COVID and natural disaster fatigue across government, industry and the community
- ADF assets prioritised elsewhere
- Protests and trespass from issue motivated groups
- Significant mental health issues within communities

Recording

The meeting will not be digitally recorded but a summary of the meeting will be provided after the meeting.

Farley, Lisa (PIRSA)

From: Jones, Lucas (PIRSA)
Sent: Tuesday, 26 July 2022 11:30 AM
To: Rhodes, Nathan (PIRSA)

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

Hi Nathan,

The Minister is doing an interview at 2pm today in relation to FMD
Out of scope

Regards

Lucas

Lucas Jones | Senior Ministerial Advisor
Office of the Minister for Primary Industries and Regional Development
Office of the Minister for Forest Industries

Level 10, 1 King William Street, Adelaide | GPO Box 1671 Adelaide SA 5001
P: +61 8 8226 2931 | **M:** 0418 927 490 **E:** lucas.jones@sa.gov.au



**Government of
South Australia**

Farley, Lisa (PIRSA)

From: Barclay, Ann (PIRSA)
Sent: Friday, 26 August 2022 1:02 PM
To: Spencer, Meagan (PIRSA); Jones, Lucas (PIRSA)
Cc: Rhodes, Nathan (PIRSA)
Subject: Out of scope FMD weekly update

Hi Meagan and Lucas, please find below the comms activities for this week,
Regards
Ann

OFFICIAL**Communications activities this week for Out of scope / FMD**

- Out of scope Attending National Biosecurity Communications and Engagement Network (NBCEN) meetings for EAD and
 - Next meeting EAD – Thursday 1 September
 - Out of scope

FMD

- External FMD talking points being developed
- Scheduled social media posts about PIC registrations (26/8), LSD (1/9), pig feed (29/8).
- FMD, biosecurity travel and pig feed flyers and posters approved, arranged printing of flyers for PIRSA stand at the Royal Show and for animal health staff to use – 25/8
- Provided Royal Show with FMD poster and flyer for internal use – 25/8.

Out of scopeOut of scope

Farley, Lisa (PIRSA)

From: Doroudi, Mehdi (PIRSA)
Sent: Tuesday, 19 July 2022 7:58 AM
To: Scriven, Clare (PIRSA); Spencer, Meagan (PIRSA); Jones, Lucas (PIRSA)
Cc: Barclay, Ann (PIRSA)
Subject: FW: FMD preparedness activities

OFFICIAL

Goon morning Minister et al.,

Please note I didn't meet with the Acting Premier and instead the CE DPC asked me to provide a summary of PIRSA's activities in relation to FMD over the last few weeks. I understand he will pass this information on to the Acting Premier. Please see below for your information, let me know if any questions.

Regards

Mehdi

From: Doroudi, Mehdi (PIRSA)
Sent: Tuesday, 19 July 2022 7:53 AM
To: Walker, Damien (DPC) <Damien.Walker@sa.gov.au>
Cc: Lloyd-Wright, Alison (DPC) <Alison.Lloyd-Wright@sa.gov.au>; Barclay, Ann (PIRSA) <Ann.B Barclay@sa.gov.au>
Subject: FMD preparedness activities

OFFICIAL

Hi Damien,

As per your request, below is a list of activities that PIRSA is undertaking to prepare SA to detect and respond to a possible EAD incursion:

State Activities

- PIRSA Chief Executive, Executive Director and Manager of Emergency Management, have visited the State Command Centre at the new Emergency Services Headquarters at Keswick, to scope the possible operating environment in the event of a detection of Emergency Animal Disease e.g. FMD. SES has indicated the facility can be utilised as a control centre in PIRSA lead emergency responses.
- PIRSA Biosecurity has been in contact with SAPOL Emergency and Major Event Section, with respect to updates on the situation in Indonesia, and the likely state actions in the event of a detection elsewhere in Australia, or in South Australia.
- Communications have been enhanced to increase disease awareness for early detection of disease and a rapid response:
 - PIRSA is developing a Communications Strategy to inform our public information activities in the event of an FMD outbreak.

- PIRSA is working with the Veterinary Surgeon's Board of SA to deliver targeted awareness communications to the private veterinary network, including information about what to do if an emergency animal disease is suspected.
 - PIRSA website has been updated to give prominence to information about Foot and Mouth disease, including advice of signs for producers to look for, and actions to take if Foot and Mouth disease is suspected. Advice for returning travellers has also been added, about how to reduce the risk of bringing FMD to Australia.
 - A social media campaign has been developed targeting Australian travellers, and we are working with Cosi (South Aussie With Cosi) to develop a video post based on key messages to share across social media and with industry audiences.
- In response to the significance of the FMD and lumpy skin disease outbreaks in Indonesia, PIRSA is reprioritising staff resources to focus on emergency animal disease preparedness activities. PIRSA is engaging an additional three Veterinary Officers within existing resourcing to build broader capacity in animal health risk-based decision making for animal disease threats, including FMD and lumpy skin disease.
- PIRSA is drafting an internal PIRSA FMD and LSD action plan that will identify any additional work required within South Australia to bolster operational preparedness. The plan will align with the nationally agreed response policy, AUSVETPLAN.
- PIRSA is working with Livestock SA, South Australian Dairyfarmers Association and PorkSA to conduct a desktop Emergency Animal Disease workshop (planned for 4 August 2022) with a small number (less than 20) of South Australia industry leaders to develop an SA industry preparedness action plan. The workshop will be based on considering 4 scenarios of how FMD or LSD could be detected and focus on the immediate response activities (first 2-3 days of the response guided by the disease strategy) and industry impacts that are likely to occur. The resulting action plan will detail activities that industry can undertake now to improve response outcomes.
 - PIRSA has been working with the pork industry on preparedness for African Swine Fever over the past 12 months. Much of this work can be applied to other diseases, and is of benefit for FMD preparedness.
- PIRSA will be undertaking a similar exercise at the SA Rural Australian Veterinary Association conference in Robe on 14 August 2022. This conference is attended by private veterinary practitioners and the University of Adelaide. This will also provide opportunities to engage and train private vets for working in emergency responses.
- PIRSA is boosting capacity and capability in the State VETLAB at Glenside, to ensure we have appropriate testing capability to support early detection of FMD, and is working closely with ACDP to initiate local testing capability for LSD. This includes increasing our serology capacity to screen for multiple emergency animal diseases including FMD and undertake surveillance testing in the event of a detection. Further, the establishment of local FMD PCR capability will reduce the time between notification of disease suspicion to disease confirmation, to allow appropriate response measures to reduce spread of disease to be implemented faster. Preparations are underway for the molecular diagnostic suite upgrade, with works to be completed in 2022-2023.
- PIRSA is also developing a package of measures for consideration by DTF under the Biofund to further increase our capacity and capability to prepare for and deliver a response to a possible future incursion.

National Activities

- The Australian Government Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry has established an Emergency Animal Disease Taskforce, to work with jurisdictions and industry on preparedness for and response to an incursion of Foot and Mouth Disease or Lumpy Skin Disease. PIRSA is participating in the consultations of the Taskforce through the Executive Director of Biosecurity and the Chief Veterinary Officer.
- PIRSA is also supporting the National Containment Strategy Working Group, which is an industry-led group working on ensuring that industry participants are aware of and able to implement the operational requirements of AUSVETPLAN – the nationally agreed framework for a EAD response. PIRSA is represented by the Chief Veterinary Officer.
- PIRSA is supporting national work underway to update, refresh and exercise policies and plans for both foot and mouth disease and lumpy skin disease, including participating in working groups to address specific policy and operational issues such as vaccination and diagnostics. This work includes the review of the AUSVETPLAN FMD Manual which will inform PIRSA's response planning.
- Additional measures have been implemented by the Australian Government at Adelaide Airport International Arrivals to address the risk of passengers arriving on direct flights from Indonesia. ^{Clause 5(1)(a)(i)}
^{Clause 5(1)(a)(i)}
^{Clause 5(1)(a)(i)} Additional signage has been installed in the departures and arrivals halls, and a Biosecurity Officer will board each arriving flight to deliver a targeted message about FMD risk. Additional targeted, surge and saturation operations have also been implemented since June 2022 to provide additional intelligence about the risk profile of the air pathway from Indonesia.

Hope this helps. Please let me know if you need any further information.

Regards

Mehdi

Professor Mehdi Doroudi PSM, GAICD | Chief Executive

Office of the Chief Executive | **Department of Primary Industries and Regions**

Government of South Australia | Level 12, 25 Grenfell Street, Adelaide SA 5000

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P: +61 8 8429 2893 | **E:** Mehdi.Doroudi@sa.gov.au

pir.sa.gov.au





Government of South Australia

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Farley, Lisa (PIRSA)

From: Rhodes, Nathan (PIRSA)
Sent: Monday, 11 July 2022 4:16 PM
To: Jones, Lucas (PIRSA)
Subject: RE: FMD treatment at Adelaide Airport

OFFICIAL

Hi Lucas

Below is from my discussions with colleagues at Adelaide Airport. While I am confident it is accurate, we will need to approach DAWE more formally if the Minister intends to speak publicly about Commonwealth operations.

- There are daily direct flight arrivals from Denpasar into Adelaide
- All flights are met on arrival by Commonwealth Biosecurity officers, who board the plane and play a 2 minute recording regarding the heightened risk of FMD in Indonesia and specifically Bali
- All flights are subject to normal screening processes, where all passengers are met at the baggage carousel, their Incoming Passenger Card is checked, and the passenger is sent for inspection or direct exit based on risk profiles
- Clause 5(1)(a)(i) 
- Unfortunately, there is not currently a detector dog at Adelaide Airport – the previous dog was removed during covid when there were no international arrivals in Adelaide, and redeployed to those airports still operating. I understand the team at Adelaide Airport is seeking reinstatement of the Detector Dog program but there is no commitment as yet.

I hope this helps – if you would like I will approach DAWE for something more formal that the minister can use to speak publicly about.

Regards, Nathan

Nathan Rhodes | Executive Director

0412 376 450

From: Jones, Lucas (PIRSA) <Lucas.Jones@sa.gov.au>
Sent: Monday, 11 July 2022 3:11 PM
To: Rhodes, Nathan (PIRSA) <Nathan.Rhodes@sa.gov.au>
Subject: FMD treatment at Adelaide Airport

OFFICIAL

Hi Nathan,

Just another question relating to FMD and the situation at Adelaide Airport.

Can you advise what exactly the commonwealth is doing with passengers coming into Adelaide from Bali in terms of screening and treatment once off the plane?

Regards

Lucas

Lucas Jones | Senior Ministerial Advisor
Office of the Minister for Primary Industries and Regional Development
Office of the Minister for Forest Industries

Level 10, 1 King William Street, Adelaide | GPO Box 1671 Adelaide SA 5001
P: +61 8 8226 2931 | M| 0418 927 490 E: lucas.jones@sa.gov.au




**Government of
South Australia**

Farley, Lisa (PIRSA)

From: Rhodes, Nathan (PIRSA)
Sent: Friday, 5 August 2022 8:58 AM
To: Jones, Lucas (PIRSA)
Cc: Doroudi, Mehdi (PIRSA)
Subject: RE: For Tomorrow - Notes

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

Hi Lucas – see points below:

- **Call for screening 100% or returning passengers from Bali**
 - The Commonwealth Government currently screens 100% of arrivals
 - **Clause 5(1)(a)(i)**
- **Call to eradicate all feral cloven hooved animals across Australia**
 - Eradication of all feral animals that could host FMD is impractical.
 - Feral hosts in Australia include cattle, buffalo, pigs, deer, camels and goats.
 - The AUSVETPLAN Wild Animal Response Strategy outlines procedures to manage wild animals in the event of an emergency animal disease outbreak such as FMD. The type and extent of any control activities during an outbreak response would be determined on what is the most effective method of control depending upon species, the density of animal population being targeted and the terrain. It is likely a co-ordinated approach involving a range of techniques will be used.
 - Livestock producers should put measures in place, where possible, to prevent feral animals coming into contact with their stock. This could include making sure boundary fences are in good order and developing a wild and feral animal control program.
 - Pest animals are declared under the Landscape South Australia Act 2019, and for most feral animal species there are restrictions on keeping, moving, selling or releasing them. Landholders have a legal responsibility to control pest animals on their properties.
 - In South Australia, control programs are underway for two feral animal species that can be susceptible to FMD – feral pigs and feral deer.

- **Out of scope**

Out of scope



Out of scope

Nathan Rhodes | Executive Director

0412 376 450

From: Jones, Lucas (PIRSA) <Lucas.Jones@sa.gov.au>
Sent: Thursday, 4 August 2022 2:54 PM
To: Rhodes, Nathan (PIRSA) <Nathan.Rhodes@sa.gov.au>
Subject: FW: For Tomorrow - Notes

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

Hi Nathan,

Are you able to get your team to provide a brief response to each of the 3 dot points below?

If you do not have the capacity we understand.

Regards

Lucas

From: Spencer, Meagan (PIRSA) <Meagan.Spencer@sa.gov.au>
Sent: Thursday, 4 August 2022 1:49 PM
To: Jones, Lucas (PIRSA) <Lucas.Jones@sa.gov.au>
Subject: For Tomorrow - Notes

OFFICIAL: Sensitive

- Call for screening 100% or returning passengers from Bali
- Call to eradicate all feral cloven hooved animals across Australia
- Pastoral lands businesses that are supported by feral animal populations

Meagan Spencer | Chief of Staff

Office of the Minister for Primary Industries and Regional Development

Office of the Minister for Forest Industries

Level 10, 1 King William Street, Adelaide | GPO Box 1671 Adelaide SA 5001

P: 0408 363 864 | E: meagan.spencer@sa.gov.au



**Government of
South Australia**

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Farley, Lisa (PIRSA)

From: Doroudi, Mehdi (PIRSA)
Sent: Thursday, 4 August 2022 4:45 PM
To: Scriven, Clare (PIRSA)
Cc: Spencer, Meagan (PIRSA); Jones, Lucas (PIRSA)
Subject: FW: Announcement of DAFF/EMA Joint Exotic Animal Disease Preparedness Taskforce [SEC=OFFICIAL]
Attachments: 216Z1522.PDF

OFFICIAL

FYI

From: Metcalfe, Andrew <Andrew.Metcalfe@awe.gov.au>

Sent: Thursday, 4 August 2022 12:29 PM

To: Clause 6(1)

Doroudi, Mehdi (PIRSA) <mehdi.doroudi@sa.gov.au>; Clause 6(1)

Clause 6(1)

Cc: Clause 6(1)

Clause 6(1)

Clause 6(1); DAFminister.corro@daf.qld.gov.au; Clause 6(1)

Clause 6(1); au; Poskett, Stephen (PIRSA) <Stephen.poskett@sa.gov.au>; Quinn, Penny (PIRSA)

<penny.quinn@sa.gov.au>; Clause 6(1)

Clause 6(1)

Clause 6(1); Crosthwaite, Kerren <Kerren.Crosthwaite@agriculture.gov.au>

Subject: Announcement of DAFF/EMA Joint Exotic Animal Disease Preparedness Taskforce [SEC=OFFICIAL]

Colleagues

You may have seen that Minister Watt has just announced the creation of a time limited Joint Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (DAFF)/Emergency Management Australia (EMA) Exotic Animal Disease (EAD) Preparedness Taskforce. A media release is attached for your information. The Taskforce was also mentioned by the Prime Minister and me at a meeting of National Cabinet this morning.

As you all know, we have very well-established plans and protocols for how we will work together in the event of an animal disease outbreak, including through Animal Health Australia. We also have our new National Biosecurity Strategy, recently agreed by Agriculture Ministers, which is due to be released in coming days. We are well invested in developing coordinated responses to potential threats, including through our Chief Veterinary Officers, the National Biosecurity Committee, and the National LSD/FMD Preparedness Coordinator.

This EMA/DAFF Taskforce will not replicate or duplicate this work, but will rather focus on testing the way our animal health plans and systems interact with emergency response systems, within Commonwealth departments and agencies and with other jurisdictions. It will accelerate our preparedness activities, which should lift the overall preparedness of all of our jurisdictions and industries should there ever be an incursion of an EAD.

The work of the National LSD/FMD Preparedness Coordinator, Dr Chris Parker and his team, will transition into an enduring function in my department, to help support its work and respond to its analysis.

The EMA/DAFF Taskforce will be jointly led by Joe Buffone, Director-General of Emergency Management Australia, and Kerren Crosthwaite, First Assistant Secretary from my department. We look forward to working with you and your teams on this important piece of work.

Joe and Kerren will work closely with the experts and leads in the Biosecurity and Compliance Group of the department, which continues to operate at a high tempo while this project is underway. I welcome your ongoing engagement with Chris Parker and his team, and all your usual portfolio contacts, at this busy time.

Best wishes,

Andrew

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**SENATOR THE HON MURRAY WATT
MINISTER FOR AGRICULTURE, FISHERIES AND FORESTRY
MINISTER FOR EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT**

MEDIA RELEASE

NEW TASKFORCE TO ENHANCE AUSTRALIA'S BIOSECURITY PREPAREDNESS

Thursday, 4 August 2022

A new Commonwealth taskforce will be established to ensure Australia is fully prepared to respond swiftly to growing biosecurity threats.

The *Exotic Animal Disease Preparedness Taskforce* will be co-chaired by a senior official from the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (DAFF) and the Director-General of Emergency Management Australia (EMA) and will include officials from the Australian Defence Force, Australian Border Force and Animal Health Australia.

Agriculture Minister Murray Watt said while the risk of Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) or Lumpy Skin Disease (LSD) entering Australia is low, it is not zero.

"Australia remains FMD and LSD free, but we cannot afford to assume it will stay that way," Minister Watt said.

"Expert judgment has assessed the risk of an FMD incursion in the next five years as 11.6% and 28% for LSD, so it is prudent to prepare now.

"While the Federal, State and Territory Governments all have well-developed biosecurity response plans in place, we will leave no stone unturned to ensure we are ready, should an outbreak occur.

“That’s why I have directed the establishment of this taskforce, to thoroughly assess our current level of national preparedness and advise of any improvements needed.

“Importantly, this taskforce will be co-chaired by senior experts in DAFF and EMA, bringing together the experts in biosecurity and animal health, along with the experts in disaster management, to work with States, Territories and industry.

“The Taskforce will get to work immediately, conducting a series of scenario-based exercises within the next month. This is the next logical step in Australia’s strongest ever biosecurity response and builds on the range of measures we have already announced to keep Australia FMD and LSD-free, both at home and abroad.”

Minister Watt said the government had learned the lessons from the outbreak of COVID-19 and the previous administration’s lack of preparedness.

“We are determined to not make the same mistakes they made,” he said.

“They were too slow on vaccines and too slow on Rapid Antigen Tests, if there was a major biosecurity outbreak in Australia, there is simply no time for delay.

The taskforce will report back to the Minister by September 5, providing advice on any additional measures that need to be taken to strengthen our biosecurity response.

MEDIA CONTACT:

Clause 6(1)

Farley, Lisa (PIRSA)

From: Jones, Lucas (PIRSA)
Sent: Tuesday, 9 August 2022 9:43 AM
To: Rhodes, Nathan (PIRSA)
Subject: FW: Biosecurity strategy [SEC=UNOFFICIAL]
Importance: High

OFFICIAL

Hi Nathan,

FYI.

Lucas

**SENATOR THE HON MURRAY WATT
MINISTER FOR AGRICULTURE, FISHERIES AND FORESTRY
MINISTER FOR EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT**

Tuesday, 9 August 2022

Inaugural National Biosecurity Strategy released

Australia's first ever National Biosecurity Strategy, released today, outlines the key actions for all Australians to ensure a stronger biosecurity system.

Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry Murray Watt made the announcement at the National Press Club today.

He said the National Biosecurity Strategy would provide clear direction to ensure our system remains fit to meet the challenges of the next decade and beyond.

"The management of Australia's biosecurity system is becoming increasingly complex, creating new challenges for governments, industry and community stakeholders in protecting our agricultural sector," Minister Watt said.

"Strong and efficient biosecurity is even more important as we respond to emerging challenges including diseases on our doorstep including Foot and Mouth Disease, African Swine Fever, Lumpy Skin Disease and Xylella.

"This strategy has been under development for more than a year and I'm really pleased that a new spirit of cooperation between Federal, State and Territory Agriculture Ministers has seen the strategy finalised and released so soon after the change of government.

"The strategy provides a new strategic direction for Australia's biosecurity system to 2030 and beyond.

"It joins together governments with industry stakeholders as we look to secure Australia's primary industries well into the future.

"By aligning all the key players, we can ensure everyone works together to counter the biosecurity threats we face.

"Australia's biosecurity system is a critical national asset and a shared responsibility, and this strategy is for all Australians.

"It is critical all Australians play their part to safeguard our clean, green, world class biosecurity status."

National Farmers Federation President Fiona Simson said the National Biosecurity Strategy was an important framework to ensure that all parts of our system are best placed to protect Australia from an increasingly complex risk environment.

"A coordinated, well-resourced, and innovative biosecurity system is fundamental to the success of our agricultural industries, and in supporting the goal of becoming a \$100 billion sector by 2030," Ms Simson said.

Chief Executive Officer of the Invasive Species Council Andrew Cox said this was the first time that Australia would have a strategy that sets a direction for our national biosecurity system.

"It is a strategy that will help us protect the many things we value as Australians. I encourage all Australians to find ways they can support it," Mr Cox said.

"The spirit of collaboration that helped create this strategy will be a fundamental element of the modern biosecurity system that will help us withstand the growing challenges that we will all face this decade."

Head of Border and Biosecurity at the Freight & Trade Alliance Sal Milici said it was a privilege to be a reference group member of the National Biosecurity Strategy.

"We look forward to playing our part in implementing the priority areas of the strategy to ensure Australia's biosecurity regime is strengthened with an important focus on also expediting the facilitation of international trade," Mr Milici said.

"These cannot be mutually exclusive."

Find out more about the National Biosecurity Strategy here:
www.biosecurity.gov.au/about/national-biosecurity-committee/nbs

Media contact: Clause 6(1)

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Farley, Lisa (PIRSA)

From: Jones, Lucas (PIRSA)
Sent: Thursday, 25 August 2022 4:29 PM
To: Rhodes, Nathan (PIRSA)
Subject: FW: EMBARGOED MEDIA RELEASE: Xtra strong biosecurity defences at Adelaide airport [SEC=OFFICIAL]
Attachments: Xtra5.png; Xtra3.png; Xtra4.png

OFFICIAL

From: Harding, Roshni (DPC) <Roshni.Harding@sa.gov.au>
Sent: Thursday, 25 August 2022 4:08 PM
To: Scriven, Clare (PIRSA) <Clare.Scriven@sa.gov.au>; Jones, Lucas (PIRSA) <Lucas.Jones@sa.gov.au>; Spencer, Meagan (PIRSA) <Meagan.Spencer@sa.gov.au>
Subject: FW: EMBARGOED MEDIA RELEASE: Xtra strong biosecurity defences at Adelaide airport [SEC=OFFICIAL]

OFFICIAL

From: Clause 6(1)
Sent: Thursday, 25 August 2022 3:05 PM
To: Clause 6(1)
Subject: EMBARGOED MEDIA RELEASE: Xtra strong biosecurity defences at Adelaide airport [SEC=OFFICIAL]

Good afternoon,

Please find below media release about return of Xtra the Detector Dog to Adelaide Airport and attached photos, embargoed until 5am tomorrow morning.

Kind regards,

SENATOR THE HON MURRAY WATT
FEDERAL MINISTER FOR AGRICULTURE, FISHERIES AND FORESTRY

THE HON CLARE SCRIVEN MLC
STATE MINISTER FOR PRIMARY INDUSTRY AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Xtra strong biosecurity defences at Adelaide airport

- **Biosecurity detector dog Xtra has been deployed back to Adelaide as part of Foot and Mouth disease response**
- **All airports with incoming flights from Indonesia now have biosecurity detector dogs**

All airports with flights from Indonesia now have Biosecurity Detector Dogs working to sniff out risk material following Xtra's redeployment to Adelaide International Airport this week.

Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry Senator Murray Watt said Xtra's move back to Adelaide was part of the Australian Government's increased biosecurity measures to keep Foot and Mouth disease (FMD) out of Australia.

"Biosecurity Detector Dogs have become an invaluable part of Australia's extensive biosecurity system to ensure compliance in travellers and keep out exotic pests and diseases," Minister Watt said.

"Xtra alone has made in excess of 2500 detections in his 5-year career as a detector dog across the Sydney, Adelaide and Perth international airports and mail centres.

"Detector dogs have also been redeployed to Darwin and Cairns to increase our measures following Foot and Mouth Disease and Lumpy Skin Disease (LSD) arriving on Australia's doorstep, in Indonesia."

Minister Watt said Xtra returned back to Adelaide after departing for Western Australia in June 2020.

"He worked primarily in the Perth international mail centre and at the shipping ports, as air traveller numbers had dropped due to the pandemic," he said.

"He is now returning to Adelaide International Airport as passenger numbers and biosecurity interventions increase again.

"We have a three-pronged approach to keeping Australia FMD-free, assisting Indonesia control their outbreak, enhancing our preparedness and strengthening our borders.

"Dogs like Xtra will continue to play a vital role in managing the significant biosecurity threats Australia faces."

Minister for Primary Industries and Regional Development Clare Scriven said Xtra will be utilised for both FMD detection and fruit fly defence.

"This is a win for South Australia, further strengthening our strong biosecurity measures," Minister Scriven said.

"I'm delighted that Minister Watt has responded so quickly to my request for a bio security detector dog in Adelaide.

"Working constructively across governments, industry and the community will help in our constant fight against bio security risks.


"Our strong biosecurity measures in South Australia also include increased surveillance and working with our industry on simulations, training and preparedness activities to ensure we keep SA safe from FMD and other exotic pests and diseases."


ENDS


Media contact: Clause 6(1)

Clause 6(1) | Senior Media Advisor
Office of Senator Murray Watt | Labor Senator for Queensland
Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry
Minister for Emergency Management

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Farley, Lisa (PIRSA)

Out of scope

From: Doroudi, Mehdi (PIRSA)
Sent: Wednesday, 13 July 2022 11:27 AM
To: Scriven, Clare (PIRSA) <Clare.Scriven@sa.gov.au>
Cc: Spencer, Meagan (PIRSA) <Meagan.Spencer@sa.gov.au>; Jones, Lucas (PIRSA) <Lucas.Jones@sa.gov.au>; Barclay, Ann (PIRSA) <Ann.Barclay@sa.gov.au>
Subject: FW: For response: AGSOC OOS 07/2022 - National Biosecurity Strategy [SEC=OFFICIAL]

OFFICIAL

Hi Minister,

As discussed, a copy of the biosecurity strategy and the relevant AGSOC paperwork are attached which I need to sign and send back to the AGSOC Secretariat by 15th July.

We will submit you a separate set of paperwork in advance of the next week AGMIN meeting.

Regards

Mehdi

From: AMM-AGSOC <AMM-AGSOC@awe.gov.au>
Sent: Tuesday, 12 July 2022 3:58 PM
To: Metcalfe, Andrew <Andrew.Metcalfe@agriculture.gov.au>; **Clause 6(1)**
Clause 6(1); Doroudi, Mehdi (PIRSA) <mehdi.doroudi@sa.gov.au>;
Clause 6(1)
Clause 6(1)
Cc: **Clause 6(1)**
Clause 6(1); Stark, Lucy (PIRSA)
 <lucy.stark@sa.gov.au>; **Clause 6(1)**
Clause 6(1)

Clause 6(1)

Clause 6(1)

Clause 6(1)

; Poskett, Stephen (PIRSA)

<stephen.poskett@sa.gov.au>; Quinn, Pennv (PIRSA) <Pennv.Quinn@sa.gov.au>; Clause 6(1)

Clause 6(1)

Clause 6(1)

; AMM-AGSOC <AMM-

AGSOC@agriculture.gov.au>; Clause 6(1)

; Stanion, Joanna

<Joanna.Stanion@agriculture.gov.au>; Locke, Chris <Chris.Locke@agriculture.gov.au>; Clause 6(1)

Clause 6(1)

; Karlov, Tim

<Tim.Karlov@agriculture.gov.au>; Lane, Peta <Peta.Lane@agriculture.gov.au>; Clause 6(1)

Clause 6(1)

; Kingston, Amanda <Amanda.Kingston@agriculture.gov.au>;

Clause 6(1)

Clause 6(1)

Subject: For response: AGSOC OOS 07/2022 - National Biosecurity Strategy [SEC=OFFICIAL]

Good afternoon,

Please find attached an out-of-session paper for consideration and response by AGSOC members (Senior Officials) — out-of-session paper 07/2022—National Biosecurity Strategy, with associated attachments and a response proforma.

Grateful if you could please review and return the signed response proforma to the AGSOC secretariat by **12pm AEST, 15 July 2022**. Apologies for the extremely tight timeframe, however pending AGSOC approval, the National Biosecurity Strategy will be circulated to ministers for consideration ahead of the Agriculture Ministers' Meeting scheduled for 20 July 2022.

As foreshadowed earlier today by Secretary Metcalfe, the department is working on some additional case study material. With the country on high alert for Foot and Mouth Disease, Secretary Metcalfe has asked for some additional information on FMD to be included in the Strategy. The existing avian influenza case study is being replaced with an FMD case study that will be circulated to you as soon as possible.

A summary of responses will be made available and circulated via email once the matter is finalised.

Please do not hesitate to get in touch if you have any questions.

Kind regards,

Clause 6(1)

Clause 6(1)

Assistant Director

Rural and Regional Affairs | AGSOC-AMM Secretariat

Engagement Branch | Agvet Chemicals, Fisheries, Forestry and Engagement Division

Telephone: 02 6272 2291 | Email: Clause 6(1)

Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry

18 Marcus Clarke Street, Canberra ACT 2601 Australia

GPO Box 858 Canberra ACT 2601 Australia

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Farley, Lisa (PIRSA)

From: Rhodes, Nathan (PIRSA)
Sent: Sunday, 24 July 2022 5:28 PM
To: Jones, Lucas (PIRSA)
Subject: FW: Mark Schipp's AGMIN presentation, Exercise Paratus information [SEC=OFFICIAL]
Attachments: MarkSchipp_AGMIN_20072022_For distribution.pptx

OFFICIAL

As discussed

Nathan Rhodes | Executive Director

0412 376 450

From: Doroudi, Mehdi (PIRSA) <Mehdi.Doroudi@sa.gov.au>
Sent: Saturday, 23 July 2022 6:38 PM
To: Spark, Elise (PIRSA) <Elise.Spark@sa.gov.au>
Cc: Carr, Mary (PIRSA) <Mary.Carr@sa.gov.au>; Rhodes, Nathan (PIRSA) <Nathan.Rhodes@sa.gov.au>
Subject: FW: Mark Schipp's AGMIN presentation, Exercise Paratus information [SEC=OFFICIAL]

OFFICIAL

Hi Elise, we can use a few of these slides. I will call you to discuss around midday. Still have a few questions for Mary which will try her after midday too. Regards Mehdi

From: Carr, Mary (PIRSA) <Mary.Carr@sa.gov.au>
Sent: Saturday, 23 July 2022 10:20 AM
To: Doroudi, Mehdi (PIRSA) <Mehdi.Doroudi@sa.gov.au>
Subject: Fwd: Mark Schipp's AGMIN presentation, Exercise Paratus information [SEC=OFFICIAL]

OFFICIAL

Hi Mehdi
As requested, no problem using the slides on Monday.
Regards Mary

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From: Schipp, Mark <Mark.Schipp@awe.gov.au>
Sent: Saturday, July 23, 2022 10:14:41 AM
To: Carr, Mary (PIRSA) <mary.carr@sa.gov.au>
Subject: FW: Mark Schipp's AGMIN presentation, Exercise Paratus information [SEC=OFFICIAL]

Mark Schipp
Chief Veterinary Officer (Australia)
OIE Delegate (Australia)

From: Clause 6(1)
Sent: Wednesday, 20 July 2022 5:36 PM
To: AMM-AGSOC <AMM-AGSOC@agriculture.gov.au>
Subject: Mark Schipp's AGMIN presentation, Exercise Paratus information [SEC=OFFICIAL]

Dear AGMIN Secretariat,

As requested at today's event, please find a copy of Dr Mark Schipp's presentation attached.

Please also see below for an overview on Exercise Paratus which was submitted to the World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH):

Dr Mark Schipp, Delegate to the WOAH and Australian Chief Veterinary Officer, Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (DAFF), Canberra, Australia informed the WOAH that an exercise program, Exercise Paratus, will be conducted from December 2021 through to the end of June 2023.

The aim of Exercise Paratus is to explore the role of the Commonwealth during a nationally significant biosecurity emergency and enhance Australia's capability to respond to current and emerging biosecurity threats. The exercise will examine the role of the department alongside Australian Commonwealth Government and inter-jurisdictions responsibilities during a biosecurity crisis.

The objectives of the exercise are to:

1. Practice DAFF's emergency management arrangements to enhance internal capability to respond to national biosecurity emergencies.
2. Explore jurisdictional requirements for support during an escalating biosecurity emergency.
3. Explore the mechanisms for Commonwealth coordination during a biosecurity emergency of national significance.
4. Explore the application of Commonwealth assistance to a biosecurity emergency of national significance.
5. Explore the application of emergency legislative powers, including the Biosecurity Act 2015, and triggers for their use.

Exercise Paratus is a series of graduated exercise activities including seminars, syndicate discussions and functional exercises. The program is being run in an 'all hazards', disease agnostic context where animal, plant and environmental pests and diseases scenarios will be used where relevant.

The majority of the exercises within this program will be virtual (digital/web-based) discussion exercises culminating in a functional exercise in May 2023.

Participants may include states and territories, Australian Commonwealth Government agencies, agricultural and supply chain industry peak bodies and community partners.

For further information, please contact the Exercise Paratus team in the Australian Government Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry at ExerciseParatus@agriculture.gov.au.

Kind regards,

Clause

6(1)

Senior Veterinary Officer | Office of the Chief Veterinary Officer | M.10.105

☎ Clause 6(1) | ✉ Clause 6(1)

Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry
18 Marcus Clarke St, Canberra ACT 2601

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Farley, Lisa (PIRSA)

From: Doroudi, Mehdi (PIRSA)
Sent: Friday, 22 July 2022 11:14 AM
To: Spencer, Meagan (PIRSA); Scriven, Clare (PIRSA)
Subject: FW: UPDATED: FMD national talking points [SEC=OFFICIAL]
Attachments: 220721_FMD_National_TPs_APPROVED_.docx

Importance: High

OFFICIAL

FYI

From: Collins, Jo (PIRSA) <Jo.Collins@sa.gov.au>
Sent: Friday, 22 July 2022 10:44 AM
To: Doroudi, Mehdi (PIRSA) <Mehdi.Doroudi@sa.gov.au>; Barclay, Ann (PIRSA) <Ann.Barclay@sa.gov.au>
Subject: FW: UPDATED: FMD national talking points [SEC=OFFICIAL]
Importance: High

OFFICIAL

FYI Mehdi and Ann. Good talking points here.
 Jo

From: Koleff, Fontella (PIRSA) <Fontella.Koleff2@sa.gov.au>
Sent: Friday, 22 July 2022 9:53 AM
To: Rhodes, Nathan (PIRSA) <Nathan.Rhodes@sa.gov.au>; Carr, Mary (PIRSA) <Mary.Carr@sa.gov.au>; Harding, Roshni (DPC) <Roshni.Harding@sa.gov.au>
Cc: Collins, Jo (PIRSA) <Jo.Collins@sa.gov.au>; Rodrigues, Sam (PIRSA) <Sam.Rodrigues@sa.gov.au>; Rose, Jacinta (PIRSA) <Jacinta.Rose@sa.gov.au>
Subject: FW: UPDATED: FMD national talking points [SEC=OFFICIAL]
Importance: High

OFFICIAL

Hi everyone,

Please see updated national TPs which have just come through this morning.

Thanks,

Fontella

Fontella Koleff | Senior Media Adviser
P: +61 8429 0488 | **E:** Fontella.Koleff2@sa.gov.au

From: Biosecurity NCN <ncn@agriculture.gov.au>
Sent: Friday, 22 July 2022 8:23 AM

To: Jagers, Bronwen <Bronwen.Jagers@agriculture.gov.au>;
Clause 6(1)

Koleff, Fontella (PIRSA) <Fontella.Koleff2@sa.gov.au>; PIRSA:Media <pirsa.media@sa.gov.au>; Brissenden, Celia (PIRSA) <celia.brissenden@sa.gov.au>; Clause 6(1)

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media.liaison.1.scc1e4@emergency.dpi.nsw.gov.au; Clause 6(1)

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crisismedia@homeaffairs.gov.au; Media@austrade.gov.au; Clause 6(1)

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; EAD Preparedness Taskforce

<EADTaskforce@agriculture.gov.au>; Clause 6(1)

; Schipp, Mark

<Mark.Schipp@agriculture.gov.au>; Cookson, Beth <Beth.Cookson@agriculture.gov.au>; Clause 6(1)

Clause 6(1)

; Biosecurity NCN <ncn@agriculture.gov.au>

Subject: UPDATED: FMD national talking points [SEC=OFFICIAL]

Importance: High

Please find attached, updated national talking points on the current situation around foot-and-mouth disease.

You're welcome to use the TPs to inform your communication materials, however we ask they're not directly distributed outside your organisation.

Many thanks, Clause 6(1)

Clause 6(1)

Public Affairs Officer | Biosecurity and Trade Strategic Communication Team
Communication and Media Branch

Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry

John Gorton Building, King Edward Terrace, Parkes ACT 2600 Australia

GPO Box 858 Canberra ACT 2601 Australia

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Farley, Lisa (PIRSA)

From: Rhodes, Nathan (PIRSA)
Sent: Wednesday, 24 August 2022 9:39 AM
To: Spencer, Meagan (PIRSA)
Cc: Doroudi, Mehdi (PIRSA)
Subject: Fwd: Detector Dogs at Adelaide International [SEC=UNOFFICIAL]

As discussed.

Nathan Rhodes - Executive Director

0412 376 450

From: Clause 6(1)
Sent: Wednesday, August 24, 2022 9:03:16 AM
To: Rhodes, Nathan (PIRSA) <Nathan.Rhodes@sa.gov.au>
Cc: Clause 6(1); Fischer, Vikki
 <Vikki.Fischer@agriculture.gov.au>; Cooper, Barbara <Barbara.Cooper@agriculture.gov.au>
Subject: Detector Dogs at Adelaide International [SEC=UNOFFICIAL]

Hi Nathan,

It was great to catch up when I was in Adelaide last month, and apologies for the delay in getting back to you – It's been an extremely busy time rolling our FMD measures, and re-opening airports.

As way of follow-up, this week we have commenced with the detector dog at Adelaide international airport. Joel Willis' team from Detection Capability and the Travellers Policy and Operations are currently working through the risk assessment process and the re-settling of the detector dog.

As discussed, and over time there is the possibility of the detector dog being used for both international and domestic flights, noting your comments regarding protecting South Australia from fruit fly, in particular, from Western Australia. This also assist us with keeping the detector dog agile. Our priority remains with international travellers, plus FMD, and I suggest to progress this, can you please provide a contact for Joel's team to understand how we can work together moving forward. We also discussed the possibility of a joint Minister's media release and happy to progress once we have established our joint plans.

Many thanks Nathan, and happy to chat further.

Clause 6(1)

Kind regards

Clause 6(1)

Principal Director | Travellers, Mail & Detector Dogs | Phone: Clause 6(1) | Mobile: Clause 6(1)
 Executive Assistant, Vicki Matuzik Clause 6(1) - Clause 6(1)

Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry
 Pathway Operations | Biosecurity Operations Division
 24 Fricker Road Perth Airport. WA 6105 Australia
 GPO Box 858 Canberra. ACT 2601
agriculture.gov.au
biosecurity.gov.au



The department acknowledges the Traditional Custodians of Australia and their continuing connection to land, sea environment, water and community. We pay our respect to the Traditional Custodians, their culture, and elders both past and present.

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Southern Australia Exotic Animal Disease: Scenario based discussion

Date: Tuesday, 16 August 2022

Time: 13:00 – 16:00 ACST

Location: Police Communications Building
20 Carrington Street
ADELAIDE SA 5000

Teams link **Join on your computer or mobile app**
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Meeting ID: 478 085 703 128
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Or call in (audio only)
[+61 2 7208 4914](#) [578835004#](#) Australia, Sydney
Phone Conference ID: 578 835 004#

Agenda Item	Speaker	Time
1. Introduction and acknowledgment of country	Professor Mehdi Doroudi PSM, GAICD	10 mins
2. Overview of Exotic Animal Disease Preparation Task Force	Kerren Crosthwaite	5 mins
3. Overview of discussion, including: <ul style="list-style-type: none">AimObjectivesMethodologyScope	Joe Buffone PSM	15 mins
4. Overview of scenario	Joe Buffone PSM	5 mins
5. Threat effects: most dangerous	Joe Buffone PSM	5 mins
6. Coordination architecture	All	25 mins
7. Movement control	All	25 mins
8. Tracing and surveillance	All	25 mins
9. Vaccination	All	25 mins
10. Destruction, disposal and decontamination	All	25 mins
11. Known issues, novel risks and mitigation	All	10 mins
12. Questions and closing	Joe Buffone PSM	5 mins

Attendees

Name	Position	Agency
Aimee Templeman	XO to SEOCON	New South Wales Police
Andrew Crisp	Emergency Management Commissioner	Victoria Police Emergency Management Victoria
Beth Cookson	D/Australian Chief Veterinary Officer	Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry
Bruce Byatt	Deputy Chief Officer	Tasmania Fire Service
Chris Ipkendanz	Director, Preparedness	Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry
Chris Locke	Deputy Secretary, Biosecurity and Compliance	Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry
Col Blanch	Deputy Commissioner (Specialist Services)	WA Police
Craig Bickell	Assistant Secretary, National Crisis Planning and Coordination	Emergency Management Australia, Department of Home Affairs
Darren Klemm	Fire Commissioner	Department of Fire and Emergency Services, Western Australia
Donna Adams	Commissioner	Tasmania Police
Dr Bronwyn Hendry	Animal Health, Surveillance and Monitoring	Animal Health Australia
Dr Therese Wright	Emergency Animal Disease Response Agreement	Animal Health Australia
Graham Cooke	Chief Veterinary Officer	Department of Jobs, Precincts and Regions
Grant Stevens	Commissioner	South Australia Police
Janelle Brooks	Director Conservation Programs	Office of the Environment and Heritage
Jasmyn Lynch	Senior Director - Planning and Policy	Conservation, Biosecurity, Biodiversity and Water Directorate
Joe Buffone	Director General	Emergency Management Australia, Department of Home Affairs
John Tracey	Deputy Director General Biosecurity and Food Safety	Department of Primary Industries
Katherine Clift	Executive Director Biosecurity	Department of Jobs, Precincts and Regions
Kathleen Plowman	CEO	Animal Health Australia
Kerren Crosthwaite	First Assistant Secretary	Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry
Kevin Dewitte	Chief Veterinary Officer	Biosecurity Tasmania
Mark Shipp	Australian Chief Veterinary Officer	Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry
Mary Carr	Chief Veterinary Officer	Primary Industries and Regions SA
Mia Carbon	Executive Director	Department of Primary Industries and Regional Development, Western Australia
Michelle Rodan	Chief Veterinary Officer	Department of Primary Industries and Regional Development, Western Australia

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Name	Position	Agency
Nathan Rhodes	Executive Director of Biosecurity	Department of Primary Industries and Regions
Neil Gaughan	Chief Police Officer	Australian Capital Territory Police
Peta Lane	First Assistant Secretary, Biosecurity Strategy and Reform	Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry
Peter Thurtell	SEOCON	New South Wales Police
Rae Burrows	Director Biosecurity Operations	Department of Primary Industries, Parks, Water and Environment
Samantha Allan	General Manager, Emergency Preparedness, Animal Health and Biosecurity	Animal Health Australia
Sarah Britton	Chief Veterinary Officer	NSW Department of Primary Industries
Steven Hegarty	Deputy SEOCON	New South Wales Police
Wendy Townsend	Chief Veterinary Officer	Territory and Municipal Services Directorate, ACT Government